Mediating madness: mental illness and public discourse in current affairs television by Simon Cross (2273971)
 
 
 
This item is held in Loughborough University’s Institutional Repository 
(https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/) and was harvested from the British Library’s 
EThOS service (http://www.ethos.bl.uk/). It is made available under the 
following Creative Commons Licence conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
For the full text of this licence, please go to: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ 
 
MEDIATING MADNESS: MENTAL ILLNESS AND 
PUBLIC DISCOURSE IN CURRENT AFFAIRS 
TELEVISION. 
BY 
SIMON CROSS 
A DOCTORAL THESIS 
SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS 
FOR THE AWARD OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY OF 
LOUGHBOROUGH UNIVERSITY 
1999 
SUPERVISOR: MR. GRAHAM MURDOCK 
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCES 
Abstract 
This thesis examines the public character of television and the various ways it works as 
communication. Drawing on a case study of recent British current affairs programmes 
dealing with mental health issues it explores the interplay between television form and 
content. The first part acknowledges television as the pivotal medium of the 
contemporary public sphere and situates its various organisations of language and 
imagery at the heart of programme makers' attempts to produce meaningful and 
entertaining programmes. Against the grain of those who see television as an arational 
technology, a case is made for its relevance as a vocal space for all citizens. However, in 
the historical context of British broadcasting, the differential distribution of 
communicative entitlements entreats us to view access to discursive space as a principle 
which soon runs up against its limits. The second half of this thesis explores the 
shortcomings of this system in relation to `expert' and lay people's access to a public 
voice on mental health issues. The recent transition from the asylum to Community Care 
invites an intermingling of voices in which the authority of this or that brand of 
professional knowledge cannot be taken for granted. The re-entry of ex-mental patients 
into the community also provides programme makers with opportunities to promote new 
forms of social solidarity based on `thick descriptions' of the person rather than the 
patient. The case-study presented here suggests however, that participation in televised 
forms of debate and argumentation does not match the promises of post-modem rhetoric. 
Despite the airing of new voices and the presentation of new controversies, British 
television's treatment of mental illness continues to revolve around established 
hierarchies of knowledge and a depiction of the (ex-)mental patient as less than a fully 
cognizant citizen. Visual techniques play a crucial role in this process. By recycling 
familiar images of madness as dangerous and unpredictable, people with a history of 
schizophrenic illness remain enmeshed in a web of psychiatric 'otherness' which 
undermines their credibility as speakers. 
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Introduction 
Introduction 
The roots of this thesis lie in the professional and academic experiences of two very 
different people. The first, a nervous, though excited, eighteen-year old student 
psychiatric nurse about to embark on a very `adult' career caring for the mentally ill. 
The second, a slightly maturer undergraduate pursuing studies in media and 
communication. Both these figures have left an indelible mark on what follows. 
Readers will perhaps not be surprised to learn that I am writing of myself. Three years 
training as a student nurse and one year spent as a registered mental nurse not only 
provided me with a ready supply of "gallows humour" about my role as a psychiatric 
nurse, but also a lasting interest in the social and cultural questions raised by the 
mentally ill and in particular their representation in the media. 
Throughout my nurse training I encountered numerous criticisms within professional 
nursing and medical writing, as well as in general conversation with friends and 
colleagues, about the media treatment of mental disorder. The following example 
from a popular nursing text-book is not untypical: `The media have enthusiastically 
capitalised on public fear, credulity and superstition and contributed in no small way 
to a negative `mythology of madness' which has perpetuated destructive and absurd 
stereotypes about mental disorder' (Lyttle, 1986: 88). Although such comments added 
little of substance to my growing interest in this topic, they did help to fertilise the 
germ of an idea that I might one day research this issue more closely. 
A year after qualifying as a nurse I began a degree course in Communication Studies. 
Towards the end of my second year I began to search for published work on the 
British media's treatment of mental illness with a view to writing a final year 
dissertation on the topic. I found only one article, dating back to 1957, and 
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pragmatically decided to abandon the idea in favour of a `better resourced' topic. My 
idea of exploring `mental illness and the media' was postponed but not abandoned. 
After graduation, and with some time on my hands, a more substantial literature 
search on the topic again yielded little. Whilst this was frustrating the thought then 
occurred that here was an exciting research opportunity. 
Initially, my intention was to produce a definitive analysis of mental illness 
representations across the whole range of British media thus heroically filling the 
sizeable knowledge gap I had encountered. Fortunately, the guiding hand of 
supervision rescued me from such lofty ambitions and oriented me towards a more 
sensible and manageable project. Looking back now, on those first weeks and months 
of research design, my eventual choice of television as the central focus for my thesis 
appears inevitable. 
Like others of my generation, television has been a constant in my life. Throughout 
my childhood and teenage years, and into my adult life, my relationship with the `box 
in the corner' has proved enduring. It would be hackneyed to claim that television is 
like one of the family but like individual members of my family, it has the capacity to 
make me laugh or cry, give pleasure or pain, make me think critically or sometimes 
not even think at all. Choosing to study television, then, pays homage to its centrality 
in my own life but also in the life of the nation. 
Television is the popular cultural form par excellence. That it is both the nation's 
main leisure activity and its major forum for public debate, fascinates me. 
Understanding how television does what it does, how it actually communicates its 
myriad contents, inevitably led on to my central interest in understanding its 
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contrasting forms of presentation. The main aim in this thesis, then, is to pursue my 
fascination with the medium's forms through an analysis of its performance as a 
forum for public debate about mental illness. Drawing on case-studies of the 
representation of mental illness within the major forms of contemporary current 
affairs television the thesis attempts to understand broadcast TV as both a system of 
signification and an organised arena of public representation. 
Television in Context 
This is a particularly interesting moment to explore this area since the last few years 
have seen major, and more or less simultaneous, shifts in both the television and 
mental health systems, and also in the relations between them. In the field of mental 
health, we have seen a shift from asylums to care in the community. Within the 
television system, we have witnessed the emergence of a `new populism'. 
As applied to television, populism draws our attention to two trends: 
1. The intensified search for ratings, prompted by the arrival of a more competitive, 
commercialised broadcasting environment. Coalition building in order to maximise 
audiences has become an even more pressing economic imperative. This has 
precipitated an increasing break with the varieties of paternalism associated with the 
ethos of public service. Programmes are now increasingly organised around what 
audiences demand rather than what they need. There is an accelerating shift of 
emphasis from analysis to entertainment. 
This movement has produced a decentering of professional expertise and an increased 
emphasis on common sense and everyday experience. As a number of commentators 
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have argued, this is particularly evident in the participatory talk shows which now 
occupy many of the spaces previously monopolised by current affairs programming. 
2. The intensification of populist television is not confined to building coalitions at the 
level of the viewing audience. As the talk shows illustrate, it also includes ordinary 
people as central contributors, and in its more radical forms, exemplified by Video 
Diaries, as producers and editors. 
Questions of Representation 
The arrival of populist television in all its variants, reopens questions around 
representation. In approaching this issue it is important to hold on to both the main 
sense of the term in English. Representation raises; 
1. Questions about social delegation - who is entitled to speak on whose behalf? What 
responsibility do they owe to their constituents? 
2. and, questions about cultural forms and genres - how should the interplay of 
discourses and the relations between speech and image be organised within the 
programme? 
The rise of populist forms of representation decentres and challenges what we might 
call the classic forms of documentary and current affairs (strongly allied to the notion 
of public service and the viewer-as-citizen). Classic forms have several 
characteristics: 
" they are problem or issue oriented 
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" they set out to investigate not only the state of things, but their causes, and to 
evaluate possible interventions 
9 the contributions of experts are therefore central 
" ordinary people appear as primarily raw data - they either exemplify a problem or 
are cast as victims. 
In contrast, populist forms: 
" centre on the articulation of everyday experience. They are built around first-hand 
testimony 
" experts are either absent, marginal or denigrated. 
Populist forms of television offer descriptions of experience - of varying `thickness' - 
but they usually provide little or no analysis. They invite viewers to share an 
experience (to identify with the speaker) but they do not provide formal certificated 
knowledge or mobilise political evaluations. As a number of critics have argued, this 
presents problems for television's role as the central institution within the 
contemporary public sphere. 
Mental Illness in Context 
The move towards populist programming within television has coincided, in Britain, 
with a major shift in the organisation of the mental health system - from asylums to 
community care. By altering the discursive field around mental health in important 
ways, this development has presented programme makers with a range of new 
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challenges and opportunities. Not only are those involved in community-based mental 
health care more accessible than the personnel of the old asylums the mentally ill 
themselves are also more visible and publicly vocal than they were. They can be 
talked to and talk for themselves in a variety of settings. 
At the same time, mentally ill people present a unique conundrum for programme 
makers not shared by any other minority group lobbying for greater access. In the case 
of schizophrenics for example, their claims to speak authoritatively about their 
experiences are substantially undermined by the dominant public perception of them 
as `unreliable' witnesses, subject to hallucinations, delusions, `flights of fantasy' and 
violent tendencies. This prevailing image of the mad as unable to advance a `rational' 
or competent argument poses problems for populist television's attempt to construct 
programmes about mental illness and mental patients around first-hand testimony. 
Mental Illness and Populist Television 
The more or less contemporaneous shifts in the television and mental health systems 
invite consideration of the terms on which mentally ill people are given a public 
voice. In order to address this issue, the thesis presents detailed exploration of 
`classic' forms of current affairs television alongside more recent populist forms. 
Populist television appears, in principle, a suitable arena for housing first-hand 
testimonies about the experience of mental illness and community care. Free from the 
dead weight of paternalism, so the argument goes, the potential is that a process of 
recognition might ensue in which mentally ill people speak, not as illustrations of 
medicalized deviance, but as citizens of the wider national community. At the very 
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least, one might anticipate that certain forms of populist television (such as Video 
Diaries) herald a more relaxed encounter between `rational society' and those 
historically and culturally defined as `irrational individuals'. 
However, populist television also generates concern about the place and function of 
expertise in public debate. Certainly, paternalism's established hierarchies of insight 
and knowledge appear squeezed by the promotion of vernacular discourses. This 
generates problems vis-ä-vis populist television's ability to underwrite viewers' rights 
to knowledge about mental health related issues. Together, the re-organization of the 
mental health system, and the shift towards populist forms of public representation, 
generate uncertainty about the role of analysis and explanation in public debate about 
mental illness. How this problem is handled both within and across a range of current 
affairs programming forms a substantial component of the second half of the present 
thesis. 
An Outline of the Thesis 
Underpinning this study of television's performance as a public forum is the core 
assumption that for all its inadequacies and failures, the medium has significantly 
contributed to democratic public life. The first chapter builds on recent debates in 
social theory concerning the conditions of public debate in the contemporary world, 
paying particular attention to the influential Habermasian ideal of the bourgeois public 
sphere and the limitations this dialogical model presents for an adequate 
understanding of television as a public forum for organising discourse and imagery. 
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Following a discussion of TV documentary's attempts to re-present knowledge and 
truth, the chapter goes on to explore radical objections to the medium's 
representational practices. The work of Baudrillard and Postman serve as important 
illustrations of a recent tendency within critical theory to downgrade and distrust 
television as a space for reordering discourse and images. The chapter rejects such 
criticisms and makes a case for acknowledging public broadcasting as a significant 
cultural achievement which, in principle, allows all citizens access to a public voice. 
The theme of the citizenry's access to a public voice is taken up in Chapter Two. 
Here, we outline the general principles of public service broadcasting and link them to 
the current tendency within media studies which views public broadcasting as the 
modern embodiment of the public sphere ideal. The chapter interprets the history of 
professional programme making within the British public broadcasting system as a 
progressive opening up of opportunities to access a common discursive space. 
At the same time, the chapter also explores the difficulties of constructing a public 
voice. It is argued that professional notions of how best to organise public discourse 
has resulted in a constant struggle over what constitutes a fair and equal distribution 
of communicative entitlements. The chapter explores the long-standing tension 
between 'access' and `exclusion' firstly within radio and, later, television. It 
concludes by exploring the rise of populist programme forms and the discursive 
opportunities they give to marginal or excluded voices. 
Chapter Three traces the rise of modem psychiatry against the backdrop of the 
movement from asylum systems to the current ascendancy of multi-disciplinary, 
community-based, care. The controversial nature of the psychiatric enterprise 
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provides an essential backdrop to understanding the competing medical and social 
models of mental illness mobilised in public discourse. 
The lack of consensus surrounding the meaning of `mental illness' finds its apotheosis 
in the disputes around the concept of schizophrenia. The chapter considers the long- 
standing opposition to this most contested of medical categories. This acts as a 
prelude to a broader discussion of other contested issues within the contemporary 
mental health field, including: the provision of community care; the labelling of voice 
hearers as mentally ill; the use of drugs to treat mental disorder; and racism in 
psychiatry. 
The aim of the fourth chapter is twofold. It seeks, firstly, to locate contemporary 
media representations of madness within the general Western artistic tradition of 
portraying madness as radical difference and the mentally ill as 'others', set apart 
from `normal' society. Secondly, it provides a bridge between the general issues 
raised in the first part of the thesis and the specific case-studies of contemporary 
television's organisation of discourse about mental illness which follow. The chapter 
develops a number of methodological points about qualitative cultural analysis and 
argues that television programmes are distinct cultural forms and should be analysed 
as such. It concludes with a synopsis of the individual programmes, which are 
analysed in detail in the chapters which follow. 
Chapter Five presents an analysis of the ways that television current affairs 
programmes mobilise and relate to the voices of psychiatric expertise. It starts from 
the reorganisation of community-based mental health services which has, it is argued, 
helped decentre the psychiatric profession as the sole source of relevant expertise and 
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authority on the causes and treatment of mental illness. It then explores how far 
different forms of actuality programming accept or reject a traditional `hierarchy of 
expertise' in which medical knowledge is placed at the top. 
Drawing on examples from a range of contrasting programmes the chapter shows that 
a plurality of expert voices are given an opportunity to speak. By paying attention to 
the mediating role of programme form and formats, the chapter explores how 
competing discourses of expertise are granted credibility and precedence both within 
and across particular programmes. While there are any number of people with strong 
claims to "know about" mental illness, the chapter seeks to argue that the regulating 
impact of a programme's form is the crucial factor in determining who is (or is not) 
defined as an `expert'. 
Chapter Six advances the argument that those with a diagnosis of schizophrenia are 
still perceived within the frame of mental patienthood despite their return to `the 
community' and their reinstatement as `ordinary' citizens. It tests this proposition 
through a detailed analysis of the terms on which schizophrenics are given a voice 
within the current affairs programmes chosen for detailed study. 
The chapter illustrates how a range of contrasting current affairs formats give voice to 
the schizophrenic experience. However, it also reveals how, in giving public accounts 
of their experiences, they are often rendered vulnerable to censure and disapprobation. 
Chapter Seven argues that the key to understanding television as both a significatory 
system and a forum of public representation lies in the shifting relations between 
speech and image. Focusing on the visual depiction of madness in the case study 
programmes, the chapter explores the continuities between traditional iconographies 
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of madness and contemporary television. The chapter shows how long standing 
representations of madness as `difference' are recycled by programme makers thus 
helping to undermine the credibility and competence of schizophrenics when they are 
given a public voice. 
(Re-) Constructing Public Voices: A Reflexive Issue 
Throughout this thesis the notion of a `public voice' is very much to the fore and (as 
just outlined) the three core chapters explore in detail how the public voices of mental 
health professionals and their patients are managed within the television system. But 
amongst the plethora of voices presented one voice remains elusive. My own. With 
psychiatry's transition from the closed, secretive, world of the asylum, a wide range 
of actors have emerged to tell their stories of psychiatry's past, present and possible 
future. I am no exception. This thesis aims to tell a story concerning how the public 
voices of those with specialist knowledge and/or grounded experience of mental 
illness are presently treated by programme makers. In order to tell this story I have 
necessarily established myself as a voice of authority within the text. In other words, I 
have become an authoritative interpreter of other people's authoritative interpretations 
of psychiatry and mental illness. In order to achieve my goal I have selected extracts 
of testimony and visual images that best suit my own argumentative and rhetorical 
interests. 
Consequently, my analysis is not neutral. In this it is not alone however. By drawing 
attention to the constructed nature of my argument I hope to highlight the constructed 
nature of all arguments, including those arguments whose construction within the 
television programmes under consideration here form the core of this thesis. I refer 
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not simply to the arguments of those whose testimonies have been directly presented 
here, but to the arguments of those programme makers whose work I have chosen to 
analyse. As a former nurse with an academic interest in television's representation of 
social issues I am very aware that I have a particular stake in making sense of how 
television makes sense of mental health issues. 
The problem of reflexivity reminds us that all attempts at understanding are an 
expression of our preconceptions every bit as much as it may contain (we hope) a 
kernel of truth. Writing about other people's writings about the experience of 
madness, Roy Porter (1987: 233) wisely notes that there is no definitive reading of a 
text: `Texts', he says, `are up for grabs. I have offered one interpretation. I must leave 
my interpretation to the interpreters, my analysis to the analysts'. With genuine thanks 
to Porter, I propose to do the same. 
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Television and Public Discourse 
18 
Television and Public Discourse 
Introduction: The Communicative Character of Television 
Television has become, for better or worse, the pivot of the public sphere in 
contemporary society. Underpinning its centrality is its ability to communicate, 
something, anything, to those viewing. This is both simple and complex. Of course 
television "communicates". This is its function. That is what it does. But how 
television works as communication, how it addresses its audiences, is a matter of 
interest since it is the basis of the medium's social, political and cultural power. It is 
the meaningful organization of words and images into programmes that are both 
listenable to and watchable that drives our desire to engage with its output (Scannell, 
1996). Consequently, enquiring into the communicative character of television is 
crucial for understanding the nature of the contemporary public sphere. Through a 
formal analysis of television's particular organisations of signification we can begin to 
come to terms with its significance as a medium of `public communication' and a key 
resource for common knowledge and discussion. 
Unfortunately, the analysis of television as a communicative medium has tended to 
take second place to debate about `television as ideology' or `television as social 
control' within media and cultural studies. These perspectives have tended to 
homogenise television, as in statements which begin: "television is... " or "television 
causes... ". As Scannell (1992: 339) points out, `The effect of this approach is to read 
off all the output of... [television] as if it works in the same way, as if there were no 
difference between the `discourses' or `practices' of news, documentary, drama or 
entertainment'. One possible explanation for this is the sheer ubiquity of television, its 
taken for granted presence (and pleasure) in everyday life. In contrast, the present 
work emphasises the variety of televisual forms and genres and sets out to explore the 
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differences in the way they organise available discourses and systems of visual 
representation taking recent debates on the care of the mentally ill as a particular 
focus. 
The study of television as communication is part of a wider theoretical concern with 
understanding the discursive practices of contemporary society, including their 
performative aspects in general and television discourse in particular. 
a 
Nowhere have these issues been more strongly contested than in the `debate' between 
Jurgen Habermas and Jean-Francois Lyotard concerning the status of knowledge in 
the modern/post-modern era. What is at stake here is nothing less than the 
possibility/impossibility of arriving at a `successful' outcome of communication-in- 
practice in which interlocutors arrive at some consensus on `knowledge' and `truth', 
however provisional. 
Lyotard: The Post-modern Condition 
Lyotard's analysis of the condition of knowledge in contemporary capitalist society, 
advanced in his seminal book The Postmodern Condition (1986), distinguishes 
strongly between `narrative' and the `scientific' modes of thought. While the former 
embraces the legitimizing function that myths and stories have played in giving 
meaning and significance to our lives, the latter rests solely on appeals to the `facts'. 
According to Lyotard (ibid: 29) this appeal is doomed to failure since `scientific 
knowledge cannot know and make known that it is the true knowledge without 
resorting to that other, narrative, kind of knowledge, which from its point of view is 
no knowledge'. In making this argument Lyotard signalled both his rejection of 
Enlightenment social theory and philosophy, and his abandonment of the 
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`metanarratives of modernity' including the `progressive spirit of understanding' and 
`humanity as the hero of liberty' (Silverstone, 1986). 
Instead of delivering progress, the metanarratives of modernity (Reason, Science, 
Wealth, the Proletariat) have, Lyotard argues, legitimated everything `from war, 
revolution, nuclear arsenals and concentration camps to social engineering, 
Taylorism, Fordist production models and the Gulag. The collapse of faith in these 
meta-narratives heralds what he calls the `post-modern condition" (Hebdige, 1989: 
79). More pointedly, he sees metanarratives as terroristic attempts to impose a unitary 
meaning or truth on societies whose dynamic and constantly evolving character eludes 
such attempts at `total' comprehension. For Lyotard `it is sufficient simply to point to 
the dark deeds of the 20th century, in particular the bloody acts of Fascism and 
Stalinism, in order to blacken the entire Enlightenment project' (Dews (ed. ), 1986: 
27) 
Lyotard's definition of post-modernity as `incredulity towards metanarratives' 
supports a celebration of fragmentation and plurality, and sees the field of 
contemporary knowledge as characterised by heterogeneous claims, in which science 
is no longer guaranteed a privileged place. Underpinning this perspective is a 
comprehensive rejection of the Enlightenment concept of reason and of the `unities' 
of representation, of meaning, of theory, and ultimately of the self. Lyotard's post- 
modernism is above all an assault on unity and totalisation and a turn towards `local' 
factors or explanations. 
Lyotard goes on to suggest that the metanarratives of modernity have been caught up 
in this shift and are now `irreparably fragmented into a multiplicity of "language- 
games" whose truth-claims are localised, and which are played with an ironic 
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consciousness of their relativity' (Dews, 1986: 68). By drawing on the 
Wittgensteinian notion of the `language game', he attempts to counter the coercion 
that he sees inherent within critical theory's search for systematicity and universality - 
a position he identifies with Habermas. In contrast, the notion of the language game 
offers a vision of society as unstable, heteromorphous and dispersed. 
For Lyotard, knowledge is always produced within particular `discourses' targeted at 
specific audiences each of which have their own criterion of accreditation. As Boyne 
and Rattansi (op. cit.: 18) make clear: 
in discussing post-modem science as `the search for instabilities', Lyotard 
suggests that social development in the post-modem epoch... will be a 
pragmatic matter of inventing new rules whose validity will reside in their 
effectivity rather than in their compatibility with some legitimating discourse. 
His concern with the "what happens" of language reveals an emphasis on 
communicative performance. The legitimacy of knowledge no longer lies in outdated 
or defunct metanarratives but in the `agonistics', the rhetorical jousting, of 
interlocutors within localized contexts of interaction. 
For Lyotard, the domination of science is no longer sustainable in an age that 
recognises no agreed criteria of justification in any sphere of human knowledge. 
Rather, it becomes one discourse amongst many. His aim is to go beyond a modernist 
reliance upon `expert' testimony and to look instead towards difference and a 
toleration of the irreducible plurality of local narratives, whose survival owes less to 
some generalisable notion of `truth' and more to a pragmatic ability to certify 
themselves as true through their effectivity in actual speech situations. This desire to 
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take difference seriously is acknowledged as one of post-modem theory's greatest 
strengths (K. Thompson, 1992). 
Habermas: in defence of modernity 
In a project spanning nearly four decades Habermas has emerged as the foremost 
defender of the Enlightenment legacy. His defence rests upon a truly massive research 
undertaking unrivalled in post-war social theory. He offers a critical theory which has 
as its aim nothing less than the re-structuring of social institutions so as to maximise 
the scope for what he calls "rational collective will formation". The problems which 
he grapples with are of major importance since they concern the vitally important 
questions of collective decision-making and the establishment of a common political 
will. His critical theory raises the central problem of how to establish within the fibres 
of civil society, channels of communication that are free from both market and state 
interference and which are guided only by a democratic commitment to the `public 
good' (Tomlinson, 1983). 
Habermas has pursued the idea of communicative rationality in an attempt to 
overcome the theoretical impasse experienced by the early Frankfurt School theorists 
in their attempt to adapt Marxism to the predicaments of twentieth century culture 
(Held, 1976). Adorno and Horkheimer were concerned with confronting what they 
saw as the `degradation of reason'. Far from being a critical tool in the service of 
humanity, reason had become, in their view, a central source of domination - an 
`instrument' - in the service of capitalism. A major criticism of this position is that 
they painted themselves into a theoretical corner from which no practical 
emancipatory project could develop. In response, Habermas sets out to provide not 
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only a critical understanding of the repressive dimensions of instrumental reason, but 
to suggest ways we might overcome it and develop an emancipatory dynamic. 
He begins this task with a consideration of language as the unique and universal 
medium of human social life. This is summed up in the following passage from his 
inaugural lecture which has guided his theory of communication ever since: 
The human interest in autonomy and responsibility is not mere fancy, it can be 
apprehended a priori. What raises us out of nature is the only thing whose 
nature we can know; Language. Through its structure, autonomy and 
responsibility are posited for us. Our first sentence expresses unequivocally 
the intention of universal and unconstrained consensus (Habermas quoted in 
Tomlinson 1983: p. 78 ). 
According to Habermas, the very fact we are language users means we are able to 
reach an understanding with other people. However, in his view, as capitalist society 
has developed so communication has become colonised by a `technical interest' 
which unfolds through work and instrumental action, and in particular, the 
development of technology. In order to control this dynamic it is necessary that 
people communicate with one another, generating what Habermas calls the 
`communicative interest'. In his view however, the communicative interest has 
become marginalised within late capitalism, which is problematic since the purpose of 
the technical and communicative interests he argues, is to enable a third interest - the 
emancipatory interest - to emerge, the goal of which is the achievement of the "good 
life", free from domination. Following Marcuse's critique of `one-dimensional 
society' (Marcuse, 1964) Habermas argues that the technical interest, which should 
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function in the best interests of society, has been commandeered by the pursuit of 
profit for its own sake and operates instrumentally. 
While Habermas's basic concerns are clearly indebted to his intellectual forbears in 
the Frankfurt School, he is also critical of them. He believes that because the tradition 
of critical theory instigated by Adorno and Horkheimer neglected the communicative 
and emancipatory interest, it produced a one-sided account of contemporary society. 
According to Habermas, their desire to focus critical attention on instrumental reason 
led them to operate with a skewed conception of rationality. Habermas seeks to 
address this imbalance by asserting the primacy of the communicative and 
emancipatory interests. Indeed, for him, the emancipatory interest is inherent within 
the communicative interest. The cornerstone of his theoretical model is the distinction 
he makes between instrumental rationality and communicative rationality. It is the 
latter concept, grounded in an appreciation of `negotiated intersubjectivity and 
normative thinking' (Dahlgren 1995: 99) that connects him securely to the positive 
foundations of the Enlightenment project and places him in opposition to the post- 
modern analysis offered by Lyotard. 
Habermas's opposition to Lyotard is grounded in his theory of communicative action. 
This is designed to be both a universally valid account of the conditions of meaningful 
social interaction and a yardstick for measuring the performance of social interaction 
free from the distorting and paralysing effects of power. The guiding idea is that 
consensually regulated conflict is the highest developmental phase of societal 
learning. Drawing on the speech act theory of Austin and Searle, Habermas has 
sought to give substance to the consensual nature of speech acts: 
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Every speech act... involves certain validity claims, which express the 
speaker's intentions to be understood, to tell the truth, to do so sincerely, and 
in an appropriate manner. The objective of any speech-act is to come to an 
understanding, that is, `to bring about an agreement that terminates in the 
intersubjective mutuality of reciprocal understanding, shared knowledge, 
mutual trust, and accord with one another' (Callinicos, 1983: 142). 
Extending a paradigm offered by Chomskian linguistics, Habermas has elaborated 
what he calls a `universal pragmatics' the task of which is `to identify and reconstruct 
universal conditions of understanding' (Habermas quoted in Tomlinson, op. cit.: 76). 
Universal pragmatics aims to define the terms for `communicative competence'. This 
involves the negotiation of `validity claims' concerning: the truth of statements, the 
appropriateness of what is said, the comprehendability of what is said, and the 
sincerity of the discursive engagement. Ordinarily, these claims are taken for granted 
and remain unquestioned. However, they may be taken to task by interlocutors. Once 
challenged, the tacit claims to truth and appropriateness must be made good in order 
for communication to proceed towards consensus. This model anticipates a resolution 
of questions/conflict even if in practice this is not feasible. That is to say, it anticipates 
a situation in which speech is free from coercive influence and all that prevails is the 
`force of the better argument'. 
The conditions for this are contained in what Habermas famously calls the `ideal 
speech situation'; a situation which is characterized by its regulation of speech acts 
according to a general requirement of `symmetry'. It must allow all parties an equal 
opportunity to initiate or interrupt lines of argument, to make or question assertions, to 
give or demand explanations, and to express and elicit subjective feelings and 
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emotions. Like the presupposition of consensus, this is an ideal, counterfactual, 
situation. Nonetheless, Habermas's point is that it functions as an optimal formal 
standard for discursive interaction and provides an anchor in the pragmatics of 
communication, for ideology critique (Tomlinson, 1983). This is underlined by 
Habermas's interpretation of ideology as `systematically distorted communication'. 
Habermas's stress upon the primordiality of communication and its role in the 
regulation of conflict through the construction of consensus is for Lyotard, anathema. 
His opposition is predicated on his belief that `the connection between legitimacy and 
consensus found in Habermas does violence to the heterogeneity of language games' 
(Holub, 1991: 140). His critique center's on Habermas's attempt to regularize 
communication as a normative ideal. By generalising his theory of a universal 
pragmatics and his notion of an `ideal speech situation', Lyotard believes Habermas 
does grave injustice to the multiplicity of language games whose claims to truth are 
always localized. For Lyotard, legitimation is local and provisional and consists in 
permitting the generation of new ideas both in science and at the level of social 
practice. A politics based on his notion of `paralogy' (the creation of new language 
"moves" and the interruption of consensus) `would respect both the desire for justice 
and the desire for the unknown' (Lyotard, op. cit.: 67). 
Habermas and Lyotard. " consensus versus dissensus 
Lyotard's objections to Habermas's communicative theory rests on the view that 
Habermas is really only offering another outmoded metanarrative of emancipation 
and that totalising theories are now defunct in the face of localized narratives which 
simply "do their stuff' (Rorty, 1985). Against this, Habermas argues that the problem 
posed by `incredulity towards metanarratives' is one of `context-dependency' that 
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leaves us unable to distinguish the rational from the non-rational. For him, this is 
unacceptable since it betrays the social hope central to liberal politics: the possibility 
of developing universal standards of critique with the aim of constructing rational 
proposals for change to existing institutions (Tomlinson, op. cit. ). It is for this reason 
that Habermas disparagingly labels Lyotard a `neo-conservative'. Rorty sums up the 
difference between Habermas and Lyotard thus: 
... we 
find French critics of Habermas ready to abandon liberal politics in order 
to avoid universalistic philosophy, and Habermas trying to hang on to 
universalistic philosophy, with all its problems, in order to support liberal 
politics. To put the opposition another way, the French writers whom 
Habermas criticizes are willing to drop the opposition between "true 
consensus" and "false consensus", or between "validity" and "power", in order 
not to have to tell a metanarrative in order to explicate "true" or "valid" (Rorty 
in Bernstein (ed. ) 1985: 162). 
Lyotard's assertion that language does not contain a universalist dimension is part of a 
wider criticism of Habermas's views on legitimation and consensus. According to 
Lyotard, `legitimation cannot be tied to universal consensus... because the pragmatic 
realm of language games is ungoverned by... pre-established rules' (Holub, 1991: 
141). The heterogeneity of localised communicative performances would be lost in 
speech situations where pre-established rules govern interlocutory action. Consensus 
for Lyotard is therefore only a particular state of discussion, not its end. Such a view 
is predicated on the idea that a post-modem `science' should be concerned with the 
undecidability of utterances, the setting of limits to precision, with conflict arising 
from a lack of complete information and so on. 
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His desire to avoid the universalist stance he associates with Habermas, leads Lyotard 
to adopt a position that holds that truth is nothing more than an argument which 
convinces a given audience at a given time. By denying the possibility that we might 
arrive at mutual understanding and consensus formation through the argumentative 
redemption of validity claims, Lyotard allows the potential for a `false consensus' to 
arise. Not surprisingly, Habermas's progressive liberal stance means that he is 
suspicious of this position. Lacking systematic notions of, for example, `objectivity' 
or `truth', such a consensus seems to him only to serve the interests of those who, to 
put it bluntly, can shout the loudest. In other words, it appears to serve the interests of 
the minority who control the material and symbolic resources of power. 
At stake is the continued possibility of mounting a commitment to principled 
intellectual enquiry in pursuit of the `good life' and a `better tomorrow'. While 
Habermas's universalistic tendencies have been attacked even by sympathetic critics 
(e. g. Benhabib, 1992), his defence of the Enlightenment project has found support 
from those concerned that Lyotard's position advocates embracing relativism as a 
necessary consequence of accepting his version of plurality-in-the-world (McLennan, 
1992). According to Lyotard, Habermas's cardinal error is to insist on forcing the 
heterogeneous character of small-scale discourses or language games into a universal 
mould, thereby distorting them. However, from a position broadly supportive of 
Habermas, Dews (1986) accuses Lyotard of a `chronic confusion' between language 
games and validity claims. The confusion arises, Dews argues, from Lyotard's 
rejection of the possibility of their being a `metalanguage'. 
While Habermas acknowledges the existence of a plurality of language games, Dews 
argues that this in no way negates the possibility that validity claims can cut across 
29 
Television and Public Discourse 
this multiplicity: `there will be clashes of viewpoint concerning cognitive, moral and 
aesthetic questions, but we cannot claim that these conflicts are in principle 
unamenable to discussion and possible resolution' (ibid: p. 23). In fact, language 
games can only operate against a background assumption that interlocutors can and 
will redeem validity claims if challenged. 
In the earlier sketch of Lyotard's objections to Habermas's theory of consensus we 
noted his view that it entails a `terroristic' attempt to homogenise the essentially 
heterogeneous nature of language games. Crucially for Dews, and this is the point 
missed by Lyotard, the Habermasian notion of consensus is expressly concerned with 
the conditions of plurality: `the regulation of the effects of social practices on each 
other in the light of the freely expressed interests of all those concerned' (Dews, op. 
cit.: 24). Developing this point, Holub has argued that although Habermas would 
admit `on the empirical level, where pragmatics has traditionally been located, [that] 
there are innumerable `games' played by rules that one cannot know in advance' 
(Holub 1991: 141), the crucial point is that as well as an empirical level, pragmatics 
also contains an implicit universal dimension; the validity claims to truth, 
appropriateness comprehendability and sincerity. Lyotard mistakes these as 
`metaprescriptives' governing actual utterances while Habermas regards them as 
anthropological universals inherent within language itself. 
A second powerful criticism of Lyotard by Holub concerns the formers privileging of 
dissension over consensus as the motivating force behind linguistic encounters. Holub 
suggests that the gap between the two thinkers may not be as wide as Lyotard thinks: 
When Habermas writes of the ideal speech situation and of discourse, he tends 
to emphasize the harmonizing dimension of his theory; but the only way in 
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which an authentic consensus can be achieved is by allowing all possible 
dissenting viewpoints to be raised and argued (ibid: 142). 
According to Holub, had Lyotard reflected a little further on Habermas's theory of 
consensus he might have recognised that Habermas is not concerned with the 
homogenisation of language games (or even with promoting one `game' over another) 
but with the conditions that support plurality in discourse (a position even the most 
hardened of post-modernists would find difficult to grumble about). As Holub puts it, 
`Habermas's theory of consensus implies and encompasses the dissension to which 
Lyotard accords priority' (ibid: 142). We noted above Lyotard's confusion between 
language games and validity claims. It is Holub's belief that Lyotard's post-modem 
scepticism of consensus produces the self-contradiction typical of all relativisms since 
he: 
cannot consistently maintain an argument that seeks to convince us that 
universally arguments do not aim at our consent. As Habermas points out, 
there are certain unavoidable assumptions that accompany any argument, and 
the propositional content... cannot contradict these assumptions. In criticizing 
Habermas, Lyotard necessarily plays by certain rules that are inscribed in 
language itself. Lyotard's claim concerning dissension is thus left with two 
equally distasteful alternatives. Either we take the claim seriously and fall into 
performative contradiction, or we do not admit that Lyotard is offering an 
argument and therefore do not have to bother with assent or dissent (Holub, 
ibid.: 143). 
The irony of this position Dews argues, `is intensified by the fact that it is only in the 
light of the democratic and humanitarian aspirations of the Enlightenment that 
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Fascism and Stalinism appear in their full horror' (Dews, 1985: 38). Consequently, 
Lyotard's post-modernist position is dependent upon the hopes and aspirations of the 
very project it sets out to supercede. 
The Bourgeois Public Sphere 
Habermas's concern is with the restoration of a communicative structure that will 
allow for undistorted communication (at least as an ideal). He wants to replace 
existing social institutions, in which distorted communication occurs, with a 
reconstructed public sphere in which participants enter into discourse on the 
understanding that no one has greater opportunity to speak and to be heard than 
another. Although this is clearly an ideal Habermas believes that in the early 
bourgeois public sphere we have a glimpse of the type of egalitarian space he has in 
mind. The salons and coffee houses of seventeenth century Europe created a space in 
which `enlightened' (male) Europeans could critically engage in political, literary and 
scientific debate (Hamilton, 1992). Despite the conspicuous absence of women, the 
non-literate, and the poor (absences that otherwise sympathetic commentators have 
repeatedly drawn attention to), Habermas believes that immanent within the 
discursive practices of these institutions is a model for the restoration of a democratic 
arena for social debate. 
He sees their critical potential residing in three main areas. Firstly, the social 
intercourse generated in the salons opened up a `social space' where the authority of 
the better argument could preside against the established status quo. Secondly, as the 
anti-clericalism inherent within Enlightenment thought began to emerge so the `aura' 
surrounding religious speakers was eroded, ensuring that the social status of 
participants was increasingly disregarded. Thirdly, Habermas believes that the salons 
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and coffee houses were in principle inclusive as well as exclusive spaces since those 
who met the qualificatory criteria of being rational, male and propertied could 
participate in debate (Stevenson, 1995). Together, these elements produced a desire 
for public rather than private forms of reasoning predicated on the idea of pursuing 
truth through communicative interaction. The eventual collapse of the bourgeois 
public sphere due to the impact of large corporate communication enterprises (most 
notably the development of a commercially oriented press) eliminated the majority of 
private individuals from public debate and commentary and with it the possibility of 
creating free and equal opportunities for democratic decision-making in mass society. 
Recently, a number of critical studies of the public sphere thesis have appeared, 
though not all have been univocal in their support (e. g. Fraser, 1992; Eley, 1991). The 
main criticisms are firstly, that by favouring the development of a rational, masculine, 
public sphere he implicitly supports a particular male form of discourse that has little 
or no place for talk about emotion. Secondly, by promoting the bourgeois public 
sphere as the site of rational public discourse Habermas neglects the development of a 
contemporaneous plebeian public sphere as evidenced for example in the formation of 
the Mechanics institutes run by local trade union branches for their members (E. P. 
Thompson, 1978). While such criticisms are entirely valid they in no way negate the 
value of Habermas's thesis, however. The continuing attraction of his basic model of 
the public sphere lies in its championing of a communicative space independent of 
both the state and the market and its potential for providing a critique of existing 
institutional arrangements for public discourse. Charges of poor historical scholarship 
and class and gender bias do not in themselves undermine the potency of his account 
of the growing gap between the desire for undistorted communication raised in the 
idealised notion of the bourgeois public sphere, and the `tragedy' of its collapse. 
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The Contemporary Public Sphere 
Habermas's historical narrative sets the scene for the development of the mass media 
as the chief institutions of the contemporary public sphere. Having displaced the 
public as the primary engine of discursivity, the mediated public sphere `refeudalizes' 
public political communication and transforms it from reasoned debate into pseudo- 
debate through its association with public relations and marketing techniques. 
Although critics have pointed to the excesses of this `refeudalization' thesis (e. g. J. B. 
Thompson, 1994), Habermas's basic concern is with describing the process by which 
late capitalist societies display a tendency to `squeeze out' the space for an 
autonomous public sphere and the degree to which the latter process structurally 
uncouples decision-making processes from channels of legitimation and `collective 
will formation'. His critique engages with the failure of the mass media to act as an 
arena within which individuals can gather to rationally debate amongst themselves on 
matters of collective concern. It is at this point however, that his interest in reaching 
consensual understanding in the public sphere displays a significant blindspot in 
relation to television. 
Habermas is concerned with providing a critique of the mass media conceived solely 
as a dialogical arena. Accordingly, he presents the public sphere as an arena of talk. 
This ignores the crucial point that television is also an arena of imagery. Visual 
images arguably play an equally important role in the construction of argumentation. 
Habermas's contention that a staged display has now replaced a rational public sphere 
oriented towards consensus, provides no opportunity to understand how images 
function both as illustrations of argumentation and as forms of argumentation in 
themselves. This blindspot is by no means unique to Habermas. Most attempts to 
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understand how the public sphere is presently constructed (e. g. Garton et. al., 1991) 
pay little attention to television as a medium of moving images as well as speech. In 
order to fully understand television's management of social debate we require an 
approach which recognises the `shifting relation between language and imagery in 
popular representation' (Murdock, 1993: 536) and the possibilities this creates for a 
broader conception of television as a `forum' of public discourse. 
At this juncture we can return to the notion of television's `communicative character' 
which opened this chapter. Scannell, like Habermas, privileges talk as the defining 
feature of public discourse. Consequently, he too gives short thrift to the role of visual 
images within the communicative ethos of broadcasting. Indeed, in a footnote to an 
essay documenting the relevance of talk to understanding the communicative process 
in broadcasting, Scannell disregards the role of visual images in the formation of 
television discourse by claiming that `[t]elevision is radio with vision added' 
(Scannell, 1991: 11). This is not particularly surprising since his own research has 
been primarily concerned with recovering the history of radio's organisation of 
discourse. However, by minimising the importance of television's visual dimension a 
weakness in Scannell's theory of communicative intentionality is revealed. This is all 
the more surprising because as Corner (1995: 14) notes, `it is in the combination of 
the two, sometimes rather subtle and even slippery, that its public communicative 
power and its openness to what is often heated public controversy and debate lie'. In 
short, the communicative power of television lies precisely in its juxtaposition of 
words with images. We shall illustrate the importance of this point throughout the 
second part of the thesis. 
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Television's ability to produce moving images means that viewers. are able to 
`witness' not only participants in debate but a host of visual representations which 
underpin (or undermine) the credibility and legitimacy of their arguments. Thus, 
television viewers' ability to reflect critically upon a diversity of argumentation and 
discussion depends as much on how things appear as on what is said. This is 
particularly important for those `forgotten' or invisible subjects (such as severely 
mentally disturbed people in psychiatric hospitals or abandoned children in Bulgarian 
orphanages) who may not have an opportunity to speak directly to others or make 
known their testimony. Television's mobilisation of a variety of visual and verbal 
modes of representation suggests that it is unsuitable as a cultural forum oriented 
towards generating the clear and consensual position on social issues that lies at the 
heart of Habermas's project for a revivified public sphere. At the same time, the 
development of a wide range of public forms of argument on television suggests that 
broadcasters remain committed to the pragmatic use of public communication 
techniques in order to inform and educate audiences across a range of social and 
political issues and that in generating understanding, feelings might be as important as 
`facts'. 
At the heart of television's attempts to further understanding has been work subsumed 
under the documentary label. The TV documentary stands as a particular instance of a 
cultural form that asserts - in the very process of its representing - an authoritative 
claim to `truth' premised on a very specific `fidelity to the real' (Winston, 1995). This 
fidelity to the real underpins the use of recorded images and sounds as `guarantors' of 
evidential probity. The images produced by documentarists working in film or 
television raise questions about the `truth-value' of what has been produced and 
which has implications both for the manner in which we are both `put in touch with 
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others' in the public sphere, as well as how we are furnished with `evidence' about the 
world `out there' beyond our immediate lived experience. 
The Documentary Enterprise: Telling 'Truths' 
From its beginning, television sought to emulate the achievements of radio and 
cinema in documenting real events and circumstances with the aim of informing and 
educating its audiences. According to Corner and Richardson (1986: 141), the 
television documentary recounts aspects of the real from `within a discourse and 
aesthetics of `maximum transparency". In other words, it is the visible evidence that 
documentary film provides which underpins its claims as a source of knowledge and 
understanding about the world. The claim is that by providing a `window on the 
world' documentarists show things "as they really are" since "the camera cannot lie". 
Embedded in documentary accounts of the world `out there' is the pursuit of 
`journalism's role in fostering interaction amongst the audience - in helping audience 
members to interact as citizens' (Dahlgren, 1995: 28). Similarly, Corner identifies the 
`radical revelatory' consequences of the documentary, where viewers are `put in touch 
with one another by revealing infrastructural relations of interdependence' (Corner, 
1986: x). Thus, the documentary enterprise is seen as being at the heart of 
broadcasting's discursive attempts to tell the whole `truth' despite (or perhaps because 
of) the infinity of competing claims to truth circulating within the social world. 
It is television's ability to record the images and sounds of actuality (Corner, 1995) 
which underlines documentary practice as a distinctive kind of seeing and hearing 
experience oriented towards observational truth claims. In other words, the validity or 
authenticity of what is being said is guaranteed by what is being shown: the self- 
evidently `true'. Consequently, documentary appeals to the `evidential' cannot be 
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separated from the technological means of reproducing the images and sounds of 
actuality. The camera and microphone underwrite the indexicality of what has been 
recorded in terms of a general `truthfulness'. It is this `trace' of the physical world in 
sounds and images, which underpins the role of the documentary as one of the key 
cultural forms of the contemporary public sphere. Despite radical variations in the 
way documentaries organise their truth claims the use of recording technologies 
enable television viewers to `witness' a circumstance or an event and then measure 
what they have seen against the sequential argument(s) carried by the voice track. As 
Corner (1996: 2) puts it, `the whole epistemic identity of documentational discourse, 
its appeal as well as its discursive capacity, changed when the indexicality of recorded 
image and/or sound was introduced'. 
Documentary programming's claim on the real is `primarily legitimated by its 
reporting of fact' (Chaney and Pickering, 1986: 29). The `classic' realist documentary 
equates facts (including imaged facts) with reality. Facts are given meaning and 
significance in the mode of their telling. It is important to stress here that Chaney and 
Pickering are not questioning the possibility of capturing `phenomenal reality'. Rather 
their point is that `reality' as represented in the documentary method is always 
dependent upon the aesthetic conventions through which it is made available to 
others. Thus the `why' of documentary construction (the point of telling an account) 
cannot be separated from the `how' of its telling (the form through which an account 
is told). Once again, this returns us to the importance of understanding the relationship 
between speech and images on television and the implications this has for the 
production of knowledge and truth in the major institution of the public sphere. 
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All documents purporting to offer `hard facts' operate on the assumption that secure 
knowledge about the world can be obtained and in turn can be re-presented 
(represented) rationally and unproblematically to audiences in the form of a 
convincing argument. For post-modernists the spectre of the Enlightenment hangs 
heavily over this presumption. As Dahlgren (1992: 29) notes, Enlightenment 
rationality tends towards `neat dualisms, and polarities such as rational/irrational, 
mind/matter and logical/mythical' with the result that a valorization of the former 
categories occurs at the expense of the latter. Lyotard's critique of Enlightenment 
philosophy rejects such dualism's, claiming that a rational, coherent, `reality' does not 
exist and that totalising theories are nothing more than `terroristic' attempts to impose 
a unitary meaning or Absolute Truth on a multiplicity of localized interpretations and 
experiences. From this perspective the documentary enterprise can be seen as just 
another `modernist' attempt to impose an authoritative truth in an era when the mantle 
of `objectivity' is simply unavailable. 
The core of Lyotard's objection to the Enlightenment project, that in an era of post- 
modernity one cannot simply `tell the truth', has implications for all manner of 
attempts to document the world. However, television's preoccupation with mimesis 
renders it particularly vulnerable to post-modern critique. The core argument is that 
television produces or constructs reality rather than simply `captures' it. As such 
televisual `reality' is a product of discourse and not a `given' in which a `true-image' 
of the world appears. Nonetheless, despite television's problematic relationship with 
the real there is still a widespread presumption within theories of representation that 
there is a `reality' distinguishable from its photographic image. In stark contrast to 
this, a radical post-modem view argues that there is no longer any difference between 
image and reality and that television's claim on the real is spent. It is in relation to this 
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most controversial of claims that we encounter the hyperreal world of Jean 
Baudrillard. 
Baudrillard and the Fading Out of the 'Real' 
According to Baudrillard, the rapid growth in mass media forms - especially 
television - constitutes the central characteristic of the transition from modernity to 
post-modernity: `whereas modernity centered on the production of things, 
commodities and products, postmodernity is characterised by radical semiurgy, by a 
proliferation of signs' (Kellner, 1989: 67). In Baudrillard's view, the multiplication of 
signs creates the conditions for a new `semiurgic society' in which all previously held 
boundaries become obliterated giving rise to new modes of thought as well as new 
cultural forms and practices. Baudrillard's claim is that whereas the sign was once 
held to refer to something other than itself - an external `reality' beyond - this has 
ceased to be the case. Signs no longer carry a smooth referential function but refer 
only to the `logic' of other signs. Consequently, signs have become their own pure 
simulacrum, their own simulated effect absented completely from any relationship 
with reality. Moreover, Baudrillard insists, we no longer possess the means by which 
we can recognize the difference between the `reality' and its simulated counterpart. 
Media are wholly implicated in this process of the fading out of the real, and with our 
constant saturation by simulacra comes an inability to distinguish the difference 
between truth and falsehood or fact and fiction. 
Baudrillard's theory of simulacra has been ambivalently received (Chen, 1991) since 
it simultaneously touches on the excess of signs pervading our image-saturated culture 
whilst immediately denying that these signs have any meaning. Indeed, it is precisely 
Baudrillard's nihilistic abandonment of meaning, truth and value that infuriates many 
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of his critics. Norris, for example, describes Baudrillard's acquiescence to the world 
of surface appearance as a damning example of post-modernism's trahison de clercs 
since it `is used a pre-text for dismantling every last claim to validity and truth' 
(Norris, 1990: 182). However, for Baudrillard this is precisely the point: 
`It is no longer possible for us to see through the appearance of, for instance, a 
`free market' to the structuring relations underneath (e. g. class conflict and the 
expropriation by capital of surplus value). Instead, signs begin increasingly to 
take on a life of their own referring not to a real world outside themselves but 
to their own `reality' - the system that produces the signs' (Hebdige, 1989: 82- 
83). 
This is a remarkable claim because if he is correct, that reality is nothing more than an 
abundance of signs, then we have no power to change them since we cannot step 
outside them. 
For Baudrillard, concepts such as `truth' and `reason' are simply defunct in a mass 
mediated culture. They are no longer useful as resources through which knowledge of 
the world can be produced and circulated. Baudrillard's analysis of media culture 
figures as part of a wider rejection of Marxism (Kellner, 1989). His view is that 
Marxist theory does not offer any scope for an analysis of signs within consumer 
culture. According to Baudrillard, this is because critical theory (initiated by Marx 
and Engels in The German Ideology) is built upon a classical Platonist doctrine which 
holds out for an (endlessly deferred) epistemic moment of Truth over `illusion' and 
`falsity'. Baudrillard's view is that we must abandon such concepts and recognize the 
(paradoxical) reality that in the post-modem era the real no longer exists. Instead of 
endlessly (and hopelessly) appealing to the `real', Baudrillard's advice is that we 
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should embrace simulacra and the hyperreal, where images relate not to hidden truths 
but to other images which are neither real nor false, but made in the image and 
likeness of other images. In short, Baudrillard's claim is that we have moved beyond 
the possibility of analysing truth and falsity (crucial to the preceding age of 
representation) since it relies upon a sense of difference - the prerequisite for meaning 
- which can no longer be found. 
This is a somber diagnosis (though Baudrillard himself welcomes this state of affairs). 
In his view, representational and mimetic theories that attempt, from different vantage 
points, to show that the real exists and can be grounded are no longer valid. At the 
same time, his central concept of simulation emphasises that there is no difference 
between image and reality: `The simulacrum... is both the reproduction and the 
original, both the image and the referent imploded into a single concept' (Fiske, 1991: 
57). Representation becomes a `non-issue' for Baudrillard because `whereas 
representation tries to absorb simulation by interpreting it as a false representation, 
simulation envelops the whole edifice of representation as itself a simulacrum' 
(Baudrillard in Docherty, 1993: 196). The irony of Baudrillard's analysis is readily 
apparent: we may now possess the technical ability to communicate to the most 
dispersed and isolated of individuals but the very form this ability takes renders 
meaningful communication redundant. Consequently, in Baudrillard's post-modem 
universe public dialogue gives way to the transmission of spectacle and information 
and meaning implode into `noise'. 
The evacuation of meaning caused by the implosion of the image and the referent has 
profound consequences for television's public sphere role. Baudrillard's insistence 
that there is no difference between image and reality suggests that TV viewers 
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experience a vertiginous collapse into a meaningless void as they pathetically struggle 
to hang on to some sense of the real. However, Baudrillard's view is that the `masses' 
are happy to consume images without their meanings since in a world of non-meaning 
that is all one can expect to do. Consequently, attempts to produce `thoughtful' 
television programmes in which complex social issues and practices are scrutinised 
within a framework of `meaningful analysis' are futile. The radical revelatory 
potential of the documentary, like ideology-critique, becomes redundant since no 
revelation of the `real' is possible - except the revelation, made by Baudrillard, that 
the real no longer exists (Billig, 1994). Lyotard's rejection of a final concept of 
`reality' or `truth' is taken to extreme in Baudrillard's writing. His interpretation of 
our post-modem condition dispenses with any notion of `reality' at all and with it the 
possibility that television can generate communicative understanding and truthfulness. 
Baudrillard's view that notions of truth can now be dispensed with stems from his 
claim that in the contemporary era the signifier and the signified have been riven 
apart: `This means that there can be no relationship between concrete events and 
regimes of interpretation' (Stevenson, 1995: 169). Baudrillard's position is one in 
which the real world and the simulated world are unable to be separated since 
everything is now appearance and appearance is now everything. In this environment, 
social life is bleached of significance such that there is no point in engaging in rational 
social enquiry (indeed for Baudrillard the category of the `social' is itself no longer 
viable in an era of simulation). As Eagleton (1991: 38) puts it, `In this sphere, as in 
the realms of the media and everyday culture, form overwhelms content, signifiers 
lord it over signifieds, to deliver us the blank, affectless, two-dimensional surfaces of 
a post-modernist social order'. Baudrillard's view that media content implodes into a 
`depthless' form has parallels with another influential observer of contemporary 
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media culture, Neil Postman. Like Baudrillard, Postman's (1985) view is that 
television culture displays not an external reality but show business. In the process, 
serious public discourse is paralysed by the sheer weight of visual images. 
Amusing Ourselves to Death: Television and the Erosion of Public Discourse 
Postman's thesis is a lament for the demise of a print-based culture. In his view, 
television's ascendancy has relegated the printed word to a position of secondary 
importance amongst the institutions of the public sphere. In the short time since its 
inception television has become the major medium through which and by which 
western culture converses with itself. Thus, whilst TV has vastly increased the range 
of issues we might talk about (sex, death, environmental degradation, racism and so 
on), it has significantly altered how we talk. The important issues of our time - 
politics, health, education, religion, science - have increasingly come to take the form 
of entertainment. Whereas the printed word was rooted in a deployment of discourse 
which encouraged the (reading) public towards reflection and rational critique, 
Postman's claim is that contemporary television culture offers only a `peek-a-boo' 
world of non-stop trivia and entertainment. Consequently, `the decline of a print- 
based epistemology and the accompanying rise of a television-based epistemology has 
had grave consequences for public life, ... we are getting sillier 
by the minute' (ibid: 
24). In short, entertainment automatically overwhelms information and the cause of 
this is the technology of television itself. 
Postman's essentialising of television takes its basic trajectory from Marshall 
McLuhan (e. g. McLuhan, 1994). Postman hails McLuhan's claim that the technical 
dimensions of television shape the content of the message carried as decisive for 
understanding the nature of the medium. Consequently, in Postman's thesis public 
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discourse - what can be said, by whom, to whom, about what and in what ways - is 
regulated by the variety of media forms in circulation at any given moment. Drawing 
on McLuhan's aphorism that the medium is the message Postman argues that serious 
discussion of public issues is impossible on television because it is a medium that 
allows only some modes of discourse to the necessary exclusion of others: 
`It is an argument that fixes its attention on the forms of human conversation, 
and postulates that how we are obliged to conduct such conversations will 
have the strongest possible influences on what ideas we can conveniently 
express. And what ideas are convenient to express inevitably become the 
important content of a culture'. (ibid: 6) 
His claim is that television influences the ideas that a culture can be said to 
`conveniently express'. He argues that just as the medium of the smoke signal cannot 
do philosophy - the form excludes the content - television cannot communicate 
serious information because `its form works against the content' (ibid: 7). On this 
point Baudrillard and Postman are in agreement. Both see television content 
imploding into form so that whatever `information' is transmitted by the medium 
immediately dissolves into spectacle (`information devours its own content' to use 
Baudrillard's phrase). 
What emerges from Postman's account is above all a distrust of television as a 
medium of public discourse. For Postman, the crux of the problem is that television 
mediates its messages through visual images rather than speech. Thus, what we see on 
television becomes all that counts as truth since we cannot mistake the evidence of 
our eyes. Consequently, we do not require much in the way of speech to emphasise 
the `reality' of what we have `witnessed'. What little there is, Postman says, is not 
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discourse proper but a simulation of discourse in which the necessity for serious and 
rational public conversation is upheld for appearances sake (which it still requires). 
Postman, like Baudrillard, thus believes that television is a banal, depthless medium. 
It is simply unable to do anything but entertain: 
`What I am claiming... is not that television is entertaining but that it has made 
entertainment itself the natural format for the representation of all experience. 
Our television set keeps us in constant communion with the world, but it does 
so with a face whose smiling countenance is unalterable. The problem is not 
that television presents us with entertaining subject matter but that all subject 
matter is presented as entertaining... Entertainment is the supra-ideology of all 
discourse on television (ibid: 87). 
Postman's broadside against television is predicated on a `typographical bias' in 
which print offers the best hope for a rational democracy. This is also a view shared 
by Habermas. His original (1989) thesis on the print-based public sphere argues that 
contemporary media of mass communication, especially television, appear more 
concerned with the production of spectacle than with the production of rational 
discourse. For both Habermas and Postman, the rapid-fire environment of the `three 
minute TV culture' means that the communication of serious issues is impossible as 
style is promoted over substance. In this image-saturated environment the `sight-bite' 
becomes the conduit for measuring the (entertainment) value of a television 
programme rather than what it has to say. And what of Truth? In Postman's view it 
becomes increasingly difficult to find given the myriad show-business forms within 
which it now (dis)appears. 
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Amusing Ourselves to Death is an account of the commercial imperative in US 
television and as such has considerable merit. However, Postman, like Baudrillard, is 
guilty of attributing television's infantilising power to its technological characteristics 
and assuming that the effects of the medium are universal and irreversible in their 
consequences. In Postman's hands, television becomes an omnipotent power in which 
audiences' understanding of the world are blurred as the boundaries between 
informational programming and entertainment implode. Following Postman, the 
development of dramatized factual ('infotainment') programmes like America's Most 
Wanted and 911 are a sign, not of increasing triviality in current affairs television per 
se, but of television recognizing that even in the sphere of current affairs what it does 
best is entertain. In contrast to Baudrillard, Postman's argument is therefore not about 
an absence of meaning caused by a proliferation of televisual signs but, rather, an 
argument about the proliferation of the same signs all producing the same thing: 
endless entertainment. 
The Limits of Technological Determinism: Raymond Williams and Television 
The commercialization of the American broadcasting environment forms the 
backdrop to Postman's critique of television. Commercial TV in the US has long been 
the target of educationalists and others, concerned that relentless competition for 
audiences has effectively paralysed any hope that the medium might instill the 
capacity to question, to criticize, and to protest (Boddy, 1995). Postman's intention is 
to extend this critique and to argue that television's educational potential is at best 
minimal. In pursuing this line he urges us to `read Marshall McLuhan' (op. cit.: 145). 
The reason for this recommendation is McLuhan's claim that its technical dimensions 
determine the communicative character of television. However, the question of the 
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medium's `essential' qualities is begged: `does television's performance as we know 
it have to do with some essential quality or with the way it has been used culturally' 
(Dahlgren, 1995: 58). On this issue Raymond Williams is instructive in detailing the 
error of attributing to technology specific intentions which place it outside society. In 
his book, Television: Technology and Cultural Form (1974), Williams claims thus: 
It is... [a] sophisticated technological determinism which has the significant 
effect of indicating a social and cultural determinism; a determinism, that is to 
say, which ratifies the society and culture we now have, and especially its 
most powerful internal directions. For if the medium - whether print or 
television - is the cause, all other causes, all that men (sic) ordinarily see as 
history, are at once reduced to effects (1974: 127). 
Williams's comments are directed at McLuhan. However, they also apply to 
Baudrillard's view of media. In Baudrillard's theory, television becomes the most 
significant determinant of the nature of society. Reversing the familiar adage that 
television is a mirror of society, Baudrillard claims that society is now a mirror of 
television (Kellner, 1989). In his hands media technologies are in the driving seat of 
history. There is no sustained exploration of this claim by Baudrillard. He simply 
notes that in `this world of surface appearances TV takes over from the real as the 
place where real things happen only if they're screened' (Hebdige, op. cit.: 82). Truth 
simply disappears beneath the simulacrum as the masses embrace the `ecstasy of 
communication': the impossibility of finding meaning in a world where only images 
matter. 
Whilst Postman's thesis is less extreme than Baudrillard's his strong adherence to 
McLuhan's technological determinism opens him to the accusation that ' he too 
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brackets off many critical issues. For example, his account of television ignores the 
long history of federal regulatory decisions, which have shaped the commercial 
structures and programme forms of the medium in America. Consequently, his 
critique says nothing about how the US television industry operates as an industry 
with traceable consequences for the range of discourses and representations in the 
public domain (Golding and Murdock, 1991). Williams's view that technology is 
shaped by existing social relations and not by some `innate' qualities of the medium 
invites a consideration of television's communicative character from within a 
perspective that looks `not for the components of a product but for the conditions of a 
practice' (Williams quoted in Golding and Murdock, ibid: 17). This approach allows 
recognition of television as a technological medium which shapes aesthetic forms of 
programmes but acknowledges the impact of non-technical influences (e. g. 
broadcasting policy decisions) on the `look' and sounds of programmes. 
Following Williams, we can avoid a technologically determinist approach and 
acknowledge instead that television is an `applied technology' in a society where 
information and communication are centralized in their origin. Moreover, an 
important part of Williams' historical approach in Television is the contrast between 
British and US television. The differences he observed between the forms of 
programming in the US and Britain led him to see `television' as more than just 
spectacle. His view is that TV is on the whole a positive cultural development since it 
broadens the basis of representation. This point has been developed in a British 
context by Scannell (e. g. 1989). His view is that public service broadcasting has 
immeasurably extended and enriched the contemporary public sphere by initiating a 
new democratic `right of access' to a public voice: `The fundamentally democratic 
thrust of broadcasting lay in the new kind of access to virtually the whole spectrum of 
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public life that radio first, and later television, made available to all' (Scannell, 1992: 
322). Thus, Scannell sees a direct relationship between the communicative character 
of broadcast output and the normative ideal of public broadcasting as a space inviting 
the participation of all citizens. 
According to Scannell, the ideals embodied within the British broadcasting system 
have led to the recontextualization of private life into the public domain, and vice 
versa. Consequently, broadcasting has in Scannell's (and Williams's) view 
considerably broadened the range of what can be legitimately talked about in the 
public domain. Enacting the principle of a `right of access' meant that broadcasters 
discovered not only the `pleasures of ordinariness' but also the entitlement of ordinary 
people to speak and be heard in the public domain. Thus, the merging of public issues 
with private testimony has significantly expanded the scope of the broadcast public 
sphere by including private experiences as a legitimate part of broadcasting's 
`universe of discourse'. The normative framework of public broadcasting advanced by 
Scannell (following Habermas) suggests that it has been pivotal in denying those in 
positions of authority their relative monopoly on public expression and representation. 
This is in fact an empirical issue and will be addressed later in this thesis in the 
context of public discourse on mental illness. Here, the crucial point is that 
television's `communicativeness' withstands any simplistic or dismissive analysis and 
demands instead a recognition that the medium is above all grounded in a diversity of 
ways of mobilising talk, seeing, information and entertainment. This diversity is 
perhaps nowhere more apparent than in the range of actuality programmes currently 
claiming purchase on `ordinary' people's lives. 
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Private Testimony in the'Public Sphere 
In recent years, television programmes documenting `private life' and `private 
experiences' have become a major feature of broadcasting output (Livingstone and 
Lunt, 1994). Across the television schedules the views, opinions and experiences of 
`ordinary people' are central to many programme makers' concerns. Interest in 
ordinary people has always been part of British broadcasting's `communicative ethos' 
and we trace the key developments (and limitations) of this impulse in Chapter Two. 
However, the explosion of so-called `access' programming poses certain problems for 
Habermas's classic model of the public sphere. On one level, ubiquitous access 
formats and other `reality' genres (Kilborn, 1994) have broadened and legitimized the 
diversity of popular voices in the public sphere. Indeed, they appear to go some way 
towards Habermas's requirement for inclusivity and recognition of the `other' as a 
possible partner in discourse. On another level however, access programmes point 
towards the antithesis of a Habermasian ideal speech situation since the `force of the 
better argument' appears redundant in many programmes. This raises the possibility 
that the mixture of voices and discourses within access-type formats appear to more 
accurately reflect Lyotard's post-modem position of celebrating difference and 
relativity. 
Talk shows in particular have come to signify television journalism's estrangement 
from traditional current affairs and documentary programming (Blumler, 1991). We 
noted earlier how the classic documentary format functions as the quintessential mode 
of public-oriented `truth-telling'. Dominated by experts and an official kind of talk, 
programmes such as Panorama and Horizon purport to give an overarching account 
of a problem or issue and to identify feasible solutions. In contrast, uncovering the 
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truth of things is not (usually) the motivating dynamic of talk shows. Rather, they are 
based on the sharing of intimacies on private life and family matters, or putting a 
personal point of view based on grounded experience. The dwindling number of 
documentary formats on television (and the concomitant rise of access initiatives 
across a broad range of television, from children's programmes to `real' holiday 
shows) suggest a greater sensitivity amongst broadcasters to the multiple, differently 
experienced realities within which people live their lives. This is not to suggest that 
official, public language and arguing is no longer a feature of public discourse. 
Rather, it is to acknowledge that private, everyday language and experience now play 
a much larger role in broadcast talk (Tolson, 1991; Fairclough, 1995). 
The post-modern challenge inaugurated by Lyotard in principle claims this 
hybridization of private and public discourse as a reflection of a post-modern 
sensibility, which refuses to declare some discourses `true', and others `false'. In other 
words, access formats recognize the "free play" of discursive processes - dissensus 
rather than consensus - as the inevitable `logic' of a public broadcasting system no 
longer driven by a quest for truth and justice What matters in talk shows is not the 
force of a better argument but the unpredictability of the communicative performance 
itself: the public display of private emotions and feelings wrapped in a plethora of 
personal narratives. In the Habermas tradition, this is a sign of a simple decline in the 
public sphere, where rational reflection and debate are sacrificed on the alter of 
"entertaining television". But the sheer number of `new' voices being heard in 
broadcast talk points to another possibility. It may be that Habermas's model of the 
public sphere requires re-shaping into a more sympathetic public space; one that 
respects the feelings and emotions of the people whose testimonies it routinely draws 
upon. In short, the hybridization of public and private discourses focuses attention on 
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the shortcomings of Habermas's classic public sphere model conceived as an arena of 
rational reflection and debate. 
Rationality, Madness and Discourse 
We have already referred to feminist critiques of Habermas's account of the bourgeois 
public sphere that argue that his masculine dissociation from the feminine reproduces 
a public world devoid of emotion and affect. This general criticism is well taken since 
it points to the way in which prevailing relations between reason and emotion 
structure rights of participation in the public sphere. According to his feminist critics, 
Habermas's gender blindness is not an oversight. It reflects the dominance of a 
masculine form of reasoning (Stevenson, 1995). Critics have also questioned the 
dominance of the so-called rationalist voice on the grounds that `[t]he Enlightenment, 
in promoting the hope of universal reason, silenced those whose voices were 
considered unreasonably emotional, superstitious or old-fashioned' (Billig, 1996: 12). 
The post-modern celebration of `Otherness' has gone some way towards reinstating 
these maligned voices as worthy of appreciation in their own right. It would be a 
mistake however, to think that every voice suppressed by the dominant voice of 
western rationalism has been rescued. 
Despite the apparent multivocality of post-modernism, certain subjects (and 
subjectivities) remain susceptible to criticism and rejection by `rational' society. One 
group for whom this is a particular and continuing problem is the mentally ill. For 
almost three centuries, madness has stood in opposition to reason. It is unreason and 
irrationality that are presumed when an individual is identified as mad. This view of 
reason and unreason as doubles is most closely associated with the French 
philosopher, Michel Foucault. In his view, the rational and the irrational have come to 
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coexist, while remaining separate. As he (1987: x) states in the Preface to his classic 
text on the `discourse on madness' in the west, Madness and Civilization: 
In the serene world of mental illness, modem man (sic) no longer 
communicates with the madman: on the one hand, the man of reason delegates 
the physician to madness, thereby authorizing a relation only through the 
abstract universality of disease; on the other hand, the man of madness 
communicates with society only by the intermediary of an equally abstract 
reason which is order, physical and moral constraint, the anonymous pressure 
of the group, the requirements of conformity. 
According to Foucault, the constitution of madness as an illness at the end of the 
Eighteenth century `broke the dialogue' between reason and insanity. In other words, 
reason came to speak for and on behalf of unreason allowing a vast silence to engulf 
the mad. Concomitantly, the mad themselves were increasingly spoken about only 
within the framework of medical, moral and scientific discourses on `mental illness'. 
Whilst Foucault's historiography in Madness and Civilization has been challenged 
(see the helpful discussion in Merquior, 1991: pp. 21-34), his view that the history of 
unreason is coterminous with the history of reason is compelling. It forces us to 
acknowledge that the history of madness is also a history of power relationships. 
Thus, generations of doctors and other experts doubted that there was any reason in 
madness and discounted whatever their charges said or wrote. In so far as the 
behaviour of the mad made any sense, `it was not in terms of their intentions, of the 
here-and-now, of social relations and the loom of language, but in extraneous terms - 
diabolical possession or an infantile neurosis' (Porter, 1987: 5). A central task of the 
present thesis therefore, is to explore contemporary residues of the severed dialogue 
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between reason and madness focusing in particular on the public testimonies of 
`experts' on mental illness on the one hand, and tales told by those labelled as `mad' 
on the other. 
From this point of view, the project of deinstitutionalization represented by the move 
to care in the community (see Chapter Three) might appear as a particularly helpful 
context in which to explore professional and lay testimonies about mental illness. Free 
of the asylum, both carers and users of mental health services can enter public 
discourse on equal terms in order to contribute to public understanding about mental 
health -related issues. But this ideal speech situation borrows heavily from a 
Habermas-inspired view of public discourse. It presupposes for example, that the 
mentally ill will encounter no difficulties in entering a discursive space predicated on 
rational reflection and debate. As later chapters will illustrate however, there is a 
continuing association between mental illness and the realm of the irrational - one that 
is often represented visually - which poses particular problems for mentally ill 
peoples' attempts to articulate a systematic and coherent (but also emotionally 
charged) account of their experiences. Here, the crucial point is that Habermas's 
emphasis upon the rational character of communication compounds mentally ill 
people's difficulties in taking up certain rights of participation in the public sphere. At 
the very least, we might expect those with a diagnosis of `mental illness' to be wary of 
publicly drawing attention to their mental health status. 
In contrast, post-modem narratives do not conform to the Habermasian ideal type of 
rational, seminar-style, discourse. This has important implications for television's 
attempts to understand and represent a broad panoply of contemporary experience. 
For example, rather than advancing a set of objective claims about the `real world' (as 
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in classic forms of documentary) perhaps more subjective forms of public discourse 
(e. g. camcorder-based `video diaries') might make visible exactly those elements 
which have traditionally been absent in documentary programming: emotional 
intensity and one's own "point of view". Viewed in this light, access programmes, 
while broadening the number of discourses in the public sphere, are also 
representational forms that oppose the established discourse practices of `rational 
society'. They also throw into relief `why the concept of the public sphere must 
necessarily be wedded to the ideal type of communication oriented towards reaching 
consensus based upon the force of the best argument' (Keane, 1995: 17). In short, 
public representations that engage with emotion and promote empathy (though not 
sympathy) with others, may provide the potential for a more congenial and supportive 
rehousing of personal testimonies of the mentally ill than that offered by Habermas's 
ideal of a rational public sphere. 
In later chapters we analyse in detail both classical forms of documentary and new 
types of access formats and demonstrate how they provide different opportunities for 
public expression and representation. In doing so they raise questions about the degree 
of freedom they allow to participants to speak either for themselves, or for others. 
These issues are taken up in more detail in later chapters. Here, we would simply say 
that the growth of access programme formats and other new modes of representing the 
`real' offers an excellent opportunity to test the relationship between various forms of 
television and ideas about its social and communicative character. It may be that in 
giving greater access to storytelling and testimonial types of discourse they provide a 
platform to individuals and groups who previously lacked a public voice. At the same 
time however, they may compound the long-established view that access TV does not 
lead to any changes in power relations, but simply provides an illusion of participation 
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in public life. While these programmes may be far removed from the Habermasian 
ideal of rational debate they also, paradoxically, encourage us to re-examine the 
grounds on which participation in the public sphere is currently being provided. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter the aim has been to outline and reject the notion that television is a 
banal technology and to argue instead for an approach which acknowledges the 
importance of television's `communicative character'. In doing so, we noted how the 
medium's historical development as a discursive space has been shaped by a re- 
negotiation of the boundaries between the public and private spheres. Indeed, 
reorganising the relationship between public and private discourse may well prove to 
be British broadcasting's most important social achievement. At the very least, in 
bringing together the discourses of expertise and grounded experience within a 
universally accessible public space (albeit one marked by constant tensions between 
`openness' and `closure') broadcasting has created significant opportunities for 
ordinary people to contribute to the cultural and political life of the nation. To argue 
that taking part in television programmes is simply "ideological" is to miss the 
connection between people's involvement in the representativeness of public life, and 
their active participation in mass democracy. It was precisely the awareness of this 
linkage which encouraged the early programme makers to create the conditions for 
accessing lay voices in the emerging public sphere. The forms this enterprise has 
taken are traced in the next chapter. This history of `access' provides an essential 
context for the detailed case studies of contemporary forms of public participation in 
television programmes about mental illness that make up the core of the present 
thesis. 
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Introduction: The Public Sphere and Public Service Broadcasting 
In recent years the Habermasian model of the public sphere has gained increasing 
currency amongst those defending the ideals of public service systems of 
communication against the swelling chorus of voices proposing commercial models 
(e. g. Curran, 1991, Keane, 1991). Its attractiveness lies in the link Habermas forges 
between the conceptual foundations of communication and the sociological concern 
with political institutions. The key to his formulation is his sustained exploration of 
the means by which the mass of citizens can participate in rational and critical 
discussion of public affairs and thus contribute to a democratic civil society 
(Dahlgren, 1995). In his early work on the rise of a mass-mediated public sphere he 
posits that the processes of late capitalism (chiefly the steering `media' of money and 
power) progressively squeeze out the space available for an autonomous public 
sphere. In this starkly pessimistic view, democratic public life has been fatally 
compromised by the intrusion of large-scale commercial interests. Public opinion, in 
this context, is no longer the collective judgement of reasoning citizens but an 
orchestrated show of mass mediated spectacle. 
Habermas characterizes the increasing ubiquity of the mass media (especially the rise 
of broadcast media) in terms of a `refeudalisation' of the public sphere (see previous 
chapter). Implicit in this formulation is the idea that public opinion formation has 
undergone a transformation away from reasoned critical debate towards the 
ascendancy of public relations and marketing techniques. This shift results in a 
decline of public involvement in political life. Instead of providing a forum that 
facilitates participatory, democratic discussion the media manipulate mass opinion 
and become a `tranquillising substitute for action'. This characterization of a 
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commercially debased public sphere reveals a continuity with the accounts offered by 
some members of the Frankfurt School. Indeed, Habermas's emphasis on the 
commodification of the public sphere exhibits a similar ambivalence towards modem 
cultural forms as Adorno and Horkheimer's `mass society' critique (see Stevenson, 
1995). And yet, this story of the public sphere's compromise and decline appears to 
be contradicted by the non-state, non-market ideals Scannell (1989) sees embodied 
within the British public broadcasting system. In Scannell's view, public service 
media are a modem embodiment of the classical public sphere. 
The core principles of public service broadcasting are by now familiar. The classical 
regulatory regime that directs broadcasting in Britain [via the BBC and the ITC 
(Independent Television Commission)] was widely seen as an essential means of 
implementing these ideals by guaranteeing equal and universal access to a diverse and 
mixed output that sought to represent the widest possible range of opinion and 
experience. Just how well the existing public service media have lived up to these 
principles is open to debate. More certain is that these principles are seen by defenders 
of public broadcasting as reliant upon two fundamental conditions: firstly, that public 
broadcasting institutions remain independent from the pressures of commercial 
market competition in order to avoid `lowest common denominator' programming 
and ensure that `minority' interests are catered for; and secondly, that state 
intervention in the planning and production of broadcast output (beyond allocating 
financial resources) should be minimized and editorial autonomy protected and 
defended. For Scannell (1989,1992), public service broadcasting's insulation from 
the market ensures that people are addressed as citizens rather than consumers. 
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The establishment of a public broadcasting system in Britain coincided with the 
moment that the vote was finally conceded to all adult men and women. It is therefore 
no coincidence that radio was seen, from the outset, as necessarily involved in 
enhancing the process of mass democracy. Broadcasting was envisaged to be an 
independent `public sphere', and a forum for public discussion of matters of general 
concern. To this end, John Reith, the BBC's first Director-General, declared the 
importance of establishing `a genuine political independence for radio so that it might 
effectively realize its potential as an agent of a more informed and enlightened 
democracy' (Scannell and Cardiff, 1982: 163). Through its universal availability 
broadcasting would contribute to the formation of listeners as rational political beings. 
It could, however, be objected that such an account substitutes an admirable 
prescriptive ideal for an accurate historical portrait. Ang (1991) for example argues 
that the entire history of British broadcasting can be better grasped as an ongoing 
project of resistance to the BBC's `cultural mission'. This interpretation sees the 
BBC's contract with its audience as similar to a teacher/pupil relationship in which 
the latter is to be cultivated and educated by the former. 
Nevertheless, as Goode (1996) argues there remains something attractive about 
Scannell's attempt to demonstrate that public service broadcasting is - ideally, at least 
-a dialogical arena in which the boundaries between the public and private spheres 
are continually renegotiated: `Broadcasting... brings public life into private life, and 
private life into public life, for pleasure and enjoyment as much as for information and 
education' (Scannell, 1992: 325). At its best, public service broadcasting has been 
pivotal in denying - though never without difficulty - those in positions of authority 
their relative monopoly on public expression and representation and in bringing public 
figures and private citizens together in a shared discursive space. As Scannell puts it, 
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broadcasting is not simply the aggregate of the programmes which constitute its 
output but, rather, a `universe of discourse' (ibid.: 325) which over 70 years has 
shifted from a distant, authoritative and paternal stance towards its audience to a more 
equal and accessible relationship. The history of British broadcasting is thus also a 
history of the progressive opening up of opportunities for access to a common 
discursive space. 
That broadcasting can and often does play a fundamental role in the social processes 
of communication, self-expression, and holding those in power to account militates 
against those forms of reductionism within media studies that see only the ideological 
power of the mass media. The implication of the public sphere model, as Garnharn 
(1992) rightly notes, is that it promises a fair and equal distribution of communicative 
entitlements among citizens. Whatever the shortcomings of this promise - and there 
are many - the ideal of an inclusive public communicative space remains an attractive 
proposition for those seeking to broaden the democratic practice of public life. The 
ideal of public service broadcasting is not simply reducible to the principle of public 
access. Its very nature as a mass medium entails a permanent disparity between the 
number of people involved in the production of symbolic goods and the numbers 
receiving them. However, granting access to a diversity of `voices' and perspectives 
goes some way towards closing the gap. The remainder of this chapter is therefore 
devoted to tracing the pursuit of the ideal of inclusion. 
Reith and Radio: The Suppression of Regional Voices 
The struggle for public access broadcasting begins with radio. Towering over the 
early history of the medium in Britain is the figure of John Reith. He saw the BBC as 
a powerful vehicle for national cultural leadership. When he became the 
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Corporation's first Director General in 1927 (it had previously been a commercial 
company) the organization was a loose arrangement of regional and local stations 
offering distinctive services rooted in the community. In its early days, limited 
finances meant that local (often amateur) talent often constituted much of the output 
of the local stations. However, the foregrounding of ordinary people within local 
programmes also stemmed from a recognition by many local BBC producers that their 
output should reflect the lives of the people living in the areas they served. According 
to Scannell and Cardiff (1991: 14) this commitment ensured that the relationship 
between local programme makers and their audiences was `interactive and 
participatory'. It also meant that for a brief period in the late 1920s people had an 
opportunity to express, to people like themselves, their own feelings and opinions 
about local and occasionally national issues. 
However, the rise of this nascent participatory culture was short-lived. By 1930 local 
radio had virtually disappeared, displaced by a strongly centralized structure. The 
logic of the Reithian BBC was to subordinate difference and particularity, 
geographical or otherwise, to the unitary `voice' of the nation. With the creation of a 
National Programme service based in London, Reith established the central control he 
believed was necessary to secure the BBC's role as a national broadcasting 
institution. Thereafter, he seized every opportunity to establish a programming 
strategy rooted in a conception of `culture' as a hierarchy, a ladder which listeners 
must be encouraged to climb. As he explicitly stated, `our responsibility is to carry 
into the greatest number of homes everything that is best in every department of 
human knowledge, endeavour or achievement' (Reith in Scannell and Cardiff, 1982: 
163). The `best' was identified with the tastes and judgements of the best people - the 
great and the good. This project involved riding roughshod over diversity and 
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differentiation. The country, including Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, were 
forced to accept centrality of control from London and were expected to succumb to 
the hegemony of English culture. This was to have a debilitating impact on audience 
participation in local and regional radio: 
The regime of control would replace informality by a studied formality; to replace local 
variety and differences by a standardised conception of culture and manners; to replace 
audience participation by a more distanced, authoritative and prescriptive approach to 
broadcasting; to replace ordinary people and amateur performers... by authorities, experts and 
professionals (Scannell and Cardiff 1991: 16). 
For Reith, the improvement of the audience was all that mattered. The extension of the 
franchise first to working men and then to women had confirmed his view that 
education was the real purpose of radio. As Reith famously stated: `It is occasionally 
indicated to us that we are apparently setting out to give the public what we think they 
need - and not what they want, but few know what they want, and very few what they 
need' (quoted in Scannell and Cardiff, 1991: 28). The BBC saw its purpose as 
celebrating and proselytizing a particular set of cultural values, rather than 
representing the general audience's interests. It did not aim to reflect the public's 
tastes, but sought to educate and guide them towards `higher things'. The Corporation 
however rejected accusations of elitism arguing that there was no inherent connection 
between cultural values and social class. Given the opportunity, the BBC argued, 
everyone could appreciate the music of Bach or Beethoven and the drama of 
Shakespeare (Crisell, 1997). In short, Reith's Arnoldian aspiration for public service 
broadcasting was that it should raise standards of public knowledge and taste through 
the active promotion of education and information. Nowhere was this paternalistic 
desire reflected more keenly than in BBC talks. 
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Matheson, talks required the inclusion of ordinary 'human' voices. To exclude them, 
she argued, was to ignore both the grounded experience underpinning the topic being 
discussed and the extent to which people were competent to speak for themselves. In 
1934 a talks series called Time To Spare caused a sensation when unemployed people 
themselves came to the microphone to testify to what it was like living on the dole 
(see Scannell, 1980; Greene, 1935). Transcripts of the programme were used by 
Labour MP's to attack the government's treatment of the unemployed. In response, 
questions were asked in the right-wing press about the factual claims of the speakers 
and their right (as `untypical' unemployed people) to speak. With the BBC Charter up 
for renewal in 1935 Reith considered controversy of this sort a liability, and the 
department was disbanded. 
After 1935, although working people with radical opinions were given access to the 
microphone, they were more likely to be heard in discussion type programmes rather 
than talks. Such programmes had the advantage of being low key and the opinions 
expressed were clearly established as personal and could be balanced by other 
speakers. The function of reflecting `typical' working class life was increasingly taken 
over by documentary features (Cardiff, 1980). These programmes, which date from 
1928, were very different from the educative talks favoured by Reith. They were often 
regarded as experiments in sound broadcasting and employed a montage of narrative, 
dramatic dialogue, music, verse, sound effects and later, actuality sound (Crisell, 
1997). Scannell (1986) points out that although many of these programmes were 
ambitious failures, in the context of the growing economic recession of the 1930s they 
gradually acquired social and political relevance. The strength of the BBC's 
documentary output in the 1930s thus `grew... unexpectedly out of its organizational 
upheavals, in particular from Reith's desire for firm control at the centre and for 
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radical and dissident members of the Corporation to be dispersed to its fringes' 
(Crisell, ibid.: 36). 
North Region: The Voices of People and Place 
Reith's attempts to `bring the regions into line' had in fact been only partially 
successful. Despite centralized policy control they had managed to maintain a degree 
of programming autonomy from London. Even as Reith was fashioning the BBC into 
a pre-eminently national and metropolitan cultural institution it was clear that the 
Corporation could not dispense with the need to have some kind of regional 
perspective (Harvey and Robins, 1994). Thus, when in 1936, the BBC commissioned 
its first comprehensive Report on the Regions from the newly appointed Director of 
Regional Relations, Charles Siepmann, he acknowledged that `centralisation 
represents a short-sighted policy' bringing about a `uniform pattern of thought' and 
`standardising taste and values' (Siepmann in Harvey and Robins, ibid.: 39). What 
developed was a system in which regional expression and difference was 
accommodated but as a subsidiary element within the symbolic `unity' of the nation. 
This meant that while there was no regional BBC policy as such, there was an 
acknowledgement that regional voices would be tolerated within the more `universal' 
principles of a metropolitan and national broadcasting culture. 
Meanwhile, Reith's abolition of the Talks Department had resulted in the dispersal of 
key members of the department's staff (Scannell and Cardiff, 1982). London's loss 
was to be the regions gain. This was especially so in the case of North Region. Under 
the direction of Archie Harding, a left-wing former talks producer, Manchester's 
North Region harboured some of the most talented writers and actors in the country. 
Harding devised a strategy for making programmes that evoked the spirit of the North 
67 
Creating A Public Voice 
and its people. Harding's best known creation was Harry Hopeful, a series that began 
in 1935. The programme was based on the eponymous character's travels (an 
unemployed glass blowers assistant played by Frank Nicholls, in real life a clock 
mender from Manchester) through the North in search of work, meeting and talking to 
people he encountered. The series occupied a space between drama and current affairs 
and employed a blend of fact and fiction (see Scannell, 1986). Its pioneering use of 
actuality sound meant that Nicholls' interviews with ordinary people, among them the 
long-term unemployed, allowed them to relate their own experiences and feelings in 
their own words. 
The BBC had launched actuality sound in 1934, using a recording van hired from a 
film company (Scannell, 1986). It was used in a documentary about cockneys hop- 
picking in Kent entitled 'Opping 'Oliday (the dropped 'h's emphasising that the BBC 
knew how ordinary people talked). In 1937 the van was acquired by North Region and 
immediately pressed into service by Olive Shapley, one of Manchester's most 
dynamic producers. Shapley took the van all over the region recording people talking 
at home, at work and on the streets. Her influence on the development of the pre-war 
radio documentary was enormous: `Single-handed, she brought to maturity the use of 
recorded actuality as the basis of the radio feature' (Scannell, 1986: 20). Shapley's 
colleague Geoffrey Bridson (a close collaborator with Harding on Harry Hopeful) 
also made use of the mobile recording unit. Many of Bridson's programmes 
incorporated actuality into his studies of the region's major industries (coal, steel, 
wool and cotton). His technique of letting ordinary people speak for themselves was 
predicated on the idea that everyone had something to say. Together, Shapley's and 
Bridson's programmes broke new ground in social documentation and established the 
practice of using actuality sound as a way for speakers to communicate with listeners. 
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By foregrounding the voices of ordinary people producers like Shapley and Bridson 
revealed themselves to be sensitive to the new possibilities for form and content in the 
medium. Their efforts did not go entirely without recognition in the years leading up 
to war. BBC listener research (begun in 1936) had identified the stratified nature of 
the audience and towards the end of the decade attempts were made to produce 
`popular' as distinct from `serious' talks for the National Programme (a development 
facilitated by Reith's departure from the BBC in 1938). At the heart of the new 
communicative ethos was renewed consideration of the viewpoint of `the man in the 
street' (Cardiff, 1980). Broadcasting had learnt that it could not work with the 
discourses of expertise alone. The testimonies of ordinary people were now seen as 
crucial to broadcasting's social role as a medium of public communication. However, 
the balance between speakers remained highly uneven: `Experience might provide 
material for [public] debate but analysis was generally the province of expertise' 
(Murdock, 1994: 113). This crucial difference in communicative entitlement also 
characterizes another significant moment in the development of pre-war social 
documentation - the film, Housing Problems. 
Housing Problems and Accessed Speech 
Alongside radio, the work of the British documentary film movement during the 
1930's provided a new space for re-presentations of `everyday life'. Under the 
direction of John Grierson, the movement's mission was to reveal `the facts' about 
working class lives. Within some of the movement's films there was an attempt to let 
ordinary people speak for themselves (although some critics have questioned the 
degree to which Grierson's method actually allowed this - see for example Aitken, 
1990 and Winston, 1995). In the film Housing Problems, made in 1935 by Arthur 
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Elton and Edgar Anstey (and produced by Grierson) for the British Gas Association, 
working people were able for the first time in the history of documentary film to 
speak about their social conditions using their own words. Despite the non-naturalist 
`look' of the film (all the working class subjects in the film are shown wearing their 
`Sunday best' clothes and their testimony is delivered directly to the camera rather 
than slightly `off to a questioner) Housing Problems initiated a tradition of 
anthropological investigations of `real life'. However, what the slum dwellers provide 
is not their own opinions about the conditions in which they live, but rather personal 
testimonies about the difficult experience of slum dwelling. 
Even so, Housing Problems was a landmark. Its radicalism lies in its communicative 
intentionality: its purpose is to ground its truth claims in the testimony of ordinary 
people. The film's claim to represent `reality' is anchored by shooting testimony in 
the slum dwellers' own houses and in their direct address to camera. These pioneering 
modes of exposition reveal an important feature of the access idea: namely, that of 
providing the viewing audience with access to issues and problems that * would 
otherwise remain unseen or hidden (Comer 1994). When Ruby Grierson (John's sister 
and the person chiefly responsible for securing the testimonies of the slum dwellers) 
said to one participant during filming, `The camera's yours, the microphone's yours, 
now tell the bastards what its like to live in the slums' (quoted in Alan Bennett's 
series, The Long Summer, C4, broadcast date: 5/4/94) she was expressing a desire 
both to access the audience to a hidden social problem, and to give a public voice to 
the previously silenced. This double aspect of accessing - of bringing lay testimony to 
a wider audience and opening the audience to lay testimony - is the source of Housing 
Problems importance as a key moment in the early history of the visual 
documentation of the `ordinary' in Britain. 
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Despite Housing Problems' achievement in giving slum dwellers a voice however, 
throughout the film an invisible middle class voice-over provides an evaluative 
commentary on what is shown while a `specialist' narrator -a councillor on a London 
housing committee - provides expert analysis of participants' testimonies. Although 
Housing Problems acknowledged the importance of giving a voice to slum dwellers 
the film makers signalled the very clear limits within which they could speak. The 
slum dwellers, as `victims' of inadequate housing policy, are entitled to speak about 
their experiences but analysis and explanation of their plight is the prerogative of an 
`expert' in housing solutions (i. e. the councillor). Thus Anstey's claim that in 
accessing slum dwellers Housing Problem's was not his and Elton's film (but theirs) 
is grossly overstated (Winston, 1995). Despite the priority given to `official' voices in 
Housing Problems however, the presence of the `ordinary' consistently breaks 
through in the form of uninterrupted testimony. And it is this registering of everyday 
experience that connects it with television documentary's attempts to voice social 
issues in the post-war era. 
The Emergence of Popular Television 
When the BBC resumed a limited television service in 1946 (transmission had begun 
in 1936) radio was still the dominant medium. Its role during the war had secured its 
place as a national institution. However, the coronation of Elizabeth II in 1953 
provided the stimulus for the building of a mass audience for television (a point 
underlined by the fact that more people watched the ceremony on television than 
listened to it on the radio). The arrival of ITV in 1954 broke the BBC's monopoly on 
television. ITV was less deferential to authority and more willing to cater to populist 
pleasures. Its supporters trumpeted the new commercial system as `people's 
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television' and claimed that ITV spelled the end of a patronizing and paternal 
broadcasting system. However, such claims belie the fact that the ITV system was 
itself modelled on the public service traditions of the BBC. Even so, its populist ethos 
meant that `a stronger sense different voices, of previously unaccessed experience, 
came through the filter of their programmes formats than had hitherto managed to 
penetrate through the sieve of metropolitan-centredness which habitually, if 
unconsciously, was used by the BBC in fashioning its images of the nation' (Corner, 
1991a: 9). 
The introduction of competition and decentralisation also provided a motor for the de- 
metropolitanisation of broadcasting, as `regional' cities such as Manchester, 
Birmingham, Glasgow and Cardiff became more important as production centres. 
Thus alongside imported American comedies such as I Love Lucy, the regionally 
based companies of the ITV system promoted provincial culture by providing 
indigenous, locally made programmes for the network. Although there is 
disagreement over the extent of ITV's commitment to local programming (see Curran 
and Seaton, op. cit.: pp. 181- 82) there is no doubt that by the late 1950s the BBC's 
metropolitan bias was seen exactly for what it was - bias. It is therefore no 
coincidence that the two most popular television programmes in the 1960s, Granada's 
Coronation Street and the BBC's Z Cars (a police drama series) were set in cities in 
the north west of England (see Laing, 1991). These dramatized images of `northern 
reality' presented in both programmes reflected British television's broader interest in 
representing ordinary working class people and their experiences. But it was to be the 
television documentary which would offer the most sustained attempt to get closer to 
the `real lives' of ordinary working class people during the 1950s and 1960s. 
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Television Documentary: Voicing the Social 
By the early fifties the documentary had emerged as a staple feature of television. The 
essentially live nature of the medium during this period meant that most television 
documentaries were studio-based `live' productions (Scannell, 1979). They were 
scripted, rehearsed and used actors to play the parts of working class characters. These 
`drama documentaries' (as they became known) were a practical solution to the 
limited options available within a television service lacking any full-scale facilities for 
documentary film work. They were displaced from the schedules when the technical 
limitations of obtaining relevant kinds of actuality material were reduced. 
The BBC's approach to documenting social issues during its brief monopoly of 
television was, in the main, both distant and non-committal. Its `distance' was evident 
both in its reliance on experts and in its technical inability to get close to `real life'. 
But with Special Enquiry it made a ground-breaking attempt to create a television 
documentary series with a populist agenda at the heart of its approach to voicing the 
social. 
Under the influence of Norman Swallow Special Enquiry (1952-57) set new standards 
for documentary on television. Swallow, a former North Region producer, had been 
enormously influenced by Anstey and Elton's Housing Problems and he sought to use 
recorded interviews with ordinary people as the basis of his films. Swallow's desire to 
access ordinary people derived from his view that early television documentaries were 
depopulated: `What was missing from television documentaries before the mid-fifties 
was, quite simply, people' (Swallow quoted in Scannell, 1979: 104). He recognized 
that in order to communicate with audiences documentary makers had to work with 
non-professional voices. Inspired by the American CBS programme See It Now, 
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Special Inquiry avoided using experts or eminent speakers to introduce chosen topics 
and turned instead to a less pompous style of television presentation - the `enquiring 
reporter' working on `our' behalf against `them'. In other words, the modus operandi 
of Special Enquiry was to position itself on the side of the `man in the street'. By 
doing so, and placing the concerns of ordinary people centre-stage, the series forged a 
new style of television journalism in which the principle `point of view' was that of 
the audience. 
In 1955 Denis Mitchell joined Swallow on Special Enquiry. A former BBC features 
producer, Mitchell believed that the voices of subjects should form the core of 
actuality broadcasts. His pioneering use of the portable tape-recorder enabled 
Swallow to gain much closer access to people's `inner' thoughts and feelings by 
allowing subjects to speak unhurriedly and unprompted (Swallow had previously used 
35mm film stock which ran out after four minutes seriously disrupting location 
interviews). Later, the development of 16mm recording equipment and cheaper film 
stock meant that Mitchell's location interviews could be obtained easily and cheaply. 
Swallow's use of ordinary speech helped ground each episode of Special Enquiry in 
`subject' rather than `observer' consciousness (Comer, 1991b). Mitchell's own 
documentary work for Granada during the 1960s made extensive use of popular 
speech as the route to a richer and deeper portrayal of popular experience and 
attitudes. ' It is for this reason that Corner (1991b: 56) has described his work as `an 
1 Mitchell was not alone in this endeavour. The BBC radio producer Charles Parker and the folk singer 
and political activist Ewan MacColl (along with MacColl's wife Peggy Seeger) pioneered the use of 
tape-recorded actuality for the BBC series Radio Ballads (1958-1964). During the recording of the first 
Ballad entitled `John Axon' (the story of a railwayman whose actions in tackling a runaway train saved 
the life of an entire trainload of schoolchildren but cost him his life), Parker and MacColl realised that 
the recorded speech of those who knew and worked with Axon was immensely powerful and deserved 
to be heard without the use of an actor's voice (the standard technique of the radio feature at the time). 
The programme received both critical and popular acclaim. The use of ordinary speech to drive the 
story was an extraordinary achievement (`Axon' was subsequently nominated by the BBC for the 
prestigious international radio prize, the Prix d'Italia) and helped cement the importance of allowing 
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early version of `access' television'. By providing an extensive and symbolically rich 
entry into vernacular experiences Mitchell's techniques of recording paved the way 
for more personalised presentations of ordinary peoples' testimony. 
In the 1960s the documentary tradition, which had developed in the 1950s, continued 
to flourish. Special Enquiry's shift of focus from the powerful to the ordinary evolved 
into the highly successful Tonight programme. Although Tonight's magazine format 
was substantially more informal than Special Enquiry, it continued and enhanced 
television's interest in the `real world'. Tonight's philosophy was summed up by the 
distinguished broadcasting commentator Grace Wyndham Goldie: `It was not always 
necessary to be respectful; experts were not always right; the opinions of those in high 
places did not have to be accepted (quoted in Crisell, op. cit.: 94). Its conversational 
approach to topics chimed well with an informal, even irreverent, mood that was 
beginning to emerge during the 1960s. However, the break with Reithian paternalism 
following the arrival of commercial television had done little to alter the new balance 
of power within which the duopoly operated. Professional programme makers 
continued to control public broadcasting's system of representation. 
By the end of the 1960s television had taken over the cinema's mass working class 
audience and was rapidly developing its own distinctive forms - in its treatment of 
politics, drama, comedy and satire, sport, interviews - different from anything 
previously seen or heard in the cinema or on radio (Curran and Seaton, 1997). In its 
non-fiction output the `fly on the wall' technique of documentary production extended 
the aesthetic limitations of the TV documentary-as journalism approach (exemplified 
by Special Enquiry) by developing a style of observationalism (or verite) that has 
ordinary people to speak for themselves in radio programmes dealing with the realities of their 
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remained popular with audiences and schedulers. The availability of lightweight 16 
mm cameras enabled a strong `evidentiary' level of visualisation to take precedence 
over commentary: `The observational mode, variously combined with expositional 
forms (interview, voice-over, to-camera presentation), becomes the central principle 
of verite-style programmes, to the point that in many such programmes all discourses 
external to the plane of observed action... are excluded' (Comer, 1995: 88). In 
practice, the `following' of ongoing action by programme makers gives viewers the 
sense of unmediated access to actuality uncompromised by the presence of the 
camera. 
One of the best-known examples of the fly-on-the-wall technique was Paul Watson's 
series, The Family (BBC, 1974). The Wilkinses of Reading were the subjects of 
Watson's film. The cameraman, Philip Bonham-Carter, spent most of the recording 
period in the Wilkins' sitting-room selectively filming the comings and goings of 
family members as well as recording their testimonies (see Corner, 1996: pp. 46-8). 
Indeed, recorded actuality formed the core of the series and created space for the 
Wilkinses to articulate about intimate domestic topics. But despite Watson's 
avowedly back-seat approach to determining subject matter the fly-on-the-wall 
aesthetic remained the `property' of the documentary maker. In other words, while 
spawning a long-running strand of documentary television, The Family `belonged' to 
Watson and the BBC. For some critics, professional control of the documentary form 
jarred with the democratic impulse of the documentary enterprise (to reveal, to make 
known, to expose etc. ). Thus, while British television became increasingly interested 
in the `realities' of everyday life, dissatisfaction with television's established 
everyday lives (see MacColl's own discussion of the Radio Ballad form in MacColl, 1990, pp. 311-36). 
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representational practices was beginning to be voiced by those concerned about the 
undemocratic nature of public broadcasting systems. 
The 1970s: Discontent and Criticism 
The late sixties proved to be a decisive moment in the development of `alternative' 
forms of media. Across all major fields of culture - in music, film, theatre, art, 
publishing, etc. - recognition of social divisions and a growing irreverence towards 
`established authority' was finding expression in new and challenging modes of 
representation. In this radical climate concern about the centralized control of 
broadcasting gathered pace. By the early 1970s the mood was typified by the 
emergence of a number of campaigning groups - the Free Communications Group, the 
76 Group (made up of disaffected BBC and ITV producers), and the Standing 
Conference on Broadcasting - each of which sought to widen public access to the 
production side of broadcasting (Crisell, op. cit. ). For these organizations, enabling 
citizens or groups to participate in the mass communication process was a way of 
democratizing the media. 
Against this backdrop of political objections to the media the edifice of 
professionalised mediations of the televised `ordinary' began to be questioned. 
Reithian paternalism had entailed the exclusion of a multitude of voices and views, 
experiences and vah}es. The call for more open and democratic broadcasting practices 
emerged out of criticisms that the BBC and ITV duopoly was not representing the full 
spectrum of opinion and experience within British society. The limits to the autonomy 
of the duopoly, coupled with a working reliance on an assumed social and political 
consensus, led to the accusation that national broadcasting systems per se were 
flawed. Critics argued for alternative methods of distribution centered on small units 
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which they believed could be more democratically controlled and equipped with less 
complicated, less expensive equipment for use by ordinary people in local programme 
making. A combination of technological developments in video and the emergence of 
an embryonic cable television system gave these hopes a degree of currency. 
Democratizing Television: From Community Television to Community Programmes 
Cable television has existed in Britain since the early 1950s. Cable systems originally 
came into being as a method of enhancing signal reception in areas where local 
topography made the latter difficult. For a rental fee cable companies such as 
Rediffusion supplied good quality signals to homes via piped cable. As advances in 
UHF transmission quality improved however subscribers left these services. In 
response to their crumbling subscriber base the cable operators tried to exploit one of 
the main advantages of cable systems - their relative abundance of channels. With 
some notable exceptions the cable companies were legally prohibited from originating 
material of their own since it broke with the public service tenet that broadcast 
channels should be universally available (Hollins, 1984). The exceptions were 
temporary licenses granted by the then controlling body, the Ministry of Post and 
Telecommunications, to five cable companies to allow them to experiment with local 
television services (see Lewis, 1978). All five experiments were owned and operated 
by commercial companies who were required to bear the full financial cost of the 
three-year experiment. Thus Bristol Channel was operated by Rediffusion while 
money from EMI helped finance the Swindon Viewpoint station. 
They were interested in the idea of local television because they felt it might help 
open doors to more profitable forms of cable-delivered programming like pay-TV. 
Initially hopes were high that the Conservative government (who had issued the 
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licences) might sanction the move into pay-TV by allowing the cable companies to 
show films and major sporting events. But these hopes were dashed by the return to 
power of a Labour government in 1974. The licensees quickly abandoned interest in 
these stations when it became clear that the new administration would not support 
their broader commercial interests. Nonetheless, the local stations continued to 
produce television programmes thanks to volunteer groups enamoured with the 
communicative potential of community access television. The emergence of 
community media - local TV, radio, video, photography, print, film - in the 1970s 
signalled a growing conviction that the means of communication and forms of public 
expression should be `small scale' with no intention of becoming mass media. For 
community media groups public broadcasting institutions had failed in their basic 
duty to provide space for a plurality of expression and opinion. 
The call for local television based upon the principles of access and participation must 
be understood as one of several efforts to reverse the societal trend towards still larger 
units and greater concentration of power (Prehn, 1992). The `new left' in the early 
1970's felt that electronic media could be powerful tools for generating social change. 
Hostility and mistrust of the BBC/ITV duopoly centred on the inability of `mass 
communication' to involve ordinary people as political citizens in policy and decision 
making activities (Groombridge, 1972). The hope was that engaging non- 
professionals in media production would increase their social and political awareness. 
Small-scale forms of public communication were not necessarily aimed at 
confrontation with the establishment, but at trying to create a local forum for 
articulation and discussion. The established national and regional broadcasters, due to 
their institutionalized character, were considered incapable of catering to specific 
audiences or of addressing local topics or interests. 
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For community media groups, small scale broadcasting in specific localities were both 
a means of changing the broadcasting system and a potential basis for social renewal . 
The small scale of operation also meant that local people could be encouraged to take 
part in all stages of programme making and in running the stations (Nigg and Wade, 
1980). However, differing attitudes on the part of the licensees meant that there were 
significant variations in the stations' aims. Thus one saw its task as providing a local 
television service of high technical quality based on national standards. It included 
information about community life as well as programmes made by local residents in 
which they expressed their own views and opinions. Another sought to fill gaps 
identified in major network output and therefore provide a local alternative to national 
television. Others again, intended to provide community television in which members 
of the local community could act as initiators, participants and programme makers. 
All the stations experienced difficulties in attracting and sustaining community 
participation over a period of time. 
Although the five original community cable experiments survived the initial severing 
of interest by the parent companies, most did not survive for long. Despite donated 
equipment and enthusiastic volunteers their shoestring budgets meant they could only 
continue to produce community television programmes for about two years. By the 
end of the experimental period four of the five stations had folded. However, by the 
end of that year a new experiment in local television appeared - Channel 40. Its 
uniqueness lay in its mode of finance. It was launched entirely with public money 
(from the Post Office and the development corporation charged with promoting its 
home base of Milton Keynes as a `new town'). Channel 40 was set up as a local 
service providing information for people new to the area and as a community facility 
for anyone who wanted to participate in making TV programmes. Although a few 
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full-time technicians and producers were employed to give editorial advice about 
producing broadcast quality programmes, Channel 40 was perceived first and 
foremost as a public communicative resource `enabling individuals and... interest 
groups to achieve their communication aims irrespective of... audience appeal' 
(Barrett, quoted in Lewis 1978: 67). 
In his report on community television for the British Film Institute in 1978, Peter 
Lewis noted that those working in the sector saw their job as providing something 
different from mainstream broadcasting professionals. They put the local community 
first, rather than the dictates of a mass institution or the demands of `professional 
excellence'. They shared a strong conviction that certain communities (including 
`communities of interest') were either ignored by mainstream media or were being 
exploited as the `subjects' of a professional documentarian' `gaze' (Bibby et al., 
1979). In contrast, advocates of community television argued that local TV was a 
form of social advocacy in which the people being `documented' were not simply the 
objects of a film-makers interpretative vision, but the subjects of their own vision. 
Thus the central hope underpinning the Channel 40 experiment (at least for those 
working for the project) was that community television could provide an alternative 
forum for the self-representation that was being denied elsewhere. What gave this 
hope the possibility of realisation was the medium of video. 
The existence, and survival, of community television stations like Channel 40 
depended on both the active involvement of local people in programme making, and 
people's practical relationship to the video-based technology which made community 
television possible. To this extent, community television was technology-led. The 
availability of relatively inexpensive, broadcast-standard video equipment simple 
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enough to be operated by amateurs was a vital factor underpinning the hope that 
community television might actually work. The idea of letting citizens take the new 
video cameras (known as portapaks) out beyond the `institutional space' of the TV 
studio in order to record aspects of their daily lives was for some `alternative' media 
enthusiasts inherently democratic and challenging (though the practice was not 
without its critics - see Bibby et al. op. cit. ). 
At Channel 40, the residents of Milton Keynes were trained in the use of portapak 
video and then encouraged to make their own programmes about the experience of 
living in a new town. The technology allowed a unique mode of address to emerge; 
which for the lack of any better phrase can be called `point of view' programming. 
Thus many Channel 40 programmes expressed a `this is what it's like..? ' attitude 
towards a broad range of `local' issues. As Michael Barrett, Channel 40's station 
manager put it: `Channel 40... is not, like entertainment television, obliged to feature 
the sensational, the special, the noteworthy; Channel 40 is about the real, the 
ordinary, and the every-day in the life of the new city' (Barrett, quoted in Bibby et al 
op. cit.: 29 original emphasis). The channel's concern with the `real', the `ordinary', 
and the `everyday' marked the culmination of attempts by Barrett and his colleagues 
to create a democratic public forum based on the concerns of everyday life. For them, 
it was in the ante rooms of social activity that community television could truly 
develop its character as a two-way form of communication. 
The community cable stations were not the only British experiments in access 
television however. In the early 1970s dissatisfaction with public broadcasting's 
representational practices was also becoming increasingly evident amongst 
professional broadcasters. They felt that the social changes of the 1970s were being 
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ignored by the major broadcasting institutions and that a considerable gap had opened 
up between their routine practices and the complexities of contemporary social life 
(Murdock, 1994). Established programme formats were seen as ignoring or 
marginalizing substantial areas of social and cultural activity. Thus around the same 
time that the first community cable channel began broadcasting at Greenwich (July 
1972), BBC2's national access programme Open Door also began transmission. It 
came about as a result of a recognition by established programme makers that their 
industry `was... out of touch with `views, life-styles and community backgrounds' 
different from those of the broadcasting professionals themselves' (Corner, 1994: 21). 
Open Door was produced by the BBC's newly created Community Programmes Unit 
(CPU) and was inspired by the broader public debate about control of broadcasting in 
the UK as well as by developments in community access television in the USA and 
Canada (Dovey, 1991). 
The CPU's remit was to establish a regularly scheduled access opportunity within the 
framework of a national television network. According to Jeremy Gibson, the current 
head of the CPU, the original maxim which brought the CPU into existence remains 
the same: `We exist to represent the under-represented, the mis-represented or the 
non-represented' (Dovey, ibid.: 164). However, while Gibson's sentiments are 
laudable it is important to remember that the CPU has, for almost 25 years, made 
programmes in which minority groups have been almost totally reliant upon 
broadcasting professionals to represent their point of view for them. While the CPU 
gave formal editorial control to its accessees, its open access model was accompanied 
by substantial aesthetic involvement from the Unit's professionals. Thus according to 
Dovey (ibid.: 166) Open Door's successor, Open Space, `started to look... like any 
other high-quality BBC documentary feature' (ibid.: 166). Although there is nothing 
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inherently `inauthentic' about high quality access television it is arguable that the 
CPU's attempts to let accessees represent themselves has to some extent been 
overshadowed by professional notions of what access television should look like. 
The issue of professional involvement/interference in programme production has 
dogged access television since its inception. Both the editorially `guided' programmes 
of Channel 40, and the professionally produced programmes of the CPU, give rise to 
the accusation that neither initiative substantially developed the scope for `true' self- 
representation on television. For example, Channel 40's critics accused it of aping the 
conventions established by mainstream television - in particular, of transforming the 
documenting potential of video into a more conscious `documentary' format (Bibby et 
al., 1979: 30). While the CPU's professionally-assisted forays into public access can 
easily be assimilated into existing notions of `good television'. Neither venture can be 
said to have wrested representational authority away from mainstream broadcasters. 
Despite their best efforts, opportunities for public participation and involvement in the 
mainstream television system remained limited. So much so in fact that calls for the 
establishment of a `third force' in British broadcasting were increasingly being voiced 
both by programme-makers within the BBC/ITV duopoly and by lobby groups. What 
they had in mind was the creation of a fourth television service to break the duopoly's 
stranglehold on public broadcasting. 
Channel 4: Extending Voices 
While Channel 4 has multiple origins (see Lambert, 1982), the channel as finally set 
up aimed to extend the diversity of broadcast output by serving special interests and in 
particular the needs of ethnic and other minority groups. To this end it was required to 
experiment with programme forms and to commission its programmes from 
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independent producers. The centralized conditions under which BBC/ITV 
programmes were produced made it practically impossible for independent 
programme-makers to get their work broadcast on the BBC and ITV networks. In the 
1960s and 1970s this was brought home to a number of distinguished television 
programme-makers (including figures like Alistair Milne, Robert Kee and Jeremy 
Isaacs) who had attempted to set up independent production companies, and had 
discovered how hard and financially unrewarding it was to work outside of the 
duopoly (Harvey, 1994). Their dissatisfaction with the `closure' of the duopoly was 
shared by Anthony Smith, a former BBC producer and during this period a research 
fellow at Oxford University. 
Ever since the BBC had been awarded a second channel in 1962 (BBC 2 eventually 
began transmission in April 1964), there had been a general understanding that the 
government would allocate the vacant fourth channel. The argument, made most 
consistently by Conservative MP's, was that ITV should run the channel to restore 
`balance' to the duopoly. However, that convenient assumption was comprehensively 
challenged by the wider debate on the nature and purpose of the fourth channel. 
During the early stages of this Smith outlined an influential plan for a `National 
Television Foundation' which would commission programmes from `authors' 
(Lambert, op cit.: pp. 46-49). These, Smith argued, would form a new production base 
outside the impregnable walls of the duopoly. His idea was that the fourth channel 
would act a `publishing house' for independent programme-makers that could tap into 
and give expression to the cultural needs of minority groups neglected by mainstream 
television. That some of these producers could also tap into the new ethnic 
communities of Britain was seen as important for creating an alternative televisual 
space for public discourse and representation. 
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Smith's publishing analogy, though not entirely without critics (mainly over its 
financial viability - see Docherty et al., 1988), struck a cord with many involved in the 
debate about the purpose of the fourth channel. More importantly, members of Lord 
Annan's committee of enquiry into the future of broadcasting (set up by the 1974-79 
Labour government) were sympathetic to his proposals and in particular his 
suggestion for creating a new television channel for minority audiences. As a 
consequence, much of his thinking (including his frustration with the duopoly) found 
articulation in the Committee's final report in 1977. Following Smith, it 
recommended an Open Broadcasting Authority (OBA) which would operate as an 
electronic publisher of material provided by independent programme-makers. 
Although the OBA plan was rejected by the then Home Secretary, William Whitelaw, 
in favour of control by the IBA the idea of developing an independent production base 
outside of the duopoly found favour amongst those in government charged with 
bringing the channel to life. The IBA version of Annan (and Smith) was broadly the 
model that the incoming Thatcher government adopted in its parliamentary bill of 
February 1980. 
As an institution that operated as a publisher of programmes rather than a producer, 
Channel 4 gave expression to a newly identified set of cultural needs, while adding to 
the commercial armoury of the independent television sector. A flourishing 
independent sector has been crucial to Channel 4's interpretation of its statutory duty 
to give expression to new themes and otherwise unheard minority views and values. 
As such, it is the latest (and probably the last) extension of the public service 
broadcasting principle. By showing independently produced programmes, often made 
in close relationship to particular locales and intended primarily (though not 
exclusively) for particular groups and communities, the hope was that television could 
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be opened up to the challenge of hearing new voices and experiences. Indeed, the 
channel's first Chief Executive, Jeremy Isaacs, made it clear after taking the job that 
he saw Channel 4's great promise as being `one in which all kinds of people would be 
able to put their point of view' (Docherty et al., op cit.: 18-19). This commitment to 
diversity is a defining feature of Channel 4's core project of correcting inequalities in 
mainstream broadcasting's (mis)representation of the disadvantaged and 
marginalized. 
Whether Channel 4 has been successful in this is a moot point. That the channel has 
tried to do this however is contestable. Its relative success in giving expression to the 
`new pluralism' of the eighties has affected the whole ecology of British broadcasting, 
extending the range of subjects dealt with by television (Harvey, 1994). One 
particularly notable aspect of the channel's attempts to voice the tensions of the 1980s 
(tensions involving a broad range of social and cultural changes) has been its 
accessing of strong opinion. Through programmes such as Comment, Opinions and 
Right to Reply, Channel 4 established the notion that TV programmes can express 
`directly' stated views without upset to the body politic. Indeed, the representation of 
`strong opinion' was interpreted by Isaacs as a key element of Channel 4's remit 
(Harvey, ibid. ). This approach was firmly within Smith's original aim for the fourth 
channel; that it should function according to a doctrine of openness to expression 
rather than the bland and neutral `balance' characteristic of the established channels. 
By challenging the received notion that `argumentative' programming should revolve 
around two contrasted points of view Channel 4 has markedly broadened the forms of 
public argument and discussion on British television. In response, the mainstream 
networks have adopted some of the channel's ideas about `polemical' television 
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(Docherty et at., op cit. ). Despite its achievements in `publishing' alternative points of 
view however, accessing `ordinary' people and `ordinary' views is not the channel's 
main priority (nor has it ever been). Moreover as Comer (1994: 31) points out, `In 
recent British broadcasting, the tendency has been for access to be increasingly 
`professionalised' as it has been partly subsumed within the movement towards 
minority programming, supplied to the networks by small independents'. Instead, a 
new form of access television is being championed. The arrival of the domestic 
camcorder has been hailed as the latest and perhaps last hope for securing unmediated 
access within the competitive and highly pressured television environment of the 
1990s. 
The Camcorder Revolution: Access as 'Do-it-Yourself Documentary 
Although the domestic camcorder was available as long ago as 1980 its poor picture 
quality ensured that its use as a tool of public communication was not taken seriously. 
It was only with developments in its technical quality coupled with its mass 
production and relative cheapness that its aesthetic possibilities (see below) have been 
realised. The first VHS combined camera and recorder emerged in the mid 1980s. In 
contrast to the portapaks used by the local cable television stations earlier in the 1970s 
these cameras were smaller, easier to use, cheaper and of better quality. They also had 
additional features such as `steady shot', instant playback and swift autofocus, all of 
which contributed to their popularity amongst the public. The camcorders relative 
ease of use has seen it rapidly establish itself as an essential recorder of family 
histories, documenting and authenticating domestic lives. The pleasures of home 
video viewing have not been lost on television producers. The popularity in the late 
1980s of programmes such as ITV's You've Been Framed and the BBC's Caught on 
88 
Creating A Public Voice 
Camera (based on happenstance `accidents' captured on camcorders and sent in by 
viewers) was the first indication that a `camcorder culture' was emerging and with it 
the possibilities for access might be transformed. 
The most important development in this context has been the innovatory Video 
Diaries series, developed by the BBC's Community Programmes Unit. In Video 
Diaries individuals with a story to tell are first selected and then issued with a VHS 
camcorder to record events in their own or their family's lives. Diarists then edit the 
tapes in consultation with professionals in the CPU. The resulting programmes are 
then broadcast on the national network and are the joint property of the diarist and the 
BBC. What Video Diaries aims to do (in theory at least) is to empower the individual 
diarist by mobilising their experientially-based vision of the world. 
This home-produced camcorder material is the latest attempt to wrest representational 
power away from broadcasting professionals by letting ordinary people express their 
own special concerns and present their own particular arguments in their own 
language and in their own way. This possibility rests not on the replacement of the 
professional film maker by the amateur but on a changed relationship between them: 
In Video Diaries the diarist is at different times, and often at the same time, researcher, 
director, producer, camera operator, sound person and editor (not to mention subject) and the 
role of the professional producer in the process is not so much removed as renegotiated 
(Keighron 1993: 24). 
However, this `renegotiated' relationship between professional and amateur film 
makers raises wider questions concerning the degree to which diarists have final 
editorial/aesthetic control over their productions. According to Video Diaries' 
executive producer Bob Long, the ultimate editorial control of the diarist is the only 
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thing about the series which is `set in stone' (Keighron, 1994: 24). However, this 
claim belies the fact that potential diarists still have to go through the most arduous 
editing process of all - being selected to make a diary. The fact that only 1 in 50 
applications are given serious consideration, suggests that the CPU's celebration of 
the authorship rights of individual diarists continually bumps up against strong 
professional criteria. This is further highlighted by the accusation that, editorially, 
Video Diaries' selection strategy has drifted towards the sensational and voyeuristic 
(see Corner, 1994 op. cit.; Dovey, 1991 op cit. ). At the same time, the claim that 
editorial control of the projects finally selected lies with diarists suggests that the 
original political aspirations of the CPU - to promote access and participation in the 
television process - remain relatively intact within the BBC, despite the organization's 
increasingly populist agenda. 
Despite concerns about the CPU's editorial drift, subjectivity remains the core of the 
Video Diaries form: `The diarist becomes the subject, story, of the film whatever 
other issues may be under discussion' (Dovey, 1996: 129). For some, such as 
American TV producer Ilan Ziv, this poses an exciting challenge: `My task is to 
destroy television'. What he in fact wants to destroy is the ideology of objectivity and 
replace it with a new emphasis on the subjective: `Lets go `subjective' all the way' 
(Fraser, 1992). Such a celebratory insistence upon the individual point of view is what 
for Ziv marks out the camcorder as a technology capable of creating a new form of 
`personal testimony' journalism. Whereas traditional forms of documentary place 
great emphasis on a neat packaging of `the issues' within an impartial "here-is-the- 
problem-this-is-the-answer" structure, camcorder culture rejects the `dominant 
ideology' of TV naturalism (Goodwin, 1993). No longer do we have to trust in 
mediated representations of a world `out there', nor do we have to abdicate 
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responsibility for truth-telling to TV professionals. Using the camcorder we can now 
have raw, authentic, self-representations of an `inner' - somehow more `truthful' - 
personal world that even the most revealing of verite documentaries could not hope to 
achieve. 
The claim that the camcorder is moving television towards a new aesthetic of 
documentary truth resides in the medium's `techno-reflexivity'. Whereas the `fly-on- 
the-wall' approach to documentary tried to efface the intervention of the camera crew 
and offer a kind of ideology of the `neutral' camera (Channel 40's project director 
Michael Barrett also believed - perhaps somewhat naively - that community access 
television could effect a `neutral' stance in its facilitating role), camcorder culture (at 
least in its Video Diaries manifestation) does the opposite. It celebrates the actual 
presence of the film-maker as part and parcel of its truth-telling function. The wobbly, 
awkward, grainy shots (especially of the diarist picking up or switching off the 
camcorder) operate as a visual guarantee of the veracity of what the camera - is 
recording/showing. Transmitted images of diarists switching off their camcorder 
within the flow of a diary can be seen as signifying that they are choosing to break 
with the `professionalised', constructed, conventions of the mediated documentary 
form preferring instead to represent their lives in ways that they themselves have 
chosen. 
Following Corner (1994), the question remains as to whether camcorder technology 
has succeeded in developing `access' as a communicative enterprise in the nineties. 
There is no doubt that the Video Diaries series has been a major advance in 
broadcasting personal testimony. These are the accounts of people traditionally under- 
represented, misrepresented or simply ignored by mainstream television. In the 
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process all kinds of subject matter have been dealt with (see Dowmunt, 1991). Video 
Diaries (along with its sister programme Teenage Diaries) has allowed viewers a 
privileged and unique mode of access to a degree of subjectivity unimaginable in 
traditional documentary modes of expression. However, even though Video Diaries 
has concentrated on `seeking out voices that are, for whatever reason, genuinely 
unheard' (Dovey, 1991: 167) there remains the possibility that the series offers 
nothing more than an entertaining (sometimes embarrassing) form of navel-gazing. In 
other words, the private, individual concerns of diarists are an end in themselves -a 
subjective discourse of emotion and self-reflection/self-scrutiny which in contrast to 
other factual television forms contributes little either to the public sphere or to the 
access idea per se. 
However, this criticism can be challenged on the grounds that it privileges precisely 
those types of factual programmes in which `public' (masculine) issues are seen as 
more important than `domestic' (feminized) concerns. The Video Diary format may 
well allow a voice to be heard but it is a lone voice that begins and ends in the sphere 
of domesticity. At its best it encourages an intimacy between diarist and viewer. At its 
worst it is `purely' personal communication taking up precious public broadcasting 
space. This approach sees developments in access and other `reality' formats (see 
Kilborn, 1994) as symptoms of a decline in public television's role as the pivot of the 
public sphere. But as Dinsmore (1996: 55) points out, the inclusion of private 
discourses in the public domain could also be seen as the result of a growing 
recognition that television is a broadcast medium enhanced by domestic tones of 
voice: 
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In the context of other factual television programmes in the schedules, the Video Diaries' use 
of a private language which is recognized as domestic and familiar claims a place in the public 
airwaves not simply for voices that would otherwise be unheard, but also for a tone of voice 
that is rarely privileged as part of the public discourse of television. 
Private, domestic, voices have been consistently marginalized by a public service 
discourse dominated by experts and an official kind of talk (Bondebjerg, 1996). Video 
Diaries reacts against this top-down tradition by privileging the private, the intimate 
and the domestic within a context of intimate engagement with the otherness being 
portrayed. In doing so, the series creates the possibility for `subtly self-reflective 
programmes in which the personal, subjective discourse of emotion and self- 
reflection, which is frequently denigrated by other factual television forms, is 
privileged as an intensely sophisticated strategy for self-scrutiny' (Dinsmore, op. cit.: 
54). 
This broadening of television's style of address facilitates a whole new repertoire of 
topics and styles of performance, a point emphasised in Scannell's (1992: 334) 
account of the role of broadcasting in the democratisation of everyday life: `The 
world, in broadcasting, appears as ordinary, mundane, accessible, knowable, familiar, 
recognizable, shareable and communicable for whole populations. It is talkable about 
by everyone'. This is not the independent realm of discourse imagined by Habermas. 
It is rather that new forms of public discourse are being generated, forms which like 
Video Diaries are indigenous to their setting. It is therefore inappropriate, Scannell 
argues, to draw upon Habermas's model of rational discourse, based as that is on a 
literary rather than electronic culture: `I prefer to characterize the impact of 
broadcasting as enhancing the reasonable, as distinct from rational character of daily 
life in public and private contexts' (ibid.: 342). This perspective makes it less 
93 
Creating A Public Voice 
paradoxical that a public national network should be the means for communication in 
private and domestic tones of voice. It also gives rise to the possibility that public 
debate on television could be a more inclusive rather than exclusive experience than it 
has hitherto been. This issue has been brought to the fore most recently with the rise 
of audience participation programmes. 
Audience Participation Programmes: Rarely Heard Voices 
Participatory talk shows are not a new phenomenon on television. They have a history 
stretching back over twenty five years in the United States (Rose, 1985). However, 
they are a relatively novel phenomenon in British television. The move from elite to 
participatory and access programming has been a slow and difficult rearrangement 
despite the greater pluralism of public broadcasting in the 1960s and 1970s (Murdock, 
1992). The spectre of Reith has loomed large ensuring that attempts to broaden media 
participation have been consistently met with questions about qualifications to speak. 
Talk shows challenge established access regulations by inviting ordinary people to 
participate in a television debate on a (usually) topical issue. They are presided over 
by a host who controls the discussion by moving around the studio and nominating 
speakers. The studio audience is made up of two key constituencies: lay people, some 
of whom have grounded experience of the issue in question, and `experts' with 
specialist knowledge and/or professional understanding of the issue. A crucial feature 
of presentation is that experts and lay participants are seated in a `democratic' manner 
such that neither is recognized as having priority access to the host (see Livingstone 
and Lunt, 1994 for a detailed description of the talk show setting). 
The talk show is built upon the experiences, opinions and lives of ordinary people. 
Across the television schedule there are a variety of both British talk shows (e. g. 
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Kilroy (BBC), The Time The Place (ITV)) and their American equivalents (e. g. 
Ophrah (BBC2) and Ricki Lake (C4)). In all these programmes ordinary people are 
invited to give opinions and speak authoritatively on social and personal issues, as 
well as to recount their experiences. By providing a public forum in which lay 
participation is highly valued, expert contributions are often marginalized (sometimes 
even completely absent). Lay knowledge is valorized on the basis of the authenticity 
of lived-experience. What the lay person knows is elevated over and above what 
experts know precisely because the former possesses grounded experience of the issue 
whilst the latter does not. Experts lack `authority-born-of-experience' and as such are 
generally considered inferior witnesses in talk shows. Consequently, their erudition 
can work against them, particularly when the host draws attention to the abstract or 
ungrounded character of their specialist knowledge (such as when data or theories are 
introduced into discussion) and invites lay participants to directly challenge them. 
Talks shows therefore involve a significant challenge to established hierarchies of 
knowledge by providing a forum in which experts are held directly accountable to lay 
epistemologies. Both are presented as interested parties but are held to know different 
things in different ways. However the argumentative strategies of lay participants are 
more readily accepted. In the discursive space provided by these programmes 
expertise is contrasted with and set in opposition to the experiences of everyday life 
(indeed experts are often invited to learn from lay experience). Livingstone and Lunt 
(1994: 97) make clear the implications of prioritizing the lay over the expert and the 
use of private individuals to illustrate public issues: `As experts belong, in 
Habermas's terms, to the system, while the laity belong to the private domain of the 
life-world, these forums break with cultural traditions, and attempt a reconstruction of 
both expertise and lay knowledge'. By placing ordinary people on an equal footing 
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with experts common knowledge and everyday experience is rescued from its 
subordinate status as `vox-pop'. 
In the talk show the voice of the expert has to respond to the testimony of ordinary 
people by joining them in constructing mini-narratives of everyday life. This 
requirement is established at the beginning of each programme by the hosts' use of a 
personal narrative to open up the broader issues at stake (at least the issues as dictated 
by the host). Underpinning the talk show's conversational discursive mode is a 
valorization of `common sense'. Common sense prevails over expertise precisely 
because it is assumed to give privileged access to `the truth'. However, truth in the 
talk show is conveyed through an interpretative frame that privileges the personal and 
individualistic over the social and structural (Dahlgren, 1995). What counts as 
evidence and a `good' argument is therefore less structured and more spontaneous 
than in a documentary deploying a narrated argument or `dominant account'. Because 
the paternalism of established public service discourse is absent from many (though 
not all) of these talk shows they have been welcomed as a sign that a pluralist public 
sphere is beginning to emerge. 
From the Bourgeois to the Plural Public Sphere 
The description of the public sphere offered by Habermas can also be read as an 
account of the emergence of an intolerant public culture. It will be recalled that the 
bourgeois public sphere is held by Habermas to be an ideal space in which people 
come together as a `public' to pursue rational debate in the interests of all. However, 
this space, and the conditions for communications within it, favours the participation 
of some citizens over others. Feminists in particular have criticized Habermas's 
failure to engage with the exclusion of women from the public sphere arguing that his 
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gender (and class) blindness privileges an overly rationalistic view of human 
communication (Stevenson, 1996) which reinforces masculine forms of reasoning and 
argumentation as the most appropriate model for communication. It is notable how 
well this criticism applies to formal broadcasting practice. As we have seen, attempts 
to win space for `different' publics and construct a more inclusive model of public 
communication have consistently battled against a powerful paternal ethos. 
It is in light of feminist critiques of Habermas that Livingstone and Lunt welcome the 
emergence of the talk show. Their approach is one that sees talk shows as expanding 
the public sphere. The Habermasian model places a heavy emphasis on rational 
dialogue to the detriment of narrative, conversational and emotional modes of talk. 
The latter have been `feminized' and downgraded ensuring that domestic issues have 
less of a stake in public discourse. In their view the talk show is evidence of a new, 
more pluralistic, public sphere in which marginalized and excluded voices regulate 
the discourse of the more powerful through the mixing of public and private 
discourses. Instead of aiming at social consensus forged through rational debate 
among `the public' (dominated by experts and professionals) the talk show format 
celebrates the essential diversity of multiple, overlapping publics engaging with 
particular (rather than universal) concerns. Livingstone writes: 
If we move away from Habermas's idealised hope for (and disillusion concerning) the public 
sphere, towards a model based on plural and diverse publics in negotiation with each other, 
then the audience discussion programme may be reasonably understood as one of the media 
genres which provides... a real public space for such negotiation (Livingstone, 1994: 439). 
However, some critics claim that talk shows, far from leading to changes in power 
relations, provide only an illusion of participation (see for example the criticism of 
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talk shows in Berman, 1991). Supporters counter by arguing that this reading is too 
narrow. In their view the social occasion of the talk show should be analyzed in the 
context of the general proliferation of access and public participation genres. 
Carpignano and his colleagues for example claim that talk shows not only signal a 
shift away from formal political agendas but also reveals the underlying crisis of the 
bourgeois public sphere: 
The crisis of the bourgeois public sphere is fully visible and displayed in front of our eyes. 
The crisis of representational democracy is the crisis of the traditional institutions of the public 
sphere - the party, the union, and so forth - and, most importantly, the present mass refusal of 
politics. If we think about the reconstitution of the public sphere in terms of revitalization of 
old political organizations... then the embryonic discursive practices of a talk show might 
appear interesting, but ultimately insignificant... But if we conceive of politics today as... 
consolidated in the circulation of discursive practices rather than in formal organizations, then 
a common place that formulates and propagates common senses and metaphors that govern 
our lives might be at the crossroads of a reconceptualization of collective practices 
(Carpignano et al., 1990: 119). 
The importance of the talk show for these commentators lies in its contribution to the 
`circulation of discursive practices'. Its conversational style displaces a structure of 
debate, conceived as a rational or civil exchange of conflicting viewpoints and 
privileges modes of discourse which are unable (or unwilling) to arrive at a 
conclusion. According to Livingstone and Lunt this generates a new type of public 
sphere in which everyday life and established power are mediated according to mixed 
and shifting discursive conventions. Crucial here is the blending of private and public 
discourses as part of a more democratic conception of `the public interest'. In their 
view the talk show promises to be a more tolerant site of public discourse in which 
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voices that were historically excluded from participation in the major medium of 
public communication can now be heard. 
Post-modern Babel or Game Show? 
Livingstone and Lunt's positive interpretation of talk shows advances an important 
claim: that in giving a platform to a multiplicity of voices and discourses they 
represent a `post-modern' condition. The talk show is for them evidence that in the 
post-modem world `the media play a central role, facilitating a plurality of previously 
repressed voices and subject positions' (Livingstone and Lunt, 1994: 175. ). The 
interplay of multiple discourses and forms of argumentation are confirmation that 
those voices that were previously drowned out by a paternalistic public broadcasting 
system, have been rescued. The traditional valorization of professional authority over 
lay experience is abandoned in favour of a `contested space' in which new discursive 
practices are developed, and within which participants are relatively free to make 
diverse interpretations, depending on their particular circumstances. The talk show 
thus becomes a dialogic community where multiple meanings flourish and diverse 
perspectives and viewpoints interrelate. However, while talk shows are clearly 
antithetical to the Habermasian ideal of rational debate and opinion formation the 
claim that they are the vanguard of a Babel-like explosion of repressed voices is one 
that merits caution. 
There is for example the possibility that the diverse voices of the talk show are 
evidence not of a post-modem babel, but of something more brutal: `The media today 
testify to the existence of an expanding market-driven heteroglossia' (Billig, 1997: 
225). From this perspective, talk shows are part of an instrumental appropriation of 
conflicting voices in keeping with the media's constant pursuit of ratings and new 
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formulas. Instead of being reflections of a post-modem celebration of repressed 
voices the talk show's revaluation of lay opinion entails a more cynical manipulation 
of personal experience. There is, then, another re-valuation of `everyday voices' at 
work here, one in which `the accessed ordinary will be made productive within the 
terms of market competition' (Corner, 1994: 33 original emphasis). As television 
becomes increasingly open to market-driven channel choice in Britain, the loyalty of 
audiences can never be guaranteed. The `economic ordering' of discursive variety 
such as that found in the talk show helps cement that illusive loyalty. 
While television is the dominant medium of the public sphere, `public sphering' as 
Peter Dahlgren (1995: 148) notes, is clearly not television's dominant institutional 
purpose: `As an industry, television has to follow the precepts of audience 
maximization and profits'. Recognizing that television operates as an industry points 
to the institutional logic underpinning the explosion of talk shows and other access 
formats. It is a commercial logic that drives the television industry's continual search 
for new programming possibilities. This market-driven desire to produce popularity 
lies behind the talk show's melange of entertainment, information and opinion. In this 
context, the talk show's blurred borderlines appear less as a post-modern collapse of 
established genre boundaries (whereby popular culture is undermining and 
overwhelming reasoned political dialogue and criticism), and more as testaments to 
the fluidity and hybridity demanded by the industry (Fiske, 1987). This is why the talk 
show contains characteristics of both game shows and `classical' debate programmes 
(Livingstone and Lunt, 1994) which helps explain both its populist disregard for 
intellectual debate and factual precision and its selection of topics and voices from 
outside the traditionally defined arenas of public interest. In the final analysis, 
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however, the question remains as to whether in the talk show's din of voices anyone 
gets heard. 
Conclusion 
In sketching a brief history of public access within broadcasting this chapter has 
focused attention on the system's relative `openness' (and closure) to the opinions and 
experiences of ordinary people. We have seen a continual struggle over two 
contrasted conceptions of `public service'. On the one hand, broadcasting is conceived 
as a public sphere in which representatives of cultural groupings, civil associations, 
pressure groups and so forth articulate particular interests. On the other hand it 
appears as a discursive space which can `soak up' the diverse opinions and 
experiences of individual citizens speaking. However, as this chapter has shown the 
principle of access runs up against its limits as soon as we acknowledge that 
professionalism and expertise will continue to have an important role in the public 
communicational enterprise. In the provision of specialist information, the filtering 
and framing of experience and the production of `high quality' programmes public 
service media have no choice but to violate their own principle of equality of access 
for all citizens: 
public service media... distribute entitlements to speak and to be heard and seen unevenly. 
They... develop a cast of regulars - reporters, presenters, commentators, academic experts, 
businesspeople, politicians, trade unionists, cultural authorities - who appear as accredited 
representatives of public experience and taste by virtue of their regular appearance (Keane. 
1991: 123). 
Nevertheless, access to and participation in the public broadcasting system has long 
been recognized as a matter of democratic importance by both broadcasters and 
101 
Creating A Public Voice 
public. The question of representation - of having a voice, of being taken seriously, of 
being treated with sympathy and understanding by programme makers - points to the 
necessity of an open public space in which external influence is limited and which 
accesses the widest possible range of viewpoints, perspectives and experiences across 
a variety of forms and genres. However, as we shall see in the context of our case 
study of schizophrenic people's entitlement to a public voice, `access' and 
`participation' in the public sphere of broadcasting is no easy matter. 
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Introduction: Asylum and Community Care in Context 
The history of the care and treatment of the mentally ill is characterised by a series of 
cycles of reform and neglect. Each moment of reform has been marked by a belief 
that a new institution or form. of treatment would solve the problems of the past. Thus 
the prominent nineteenth century lunacy campaigner, Sir George Paget, could claim 
that the public asylum was the "the most blessed manifestation of true civilization the 
world can present" (Quoted in Scull, 1996: 69). With the benefit of hindsight this 
appears a curious, even perverse, statement but at the time it perfectly expressed the 
Victorians' conviction that a kindly, more humane approach to treating the mad had 
been found. Later, the resurgence of community-based mental health care was again 
the occasion for optimism. Here, for example, is a visiting New York psychiatrist to 
mid 1950s Britain commenting on hospital-community relations: 
My trip to England... changed my attitude towards the function of the mental hospital, and the 
needs of the mentally ill. The progress we so admired in England, which is culminating in... 
community-oriented psychiatry, arose from the attitude that mentally ill patients were still 
responsible people who were competent to control their own behaviour except for brief 
periods... We discovered that the mental hospital was not the exclusive site for psychiatric 
treatment, but served as a centre for community-based mental health programmes which 
included consultation with family doctors, clinic treatments, and day care (quoted in Jones, 
1993: 153). 
In the mid 1990s however, enthusiasm for community-based mental health treatment 
is at a low ebb. The social costs of community care have been increasingly questioned 
and there is even talk of it being a `failed' policy and that perhaps the mental hospital 
was, after all, the best place in which to care for the seriously mentally disturbed. 
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To understand current concerns and debates however, we need to retrieve something 
of the complex history of oscillation between the ascendancy of the asylum and the 
counter claims of community-based care. As a recent historiography of nineteenth 
century psychiatry has shown (Scull, 1996) the choice of asylum or community is not 
mutually exclusive. Victorian faith in the capacity of large, well run asylums to deal 
with the problem of `madness' did not mean that existing community-based 
interventions were abandoned. To the contrary, private forms of `community care' 
remained in situ long after the provision of public asylums. Similarly, the ascendancy 
of community-based mental health services in our present era does not mean that the 
hospital has no role to plays in the delivery of psychiatric treatment. The need for 
asylum for the most disturbed mentally ill continues to be at the forefront of 
community care policies (Though agreement over the number of beds needed for this 
group is surprisingly elusive). The challenge for mental health policy is in striking a 
balance between the practice of confinement and the principle of restoring mental 
patients to mainstream society. This chapter shows how difficult this balance has been 
to achieve. 
The Emergence of Modern Psychiatry 
Before the nineteenth century the treatment of the mad was not a specialized branch 
of the medical profession. When for example George III suffered attacks of mania he 
was treated by Francis Willis, who was both a clergyman of the Church of England 
and a doctor of medicine'. Willis had a reputation for successfully treating madness 
which had been earned by running a private madhouse in Lincolnshire (Porter, 1987). 
1 Clergymen keen to supplement their church income operated many early eighteenth madhouses by 
taking in fee-paying lunatics. This was how Willis initially came to be a private madhouse keeper (see 
Jones, 1972: pp. 34-8). 
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Private madhouses in eighteenth century England were run for profit and were thus 
for the exclusive use of wealthy families. They began, like the Bethlem hospital (or 
Bedlam in popular parlance) in London, as municipal or religious charities (Scull, 
1979). They might have an honorary physician who would visit and prescribe 
treatment - usually a combination of purging, emetics and bleeding with detention and 
restraint for the most violent. In contrast, pauper lunatics in the eighteenth century 
were dealt with under the existing poor laws and were subject to the harsh conditions 
of the workhouse (along with poor, old, disabled, and orphans). The absence of formal 
provision for the majority of lunatics in this period reflects the fact that lunacy was 
more a social than a medical category and therefore not seen as a condition which 
warranted specialist attention by medical practitioners. 
By the early nineteenth century private madhouses in England were a flourishing and 
lucrative business. They were set up by individuals who saw a potential market in the 
residential care of the insane. They had also begun to take in large numbers of pauper 
lunatics under a system of contracting out developed by the poor law authorities. For 
many of these unfortunate people the madhouses were a coercive and brutal 
experience. Since they were not subject to any form of inspection, profit-hungry 
madhouse keepers were able to chain their pauper charges more or less permanently. 
Private patients fared little better. Without a formal admission or discharge system 
`troublesome' men and women were illegally placed in private madhouses for the 
benefit of unscrupulous relatives whose motive was (usually) financial. Indeed, 
madhouses became an issue of increasing public concern throughout the nineteenth 
century2. The gradual emergence of voluntary asylums funded out of charitable 
2 Lurid and frightening tales of people detained against their will were common. Women appear to have 
been especially vulnerable to illegal detention by their husbands (see Jones, 1972, pp. 111-14). 
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donations however, pointed to a more therapeutic attitude towards lunacy bound up 
with the idea that lunacy was a medical matter requiring a curative rather than 
entrepreneurial approach. 
Porter (1990) argues that medical practitioners increasingly took over from the lay 
entrepreneurs who had previously controlled the lucrative trade in lunacy. There were 
two reasons for this: the value of specialisation necessary in a congested occupation 
(medicine); and the professional and financial benefits to medical career prospects (cf. 
Scull, 1996). The establishment of voluntary lunatic asylums grew out of the 
provision of specialist lunatic wards attached to general hospitals. The first separate 
institution for lunatics was St. Luke's Hospital in London opened in 1751 and by the 
early nineteenth century lunatic asylums were a common feature of the urban 
industrial landscape. Medical men were often involved in the initial establishment of 
voluntary asylums because of the possibilities these institutions offered for enhancing 
their position (see for example Scull's (1996) discussion of the early nineteenth 
century mad-doctor, John Conolly). The new asylums helped cement the 
professionalization of a group of `mad-doctors specialising in insanity. However in 
the turbulent arena of early Victorian psycho-politics the medical profession met with 
resistance not only from private madhouse keepers (understandably worried about 
their livelihoods) but also from protagonists of William Tuke's moral treatment. 
The medical profession had for some time been concerned with developing a model of 
insanity in which madness was identified as a medical category with a biological 
basis. The beginning of the nineteenth century thus saw a proliferation of diagnoses 
with specified symptoms and aetiology. The causes of insanity were seen to be inside 
the person; a result of physical imbalances and an eruption of nature (Porter, 1987). In 
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contrast, Tuke's lay theory of moral insanity viewed madness as intrinsically bound 
up with the social environment. It rejected established medical treatments (bleeding, 
blisters, evacuations, beatings) and in principle eschewed mechanical restraints3 
preferring instead to offer patients an orderly physical environment in which they 
could regain their `normality' (Rogers and Pilgrim, 1996). That the medical model 
prevailed (and eventually assimilated moral treatment into its armoury of therapeutic 
techniques) underlines the ascendancy of the scientific world-view during the 
Victorian era. For lunacy reformers madness was one of the natural ills that human 
flesh was heir to and its cure lay in the hands of `scientific psychiatry'. 
In the first half of the nineteenth century lunacy reform was led by an influential 
lobby of aristocratic philanthropists, entrepreneurs and Quakers (Busfield, 1986). 
Their effort in bringing lunacy to the forefront of government thinking and action was 
crucial to the eventual implementation of a public asylum system4. Between 1801 and 
1844 there were 71 Bills relating to lunacy (Rogers and Pilgrim, 1996). Recurring 
scandals involving the treatment of lunatics in private madhouses5 and the few 
existing `county' lunatic asylums (legalised in 1808) forced parliament and the 
medical profession into agreement with lunacy reformers that a comprehensive public 
asylum system should be established. Scull (1989) also argues that the allure of 
economies of scale encouraged government support for lunacy legislation. Segregated 
3 Though in practice Tuke and his colleagues retained the use of certain 'material bonds' (i. e. chains) 
for the control of particularly violent or dangerous inmates (Jones, 1993). 
4 For an account of the long-campaign by lunacy reformers to establish a public asylum system see 
Jones, 1993: pp. 41-77. 
s The English parliamentary inquiries of 1807 and 1815-1816 had alerted a larger public to the issue of 
the treatment of the insane. Many of the most serious abuses exposed by the 1815-1816 Committee 
implicated medical men in the beatings and maltreatment (including deaths) of lunatics. Thus, 
parliamentary revelations of inhumanity and neglect in the madhouses simply confirmed to many 
people that madhouses and mad-doctors were dangerous places and to be avoided by all who had the 
means to do so. 
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control for the mad provided an economic solution to the increase in the cost of 
poverty that arose from the burgeoning market economy system. Lunacy reformers 
also argued that asylums would provide a site of scientific cure and recovery for 
mental disorder, which would restore people to an economically active status6. The 
culmination of the lunacy reform campaign was the passing of the 1845 Lunacy Act. 
The 1845 Act was the crucial legislative moment in the birth of the public asylum 
system. It ensured that the provision of asylums became mandatory in England and 
Wales7. All public asylums were required to have a medical practitioner specializing 
in mental disorder living within the physical boundary of the institution and acting as 
its 'superintendent '8. Thus, while asylum reform involved certain bureaucratic 
obligations for superintendents they were now legally recognized as the primary 
experts in the care and treatment of the insane. The public asylums provided an 
institutional basis for the development of expertise and claims to expertise, so crucial 
to the successful professionalization of asylum superintendency (The medical 
profession had struggled hard to persuade government that the superintendent post 
was only suitable for a medically qualified person). They also offered increased 
opportunities for the psychological analyses of madness and other mental deficiencies 
necessary for the development of a coherent conceptual framework of mental 
6 According to Scull (1989) the promise of recovery was crucial to the constitution of the public asylum 
system. The lunacy reform movement championed the mental asylum as the best possible hope for the 
recovery of lunatics. Crucial to their argument was the construction of the asylum as an `ideal 
therapeutic space' in which people could once again be made economically productive and self-reliant. 
Ideologically, this vision of the asylum was extraordinarily attractive and helped secure the Victorian 
governing classes' consent to the lunacy reformer's schemes. 
Scotland's legislative separation from the rest of Great Britain meant that it did not develop a formal 
public asylum system until 1856 (see Scull, 1996: pp. 90-5 for an account of the evolution of lunacy 
reform in Scotland). 
8 The Lunacy Act thus spelt the end of private madhouses. The Act specified that the medical 
profession had exclusive jurisdiction over the treatment and management of insanity. 
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disorder. The term `psychiatry', which was introduced into British medicine for the 
first time in 1846, is further evidence of the link between the 1845 Act and the 
emergence of a sub-speciality of medicine. 
The confinement of large numbers of pauper lunatics in purpose-built mental 
asylum's created opportunities for an intellectual empire which in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century was colonised by new concepts, theories9 and treatments 
for mental disorder. Asylum doctors (known as alienists) decided not only the 
boundaries of mental disorder in the broadest sense, but also the type of problems and 
procedures that were best dealt with in an institutional context. Typically the asylum 
would cater for those labelled insane, while the less severe emotional disturbances 
(commonly called `neurosis') were largely the prerogative of private doctors and 
general practitioners. It was on the terrain of the less severe mental disorders that 
psychoanalytic ideas and treatments (the so-called `talking cure') established and 
maintained a therapeutic foothold outside the framework of institutional psychiatry 
(Busfield, 1996). Thus, by the close of the nineteenth century madness and insanity 
was identified as the distinct intellectual and physical property of the psychiatric 
profession with their own claims to specialist expertise. 
The Asylum Years 
Most public county asylums were situated in the countryside and pursued a policy of 
segregating the mentally disturbed from the general population so as to avoid the 
9 Throughout the nineteenth century a variety of medical journals appeared devoted to the idea that 
insanity was a disease of the brain. These publications (the most influential was the Journal of Mental 
Science first published in 1854 and the forerunner of the British Journal of Psychiatry) were extremely 
important in identifying lunacy as the professional domain of medical experts. They also helped ground 
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threat of `moral contagion' posed by mental illness. After the 1845 legislation, both 
the numbers of asylums and their inmates grew rapidly. By the time of the First World 
War some county asylums housed upwards of 2000 inmates ensuring that they 
performed a major custodial function (Jones, 1972). At its peak in the mid 1950s, 
Britain's asylum population reached approximately 150,000. At the same time, it 
became increasingly clear that these institutions were `anti-therapeutic', not least 
because they were morally stifling as well as custodial. That the Victorians produced 
a morality as severe and uncompromising as their architecture is evidenced by the 
harsh moral regime experienced by inmates (based largely on Tuke's moral 
treatment). Despite (or perhaps because of) this, the asylums provided a practical 
`solution' to the social problem of lunacy. And because asylum superintendents were 
charged with defining madness and admitting patients, they could effectively create 
the demand for their own professional services. 
The asylum doctor was adorned with the full panoply of professional power. Their 
charges were often restrained in immobilising chairs, spun to the point of collapse in 
revolving chairs, purged, starved and beaten (Scull, 1979). Eventually other less 
immediately punishing treatment regimes were introduced. The late nineteenth 
century saw the introduction of drugs. Potassium bromide, chloral hydrate and 
paraldehyde were widely used as hypnotics and anticonvulsants (In fact most inmates 
regardless of symptomatology were given some form of medication). It will be noted 
that the drugs mentioned also have a powerful sedative effect and excessive reliance 
on preparations like these was as much a managerial response to the growing number 
of patients being admitted to the asylum as it was a search for medical benefits. 
medical claims that insanity was essentially a scientific phenomenon amenable to rational discussion 
and empirical investigation. 
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Despite Victorian distaste for mechanical restraints (e. g. strait-waistcoats and leg- 
locks) such devices remained in common use within all asylums. One reason for this 
was the relatively small number of attendants per asylum inmate, many of whom were 
left to manage their vulnerable (but no doubt difficult) charges in whatever practical 
way they thought fit. 
The public asylums were for many years dependent on the labour of untrained nurses 
and attendants (the first training programme for asylum attendants did not take place 
until 1889). Their work was often arduous and exhausting (some wards 
accommodated up to sixty or seventy patients). They were responsible for all aspects 
of care: exercise, amusements, dressings and poultices, employment, and the 
treatment of the incontinent. Attendants could expect to work up to seventy hours per 
week often in split shifts (they might only have four hours sleep in twenty). Their 
rates of pay were low and theft of hospital property rife. 'Between 1860 and 1880,91 
out of 567 attendants were dismissed for reasons varying from `dishonesty' and 
`cruelty' to being drunk on duty' (Jones, 1993: 119). Asylum doctors were not 
generally keen on training for attendants for the simple reason that they would have to 
do (and pay for) it themselves out of the asylum budget. Some attendants worked for 
many years on the same hospital back wards (wards which were deemed unpopular or 
which housed chronic and demanding patients). It is not therefore surprising that most 
asylums fell prey to a culture of bullying and petty tyranny by bored and unsupervised 
attendants. 
By the close of the nineteenth century public asylums had become mammoth, 
custodial institutions. In the half century following the introduction of the compulsory 
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asylum system while the general population grew by 80 per cent the number of 
lunatics quadrupled (Scull, 1979). The reasons for this growth are varied. Nineteenth 
century doctors were convinced that mental disorder was on the increase (as a 
consequence of industrialisation and a rapid growth in population and geographical 
mobility). Another view simply sees the growth of the asylum in terms of medical 
progress and greater benevolence towards the `mentally ill'. Yet another posits that 
asylums were a disciplinary response to the poverty caused by an expanding market 
economy system (Scull, 1979). In response to these explanations Jones (1972) has 
noted that many of those admitted to asylums had problems which were well- 
advanced by the time of admission. In part, this was the result of the institutional bias 
of the poor-law system which meant that families in need of help for disordered 
relatives could only obtain poor-law relief in institutions. In part, it was because of the 
custodial, last resort character of the institutions themselves (Those admitted were 
held on a compulsory basis). Asylums thus became clogged up with chronic cases 
many of whom were unnameable to therapeutic intervention. 
Within this closed and forgotten world, the nineteenth century asylum patient's life 
was harsh and unremitting. Their lot was essentially one of work, plain food and 
conformity. Physical, psychological and social restraint was freely employed and 
asylum staff always had the comfort of knowing that the `unimproved' or difficult 
patient was safely segregated in a setting where the social mores of society would not 
be offended. The inmates were largely poor and were expected to display suitable 
gratitude for the care and shelter provided. There was considerable social distance 
between staff and inmates and an aroma of moral censure permeated the attitudes of 
many who worked there. New patients quickly learnt their place in the asylum's 
pecking order and it was unlikely that once they had been `put away' they would be 
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able to re-emerge and assume their former place in society. This loss of liberty was 
compounded by a loss of individuality once immersed in the system. Inmate's lives 
became moulded to the needs of the institution until finally, they became 
institutionalized and dependent on the regime that was supposed to effect their cure. 
However, as the presentcentury unfolded experimental (cynics might say desperate) 
attempts to do something for the masses of forgotten asylum patients began to appear. 
Within psychiatry the suspicion that insanity was the result of an organic disease 
found legitimacy in new modes of biological thinking10. Developments in German 
psychiatry had a particular impact on European psychiatric thought. The work of 
Griesinger and Wernicke emphasised the congruence of psychiatry and neurology and 
helped establish academic psychiatry as a university discipline (Porter, 1997). 
Influenced by German models, physical treatments focusing on the brain were seized 
upon by many European psychiatrists. In 1933 Sakel introduced insulin therapy in the 
(mistaken) belief that hypoglycaemia associated with a carefully induced insulin coma 
would somehow interrupt abnormal neural connections in the brain. In 1935 the 
Portuguese neurologist Egas Moniz introduced psychosurgery (prefrontal leucotomy) 
for the management of obsessions and anxiety. The procedure, for which Moniz was 
awarded the Nobel Prize, spread rapidly throughout the world and formed an 
important component of the psychiatric arsenal (It continues to be used today on a 
small scale). 
These latter modes of psychiatric treatment are well known. However, less well 
known are other bizarre treatment approaches that reflected psychiatry's strong desire 
10 A highlight was the discovery around 1900 that syphilis was the cause of a condition called General 
Paralysis of the Insane, which affected a large group of patients, and seemed to give hope that a 
physical basis would soon be found for all types of mental disorder. 
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to be taken seriously within the scientific world. These include: malaria therapy (the 
rationale was to induce a fever so that the resulting heat would fry the disease); 
transplantation of endocrine organs; surgical removal of large parts of the small 
intestine; renal dialysis; and metrazol-convulsion therapy (see Clare, 1980). Although 
these haphazard attempts at treatment assumed drastic physical forms they 
nevertheless helped ground psychiatry's claims to scientific legitimacy. In 1938 
Cerletti introduced electroconvulsive therapy (ECT). It immediately assumed `heroic' 
status within the therapeutic armoury of the asylum and was freely applied to most 
inmates regardless of symptoms. The idea of ECT was to induce an epileptic type 
seizure in individuals in the hope of alleviating distressing mental symptoms (ranging 
from mania to depression). It was partly because of the hostility that shock treatments 
later attracted both within the institution and in society at large, that when the new 
range of psychotropic (mood-influencing) drugs becoming available after the war they 
were greeted with great enthusiasm by psychiatric professionals (Porter, 1991). 
De-institutionalization and Community Mental Health 
As early as mid-Victorian times, when the asylum-building programme was at its 
height, many of those involved in the drive to establish the new system expressed 
concern that a gigantic asylum was a gigantic evil (Porter, 1991). However, a full 
century would pass before the modern anti-psychiatric movement began to 
systematically catalogue the negative effects of institutionalization. During the 
Second World War the British psychiatrist Maxwell Jones began to generate interest 
in an alternative approach to caring for the mentally ill. His supervision of armed 
forces personnel traumatised by the experience of war led him to the view that large 
0 
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institutions were not suitable to caring for many types of mental disorder. He argued 
for a more democratic restructuring of the care setting in ways which led to the 
establishment of more open and patient-centered facilities. The concept of the 
`therapeutic community' was born. With it came the hope that community-based 
mental health care might prove a more therapeutic site of treatment for those with 
mental problems. 
The years 1954-59 has been described as ones of `therapeutic flux' in British 
psychiatry (Jones, 1993: 150). During this critical period the barriers between the 
mental hospitals and the outside world began to erode. A combination of new and 
highly effective psychotropic drugs (see below), the rise of the anti-psychiatry 
movement, and mounting fiscal pressures together triggered an `open door' movement 
in psychiatry. For the first time Britain's mental hospitals began to unlock their doors 
and give patients some freedom of movement. The notion of psychiatric day hospitals 
attached to District General Hospitals was suggested as a possible new setting for 
community-based mental health care. Many politicians favoured this approach since it 
offered the prospect of reducing the large numbers of very expensive psychiatric beds. 
It was a Conservative Health Minister, Enoch Powell, who delivered the clearest 
possible signal that the large mental hospitals had had their day. In an address to the 
annual conference of MIND (the National Association for Mental Health) in 1961, he 
spoke in characteristically uncompromising terms of the elimination of most of the 
country's mental hospitals within fifteen years. He described them thus: 
There they stand, isolated, majestic, imperious, brooded over by the gigantic water-tower and 
chimney combined, rising unmistakable and daunting out of the countryside - the asylums 
which our forefathers built with such immense solidity. Do not for a moment underestimate 
their power of resistance to our assault (Jones 1993: 160). 
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Powell's assumption that an asylum closure programme would be strongly resisted 
was correct. Many superintendents opposed his policy arguing that the mental hospital 
was, amongst other things, a great success in caring for many vulnerable and 
friendless people and therefore should not be allowed to decline and disintegrate. But 
the superintendents had a vested interest in maintaining the traditional system. Their 
position carried great prestige and authority within the hospital power structure 
(which placed them at the apex of the hospital hierarchy and patients very firmly at 
the bottom) and many viewed their patients as little more than vulnerable children 
who needed constant care and attention. Such infantilization (a direct consequence of 
the moral treatment regime borrowed from Tuke) meant that patients could not 
develop fully adult roles within the hospital setting and certainly could not challenge 
their medical treatment. Indeed, such was the authority of the superintendent that even 
junior members of the medical and nursing staff were unable (or unwilling) to 
challenge them about any aspect of their regime. The entire asylum was under the 
powerful punitive influence of the superintendent. 
Despite the superintendents' hostility to asylum closures however, support for a 
community based mental health system quickly began to gain support from a number 
of sources. For the DHSS (the Department of Health and Social Security), it made 
sound financial sense to treat psychiatric patients on the site of existing general 
hospitals rather than to duplicate hospitals and ancillary staff. It was also anticipated 
that a vigorous community care system could further reduce the need for hospital 
treatment and thereby reduce costs (Clare, 1980; Scull, 1977). But amongst those 
most supportive of the plan to close the mental hospitals were a growing number of 
newly trained psychiatrists keen to have their expertise recognized as on a par with 
that of their medical and surgical colleagues: 
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The majority of psychiatrists desired to be recognized as clinicians within the mainstream of 
medicine and saw the promised transfer of their work from the isolated mental hospitals to 
new units situated alongside their medical and surgical colleagues as tangible evidence of such 
recognition (Clare, 1980: 415). 
The asylum had provided the context in which psychiatry had successfully 
medicalized madness. In this respect the work of the asylum was complete. What was 
now imperative was to bring psychiatry in from the margins of scientific medicine and 
establish its rightful place as a speciality on a par with, say, obstetrics or neurology. 
Meanwhile, the effects of protracted institutional living - collectively described as 
institutionalization - was beginning to attract public attention. The hospital 
environment was the subject of a number of powerful critiques on both sides of the 
Atlantic. Long-term institutional care was identified as the cause of apathy, 
dehumanization and passive dependence which, in combination, render the patient 
helpless and may be more damaging than the disorder leading to their hospitalization 
in the first place. In 1959 a British psychiatrist, Russell Barton, produced the 
important book Institutional Neurosis in which he used the term announced in the title 
to describe (and thus medicalize) the constellation of adverse effects of 
institutionalization upon patients. The `mental bed sores' described by Barton gave 
way to an even more damning account of institutional life. The American sociologist 
Erving Goffman's analytical dissection of a public asylum in Washington D. C. 
(published in 1961) revealed the degree to which the rigid confines of the mental 
hospital `stripped' people of their individuality and led inevitably to social atrophy. 
Goffman's book helped to reinforce a picture of the mental hospital as an outdated, 
custodial institution unsuitable to the promotion of good mental health. 
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His work acquired widespread currency amongst those who saw the mental asylum as 
the crucial factor in forming mental patients. Its efficacy as a therapeutic environment 
was placed in serious question in many western countries. The legitimacy of 
community care for the mentally ill therefore emerged, not through a careful 
demonstration of its merits, but by rendering the alternative unthinkable: `who in the 
circumstances would attempt to dispute the claim that "the worst home is better than 
the best mental hospital"' (Scull, 1989: 310). Community-based mental health care 
was presented as superior to institutional care primarily on the grounds of its 
difference from what had previously been the dominant therapeutic strategy. The 
psychiatric profession, stung by a succession of internal and external criticisms of its 
institutional practices, pushed hard for reform of mental health policy and saw a move 
to the community as an opportunity for greater professional prestige. This negative re- 
evaluation of the asylum eventually led to two important developments, 
deinstitutionalization policies, through which thousands of mental patients were 
released from long stay hospitals, and the allied psychiatric orientation towards social 
and community care (Samson, 1995). 
The movement for the abolition of the mental asylum gathered pace throughout the 
1960s. The Ministry of Health issued the Hospital Plan for England and Wales a year 
after Powell's speech. The Plan stated that mentally ill and other similar patient 
groups (such as the mentally handicapped) would no longer occupy hospital beds for 
long periods (Jones, 1993). Mental illness was recast as acute illness rather than as a 
chronic problem requiring long-term institutional facilities". Psychiatric treatment 
11 Sir Keith Joseph encapsulated the new approach towards the treatment of acute mental illness during 
his tenure as Conservative Secretary of State for the Social Services. In the year of his appointment 
(1971) he announced with some enthusiasm: `Psychiatry is to join the rest of medicine... the treatment 
of psychosis, neurosis and schizophrenia have been entirely changed by the drug revolution. People go 
into hospital with mental disorders and they are cured, and that is why we want to bring this branch of 
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would in future be concentrated in the new District General Hospital that would 
provide acute treatment in all medical specialisms. Although admissions to asylums 
began to drop from the mid 1960s, the reduction in the overall numbers in long-stay 
psychiatric beds was slow. The full impact of community care policies only began to 
be felt in the following decade with the introduction of small psychiatric units situated 
in the new District General Hospitals. The new model of care aimed to provide 
services for every stage of the illness, and to emphasize prevention as well as cure: 
through primary care facilities, hospital beds for chronic patients, day hospitals, 
residential care, hostels, out-patient clinics and so forth. This diverse range of services 
called for greater involvement from a wide range of specialists in mental health not 
just the psychiatric profession. 
Since the early 1980s the delivery of `individual patient care' has been the 
responsibility of the multidisciplinary (MDT) psychiatric team. The MDT is made up 
of a range of professionals (including community psychiatric nurses, occupational 
therapists, psychologists, and social workers) working alongside (rather than 
subordinate to) psychiatrists in supporting the mentally ill. MDT's therefore contain a 
broad spread of views and experience. Although, typically, the MDT works together 
each profession has developed specialists in their own individual area of practice. The 
proliferation of specializations within the mental health system has compounded the 
erosion of medical dominance within psychiatry begun by the dismantling of the 
asylum system. Community psychiatric nurses and social workers have emerged as 
important figures in the community care enterprise acting as a mediating link between 
the MDT, the patient/client and their family. It is in this context of the non-medical 
medicine into the scope of the 230 district general hospitals that are planned for England and Wales 
(Jones, 1972: 340). 
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mental health practitioner assuming a primary care role that British psychiatry has 
arguably been transformed into a more egalitarian system of health care than was 
possible during the asylum era. 
Mental Health Services in the 1990s 
Although the idea of community-based mental health care has been promoted by 
successive national government's the rhetoric has not matched the reality. Despite 
Powell's reference to asylums as `doomed institutions' (Jones, 1972: 322), mental 
health services remained highly dependent on institutional and hospital-based 
resources until the 1980s. Margaret Thatcher's third Conservative administration 
finally brought to fruition Powell's vision of asylum closures. The 1990 National 
Health Service and Community Care Act can be considered a `defining moment' in 
the acceptance of care within communities as the preferred way of meeting the needs 
of older people, disabled people and those with mental health problems or learning 
difficulties. The Act committed local authorities to provide both acute and long-term 
care in a community-based context (though its implementation was delayed until 
April Ist 1993). The Act immediately accelerated the previously slow decline in 
mental hospital/residential beds. Many thousands of long-stay and chronic patients 
found themselves discharged from hospital and under the care of local social service 
departments rather than a specialist mental health service. 
One the major criticisms of deinstitutionalization centered on the political support 
given to care in the community by the Conservative government. For many, the 
community care policy was driven primarily by fiscal rather than social concerns. The 
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evidence for this claim lies in the fact that expensive and costly long-term psychiatric 
beds have been cut in favour of less expensive community services for acute, less 
serious mental disorders (Busfield, 1986). The disappearance of long-stay psychiatric 
beds and the lack of a co-ordinated discharge policy have also created a vacuum at the 
heart of care policy for mentally ill people. This has led to an explosion of private, 
residential care for this vulnerable group of people12. Places in private residential 
homes are funded through social security benefits and a new breed of `mental 
entrepreneurs' has emerged to exploit the profits to be made from housing the 
chronically mentally ill. Between 1978 and 1989 for example, total spending on 
supplementary benefit leapt from £80 million to £1.5 billion (Muijen, 1995). In short, 
a new trade in lunacy has emerged that dwarfs the profits made in the private 
provision of residential care for the mentally ill in the nineteenth century. 
Models ofMental Illness 
The decline in the pre-eminent position of the mental asylum has also been matched 
by a decline in adherence to medical models of mental illness amongst mental health 
professionals. The values and assumptions of bio-medical psychiatry have 
traditionally been most secure in the context of the mental asylum in which doctors 
held the balance of power (Samson, 1995). The movement away from the asylum has 
meant that orthodox bio-medical concepts of mental health and illness have become 
much more insecure. Likewise, particular professional approaches to `curing' are 
increasingly open to question. The long-standing philosophical and sociological 
12 Private residential homes catering exclusively for the mentally ill are usually described as `hostels' or 
even `hotels' in order to avoid the employment of expensive psychiatric nursing staff. The fact that 
residents are discharged from hospital and thus no longer formally recognised as 'patients' means that 
the more unscrupulous proprietors need only employ a bare minimum of untrained staff. 
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critique of psychiatry has found renewed enthusiasm amongst those concerned about 
the `socially relative' nature of both psychiatric knowledge and general concepts of 
illness (Sedgewick, 1982). This critique has been especially influential amongst 
psychiatric professionals working on the fringes of medicine (such as social workers 
or psychotherapists). The social model of mental illness has therefore been one of the 
main beneficiaries of de-institutionalization. 
The work and approach of western psychiatry, like most branches of the medical 
profession, is based on a scientific method which, according to its practitioners' own 
professional self-conception, justifies its institutional separation from lay knowledge 
of the `human mind'. Thus, while psychiatrists acknowledge their power as an 
occupational group with specialist knowledge, they do so in the belief that they 
exercise their power and knowledge in the best interests of both individual patients 
and society. However, an alternative view of psychiatry sees it as a dominating 
profession which has historically monopolised the provision of mental health care 
within the institutional context of the hospital/asylum and has consistently made 
covert value judgements about a person's `mental illness type behaviour'. This 
division between the `pro' and `anti'-psychiatric lobby underpins a crucial point: that 
psychiatry operates not with a straightforward consensus about its clinical and 
diagnostic practices but in a force-field of conflicting ideologies and competing 
models of mental illness. 
The `medical model' of psychiatry has long faced opposition from other, `social 
models' of mental health care (Tuke's theory of moral insanity being perhaps the first 
instance of lay opposition to a medical model of mental disorder). Medical models are 
based upon the assumption that mental disorders are illnesses like any other. There is 
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assumed to be a pathological lesion within the brain that leads to disturbed function, 
the lesion being assumed to be genetic or biochemical. Medical models do not 
exclude the effect of social and/or psychological forces, but place them in a 
subordinate relationship to physical changes in the organism. They see the mentally 
disordered as suffering from illnesses that are, as yet, incurable and only amenable to 
palliative treatment (aimed at relieving the symptoms rather than an unidentified 
cause). Such approaches display a marked preference for physical treatments (drugs, 
electric shock treatment and, occasionally, psychosurgery) which are distrusted by 
many critics of psychiatry who tend to view them as essentially punitive measures. 
However, many psychiatrists point to the amelioration of symptoms as evidence of 
their treatments' success (see Roth and Kroll, 1988). 
Social models on the other hand, tend to emphasise the presence of social and 
psychological factors in the aetiology of mental disorder. Whereas medical models 
situate `the problem' firmly inside the patient, social models locate the roots of mental 
disorder in social and family structures. `Mental illness' is seen as a label applied by 
psychiatrists to certain forms of `deviant' behaviour with the result that `patients' are 
stigmatised in much the same way as criminals (Schell, 1966). Much of the 
momentum behind the concept of labelling is derived from an appreciation of the 
arbitrary nature of psychiatry's diagnostic process (that practitioners usually first 
decide what to do about a person, and then `discover' the appropriate diagnostic label 
with which to justify their decision). Labelling theory also posits that persons begin to 
act as mentally ill only after and as a result of having been labelled as such by 
psychiatrists acting as agents of the dominant social order (see Rosenhan, 1973). A 
rider to this view holds that the full clinical picture and deteriorating course of 
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illnesses such as schizophrenia are caused not by the unfolding of the disease process 
itself, but by the effects of hospitalization upon the patient. 13 
Labelling theory was mostly an external critique. However one of the most influential 
counters to orthodox psychiatry came from within psychiatry itself. R. D. Laing's 
critiques of his own profession has attracted both veneration and vituperation. It has 
been enshrined by the broad left as encapsulating a scathing indictment of the 
tyrannical bourgeois family and capitalist society. But it has also been roundly 
condemned by many social scientists as mystical, confused and unscientific. Laing's 
work on the meaning of madness is imbued with a deeply humanistic concern for the 
plight of those labelled as `mentally disordered'. His first book, The Divided Self 
(1959), presented what would become a lasting contribution to the philosophical 
analyses of bio-medical psychiatry and the rendition of schizophrenia as an 
`intelligible' phenomenon. His principle claim was that seemingly irrational and 
schizophrenic responses are in fact `normal responses to an abnormal situation'. 
Laing's thesis is that the behaviour called schizophrenia is a strategy by means of 
which sensitive people can live in an unliveable situation, a creative form of escape 
from the madness of the ordinary world. 14 
13 The premise here is that the person was only a `little deviant' prior to hospitalization but became 
fully so once an illness label had been attached. However, social labelling theorists have been accused 
of ignoring evidence which suggests that seriously mentally disturbed behaviour has been recognised 
by family members for considerably long periods of time before medical help is sought. Only then, 
months to years after the onset and full development of an illness is a diagnosis offered (see Roth and 
Kroll, 1986). 
14 In a passage in the preface to the second edition of The Divided Self (1965: 11) Laing describes our 
`present pervasive madness' thus: `A man (sic) who prefers to be dead than Red is normal. A man who 
says he has lost is soul is mad. A man who says that men are machines may be a great scientist. A man 
who says he is a machine is `depersonalized' in psychiatric jargon. A man who says that Negroes are 
an inferior race may be widely respected. A man who says his whiteness is a form of cancer is 
certifiable'. 
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Laing's name is often coupled with that of Thomas Szasz. Szasz (1974: 8) suggests 
that, strictly speaking, illness can only affect the body, not the mind: `Mental illness is 
not something a person has, but is something he does or is'. His argument (similar to 
Laing's) is that mental hospitals are prisons and that those who work in them are 
jailersls. However, Szasz does not deny the concept of mental disorder but vigorously 
attacks the concept of `mental illness'. He suggests that people who have `life 
problems' such as being victims of racism) are thrust into the `sick role'. While the 
`neurotic' embraces the role in order to receive help with problems of living, the 
`psychotic' may have the sick role involuntarily applied. It thus acts as a convenient 
way of labelling objectionable behaviour and helps to justify `treatment' by 
incarceration. In other words Szasz considers traditional psychiatry to be a form of 
social oppression which suppresses and controls deviant minorities under the cloak of 
medicine. However, it is important to note that his opposition to institutional 
psychiatry is delivered from the point of view of a psychiatrist in private practice. His 
main target was a publicly funded mental health service, which in the United States 
posed a considerable threat to private psychiatric practice. 
The Contested Terrain of `Mental Illness' 
Mental illness, like its nineteenth century counterpart madness, is an evaluative 
concept which categorizes some aspects of thought, action, or behaviour as abnormal, 
defective or disordered. According to Foucault (1987) this involves first and foremost, 
a judgement of mind rather than of behaviour. His argument is that `madness' is 
constructed in opposition to reason, and that it is therefore unreason and irrationality 
's Both Szasz and Laing's claim that the mental hospital was essentially a prison found `empirical' 
support Goffman's influential critique of asylum's as `total institutions' not dissimilar from jails and 
borstals. 
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that are presumed when an individual is identified as mad/mentally ill. But it is not the 
content of ideas and beliefs per se that underpin claims as to irrationality. Rather they 
are typically grounded in judgements of the way in which beliefs, ideas and actions 
are grounded and accounted for (see Smith, 1978). Disputes over what does or does 
not constitute mental illness cannot therefore be easily settled by resort to `the facts'. 
They necessarily involve judgements, values and ethics. Establishing the boundaries 
between different types of mental disorder is often the result of lobbying and 
competition between medical practitioners working in the field. and outcomes vary 
across time and place16. As a consequence, the demarcation lines separating mental 
illness and mental health are continually contested. 
We cannot, with any confidence, draw a simple dividing line and insist that those 
characteristics falling on one side are invariably to be found only in the mentally ill 
and those on the other are only to be found in the mentally healthy. Between the stark 
confusion and despair of mental illness and the lived peace and contentment of mental 
health, there lies an extensive gulf of unhappiness and maladjustment within which 
we can be far less sure of our categories. Within this intermediate zone there are many 
people whose behaviour may well be disturbing to established norms (for example, 
glue sniffers) but who cannot be easily subsumed under a simple definition of `mental 
illness'. However, despite these difficulties of attribution the psychiatric profession 
has over the years advanced strong claims for its ability to classify and diagnose 
mental illness in its various manifestations. This has always been a disputed and 
16 The now classic example is homosexuality, which had been included as a mental illness in the 
American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual. However in 1972 the 
Association decided (by postal vote) that it was not in itself an illness and removed it. 
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controversial exercise and nowhere has psychiatry's taxonomical endeavour been 
more troublesome than with the concept of `schizophrenia'. 
The Disputed Concept of Schizophrenia 
The severe abnormalities of experience and behaviour associated with schizophrenia 
have been described by clinicians for more than a century. According to most 
accounts, it is a major mental illness characterized by various symptoms including; 
visual and auditory hallucinations, delusions, bizarre beliefs, thought disorder 
(manifest in incoherent speech), social withdrawal and lack of insight. However, 
despite the apparent certainty of such definitions schizophrenia continues to provoke 
fierce disagreements. According to one researcher, `[s]erious questions remain about 
whether schizophrenia can be considered an illness; about whether it is one condition 
or several, about whether clear dividing lines exist between schizophrenia and normal 
functioning or even between schizophrenia and other kinds of mental disorder' 
(Bentall, 1990: xiii). Despite one hundred years of research and clinical interrogation 
then, there is no consensus about what schizophrenia is, what causes it, and whether 
or not there is (or should be) a `cure'. Furthermore, doubts about the validity of 
`schizophrenia' as a medical label surface constantly in relation to claims concerning 
the problematic status of the concept of mental illness more generally. 
Doubts about the medical concept of `mental illness' are played out against a 
backdrop of continual dispute over schizophrenia and the arguments surrounding its 
present position as the cornerstone of modern psychiatric theory. This has led some 
critics to suppose that one can bring the whole edifice of psychiatry crashing down 
simply by demolishing `schizophrenia' as a scientifically valid category (The work of 
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Szasz is often cited as an example of this approach). No other type of mental disorder 
has such a reputation. The antipsychiatric movement of the 1960s and 1970s reserved 
its fulmination almost exclusively for schizophrenia. In contrast, `manic-depression', 
schizophrenia's main bedfellow in psychiatry's classificatory system of major mental 
illnesses, has been relatively ignored by the fierce ideological battle being waged over 
the existence/non-existence of `mental disease'. This is in part a consequence of a 
more clear-cut aetiology and relatively successful treatment approach (such as 
lithium, which helps stabilize mood). But it is also due to the persistence of strong 
competing views of schizophrenia as both a scientific concept and a political issue. 
At the centre of controversy has been the lack of empirical evidence to justify 
schizophrenia's status as a scientific concept. Boyle (1990), for example, has argued 
that the concept was full of contradictions at birth and remains so now. Her view is 
that early evidence for the existence of schizophrenia is unreliable but that its survival 
as a concept is crucial to psychiatry's continued credibility as a medical profession: 
`Given the central role attributed to `schizophrenia', the vast literature surrounding it, 
and the research effort to validate claims made about it, it seems reasonable to suggest 
that psychiatrists are dependent upon its retention as the prototypical psychiatric 
disease' (Boyle ibid: 179). The problematic status of schizophrenia as a classification 
is further compounded by social scientific objections to the label 'schizophrenic' 17 
and the value judgements it incurs. Many sociologists of illness have denied that 
17 The objection appears to stem from the task of trying to place physical and mental illnesses on the 
same (positivist) footing, in order to reduce the controversial nature of the distance between the two 
(see Sedgwick, 1972). Many social scientists argue that by working in the reverse direction (relativism 
rather than positivism), the character of both physical and mental illness can be revealed as `social 
constructions'. Intrinsic to this view is the point that there are no `illnesses or diseases in nature' 
outside of the significance that humanity attaches to them in a given culture. This is not to deny that 
diseases would exist as phenomena in the world if we did not recognise them. Indeed, it is precisely 
their existence that necessitates trying to make sense of them if we are to diminish human suffering. 
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mental `diseases' are meaningful scientific realities, regarding them as `labels' pinned 
on patients for reasons of social and professional convenience: that which is 
disturbing gets called `disturbed'. In other words, the disorder may not be `real', but 
an artefact of the encounter between psychiatrist and patient in which the former 
exercises power over the latter. 
Even from this brief sketch it is clear that the concept of schizophrenia does not 
command consensus. It lies on the cusp of competing interpretations of mental 
disorder; scientific, historical and sociological discourses each making sense of the 
subject according to its own particular agendas. However, scientific discourse has 
clearly had most direct impact upon individuals. It is from the formulations of 
scientific psychiatry that we have inherited a highly deterministic view of the 
unfolding of schizophrenic lives. A crucial issue here is the degree to which an 
exclusively scientific account of schizophrenia precludes and obscures other possible 
interpretations. The `discovery' of schizophrenia is rooted in the nineteenth century 
asylums of Europe. It is from within these places that psychiatry derives its power to 
define and classify certain types of behaviour and experience as `schizophrenic'. But 
it is also in these places that the `disease entity' of schizophrenia is implicated in a 
social history that has had, and continues to have, a bearing on how we view 
schizophrenics. In order to understand the relation of medical ideas about 
schizophrenia to moral judgements about schizophrenics we will briefly trace the 
origins of the condition. 
However, the concepts we invent to account for the disease come to shape not only the observations we 
make and the remedies we prescribe, but also the very manifestations of the disease itself. 
130 
Debates and Issues in Mental Health 
The Making of Schizophrenia 
In 1896 the great German psychiatrist Emil Kraeplin (1856-1926) introduced his 
important differentiation between manic-depressive . psychosis and `dementia 
praecox'. 18 His pioneering work on a classificatory system for mental disorder led him 
to a study of specific clusters of symptoms, showing particular patterns of onset, 
development and outcome. Bringing together existing concepts of `hebephrenia' (an 
incoherence in the train of thought as well as marked emotional disturbance), 
catatonia and paranoia into a single disease entity his formulation outlined a 
degenerative psychotic condition with typical autistic features. Kraeplin described the 
characteristic symptoms of the dementia praecox patient as including: hallucinations 
(usually of an auditory nature), a decrease in attention towards the outside world, an 
interruption of the thinking process, an impairment of understanding and judgement, 
delusional beliefs, emotional blunting and stereotyped behaviour (Clare, 1980). The 
term was to prove short-lived however. Firstly, many dementia praecox patients did 
not show a permanent dementia. Secondly, the term encouraged a rather hopeless 
prognosis and therapeutic nihilism. Within a decade Kraeplin's identification of 
dementia praecox had been superseded by another formulation which would prove far 
more durable. 
It was the Swiss psychiatrist Eugen Bleuler (1857-1939) who in 1908 first used the 
term `schizophrenia'. He chose the term because, as he put it, `... the rending 
(disconnection) or splitting of the psychic functions is an outstanding symptom of the 
18 Current diagnostic practice, reflecting the influence of Kraeplin, postulates the existence of two 
major functional psychoses - schizophrenia and manic-depressive psychosis - which are regarded as 
separate and discrete mental disorders. 
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whole group'19 (Clare, ibid.: 122). Bleuler's conception was wider than Kraeplin's. 
He retained the concept of a disturbance in the coherent integration of ideas and 
emotions as an essential feature of schizophrenia, but did not speak of a discrete 
disease per se. He used the term in the singular, but was in no doubt that he was 
dealing with a group of diseases: the schizophrenias20. Kurt Schneider, a German 
psychiatrist, further consolidated the definition. In 1959 Schneider identified a 
number of symptoms which he regarded as of first rank importance in differentiating 
schizophrenia from other psychotic conditions. First-rank symptoms comprise thought 
disorder (such as believing that thoughts or actions are under the control of an 
external, alien force), auditory hallucinations in the third person (e. g. disembodied 
`voices' maintaining a running commentary on one's actions, or discussing thoughts 
or behaviour as they occur), and primary delusions (e. g. delusional ideas arising from 
perceptions which are in themselves normal). In Britain these symptoms have been 
adopted as the operational benchmark for diagnosing schizophrenia (Clare, ibid. ). 
19 The term `schizophrenia', although literally meaning `splitting of the mind', refers to a fragmentation 
of thought processes in which a sufferer's personality is said to `deteriorate'. Bleuler's original 
formulation emphasised possible psychodynamic factors in the onset of the disorder. In contrast, 
Kraeplin's dementia praecox emphasised the probability of a biological causation. British psychiatry 
has favoured the Kraeplinian approach whilst the greater influence of psychoanalytical theory in the 
United States has meant that Bleuler's concept has found more fertile ground (see Boyle, 1990: pp. 16- 
41). 
20 Subsequent classifications of schizophrenic disorders identify four main types: Simple schizophrenia 
(Onset is usually adolescence with insidious and slowly progressive deterioration of personality. 
Hallucinations and delusions are usually absent The primary symptoms are emotional blunting and loss 
of volition. ); Hebephrenic schizophrenia (Onset is usually in late teens. The underlying state is one of 
dullness and apathy though behaviour may be erratic and unpredictable. Auditory hallucinations are 
common. ); Paranoid schizophrenia (This form has a later onset (30-50 years) and the major symptom 
is the presence of delusions of persecution with auditory hallucinations. ); Catatonic schizophrenia 
(This form is commoner in females. It has become increasingly rare in the last 30 years and many 
catatonic symptoms may have been a response to institutionalization. The essential feature of this form 
is psychomotor disturbance, often alternating between the extremes of hyperkinetic excitement and 
catatonic stupor). For a detailed medical overview of schizophrenia see Clare, 1980: pp. 120-68. 
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Schizophrenia as Other 
The `discovery' of schizophrenia as an all-encompassing illness finds clear expression 
in the creation of the asylum system. However, arguably the figure of the 
schizophrenic was not produced so much by the asylum as by their exclusion from a 
wider field of social forces21. Nevertheless, the asylum came to play a crucial role in 
making the schizophrenic more nearly resemble what others took them to be 
(demented, feeble-minded, unpredictable, etc. ). It also provided the conditions of 
observation in which social judgements could be made about their broken and 
biologically flawed individuality (Barham, 1992). In this context asylum doctors 
became distrustful of what their charges actually said. They heard not the person, but 
the `typical' illness, the psychosis at the heart of every schizophrenic's improper 
engagement with the world. The patient, we were told, showed little meaningful 
interest in the outside world, neither engaging nor communicating with it. Their 
condition rendered them incommunicado, alien from humanity. This designation of 
schizophrenia as flawed individuality `brought into focus one of the inchoate 
tendencies of psychiatry, the notion that insanity was essentially alien, different, 
other' (Porter, 1987: 34). 
Critics of orthodox psychiatry such as R. D. Laing have observed that it is a short step 
from claiming madness to be alien and meaningless to the notion that it is 
incomprehensible and inaccessible. The suffering of the schizophrenic (if we allow 
that schizophrenia is an illness in which suffering occurs) further compounds the 
21 This is not to deny that many of the `chronic symptoms' displayed by patients hospitalized in large, 
impersonal and faceless asylums resulted from the institutional environment in which they were 
contained. Rather it is to suggest that the identification of the chronic schizophrenic was the inevitable 
consequence of their inability to take part in the productive process. They were perceived as valueless 
in relation to the requirements of the labour market (see Barham, 1992: pp. 85-7). 
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obstacles to communicating with them. Their psychotic symptoms - `voices', 
delusions, thought disorder - are the very stuff of incomprehension. Following 
Kraeplin, generations of doctors and other experts have been taught that this failure to 
communicate, to interact properly, is the fault of the schizophrenic (or more precisely 
is the fault of the disease process as manifest in individual patients) rather than the 
inability of the professional to deal with `disturbed' patients. This has led `to an 
extraordinary deafness towards the communications of the disturbed, and in particular 
a discounting of the reactions to, and complaints against, the psychiatric treatment 
meted out to them. The protests of the mad have been interpreted as symptoms of 
their madness' (Porter, 1987: 5). We have thus inherited a deep disposition to see 
schizophrenia as an abyss of difference, a `constellation of pathology' which sets the 
patient apart from other human beings. 
The destination of those labelled `schizophrenic' has for the most part been as long- 
term inmates of asylums. Their fate has largely been in the hands of psychiatrists but 
the psychiatrists' diagnoses push the person further and further into the role of the 
Other. They become dangerous `outsiders' existing beyond the moral community22. 
For many thousands of schizophrenics discharge from the asylum was not something 
to be expected. Theirs was an all encompassing condition to which loss of liberty was 
the only appropriate response. In crucial respects the custodial history of the asylum is 
recapitulated in the traditional account of schizophrenia `as a narrative of loss in 
22 The notion of `moral community' is used here in the sense that moral considerations appear to inform 
judgements and decisions about what constitutes mental illness. Thus, where the intelligibility of an 
action cannot be adequately perceived as deviance of an `accepted' kind (i. e. breaking a rule knowingly 
or intentionally) the ascription of mental illness is likely from a lay person and, consequently, has a 
very high probability of being confirmed by psychiatrists, albeit with the gloss of a medically defined 
diagnosis. 
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which the pre-illness person goes missing, seemingly abandoned by the force of the 
disorder' (Barham and Hayward, 1991: 2). They are cast out from the role of ordinary 
citizen and lose all rights and obligations normally attached to that status. The 
schizophrenic is someone in whom a drastic rupture has taken place in the continuity 
of their biography: `Suppose we ask, `Who and what existed before the illness, and 
who and what endure during and after? ' Some schools of thought... `do not accept 
that there is an "after" with schizophrenia, only before' (Barham and Hayward, 1991: 
2, my emphasis). 
New Problems, New Controversies 
The closure of asylums does not mean that the difficulties of schizophrenic people are 
over, however. On the contrary, there are presently a number of contentious issues 
surrounding Britain's mental health system which affect, to a greater or lesser extent, 
both people with a diagnosis of schizophrenia and their carers alike. Firstly, there is 
the issue of what constitutes proper provision of care for schizophrenics discharged 
from mental hospitals under care in the community arrangements. Secondly, the 
concept of 'labelling' people as `schizophrenic' continues to focus attention on the 
medical conception of the meaning of hearing `voices'. Thirdly, there is concern over 
the treatment practices of orthodox psychiatrists and in particular their apparent over- 
reliance on drugs to treat schizophrenia. Fourthly, there is the issue of equity of 
treatment for black schizophrenic patients detained within the mental health system. It 
is to these four areas of controversy that we now turn. 
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The Provision of Care in the Community 
The transfer of Community Care responsibilities to local authorities, although 
welcomed by many mental health professionals, has brought new problems and 
controversies. With Community Care reform has come criticism that the mentally ill 
are no longer in receipt of appropriate (i. e. medical) treatment and allied support both 
because of a lack of properly trained staff (especially community psychiatric nurses) 
and the absence of adequate local authority day-care facilities. Moreover, housing 
shortages mean that thousands of former mental hospital patients are now homeless 
and are unable (or unwilling) to be monitored by mental health professionals and 
general practitioners 23. Consequently, Community Care policies have resulted in 
potentially dangerous individuals being left to roam the streets becoming at the very 
least a public nuisance and, at worst, a threat to themselves and/or others. 
Notwithstanding the accuracy of such claims (and the significant, though little 
reported fact, that the risk of serious violent attack from mentally ill individuals is 
very sma1124) two heavily publicised violent incidents involving mentally ill people 
discharged from psychiatric hospitals have become synonymous with the supposed 
failure of Community Care. 
Firstly, the murder in December 1992 of Jonathan Zito, a passenger on a London 
Underground train attracted considerable media attention after it became clear that 
Zito was the random victim of a mentally ill man who had recently been released from 
a psychiatric hospital in order to receive care in the community. It was widely 
23 G. P. 's are extremely reluctant to take homeless mentally ill people on to their books, a problem 
exacerbated by fund holding arrangements that make chronic mental illnesses (e. g. schizophrenia) a 
financially unattractive condition to treat. 
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reported that Zito's killer, Christopher Clunis, was a paranoid schizophrenic with an 
apparently long and unpredictable history of violence. Clunis had become 
increasingly paranoid in the days and weeks before his attack on Zito yet had failed to 
be given the appropriate treatment which might have prevented his mental condition 
from worsening25. Following his arrest it was established that Clunis believed fellow 
passengers on the Underground were about to harm him and this prompted him to 
launch an attack on Zito, stabbing him to death. Zito's murder and Clunis's 
subsequent incarceration in Broadmoor special hospital were widely reported on by 
the British media and mobilised to illustrate the problems apparent in the care in the 
community approach. The crucial question asked by the media was whether Zito 
would still be alive if Clunis had received proper medical (i. e. drug) intervention in 
the days building up to the attack. 
The second incident involved another schizophrenic, Ben Silcock, who was badly 
mauled after climbing into the lions den at London Zoo on New Years Eve 1992. The 
incident had occurred only days after Silcock tried, but failed, to gain admission to his 
local psychiatric hospital. He had recognized that his schizophrenic symptoms were 
worsening and had sought treatment. However, rather like the character Yossarian in 
Joseph Heller's Catch 22, it was felt by medical staff at the hospital that his action 
was itself evidence that he was not suitable for in-patient treatment and he was 
refused admission. The incident was significant (and especially newsworthy) because 
24 In fact MIND point out that Community Care has led to increased harassment and a number of 
extremely violent attacks upon former mental patients by members of the public (see Sayce, 1995). 
25 Following Clunis's conviction the Zito case continued to attract public interest because Zito's widow 
and Clunis pursued a joint legal challenge against Camden Mental Health Trust for failing to provide 
Clunis with the psychiatric treatment necessary to stop him from becoming seriously mentally ill. Their 
claim for damages against the Health Trust was subsequently rejected by the High Court but succeeded 
in keeping the issue of Community Care provision high on the political and policy agenda. 
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Silcock was filmed by an amateur camcorder enthusiast being mauled in the lions' 
den. Surgery to repair the damage reportedly took eight hours (Jones, 1993). The 
footage of Silcock in the lion's den received considerable media attention and quickly 
became a cause celebre symbolising for many, the failure of Community Care. 
Though different in their consequences, both the Clunis and Silcock cases generated 
sustained criticism of the government's asylum closure programme and prompted 
debate on the specific motives underpinning Community Care policies. 
Hearing Voices: Labelling Madness 
One issue that has plagued psychiatry continually in the post-war years has been the 
meaning of hearing `voices'. In a famous study, Rosenhan (1973) reported how he 
and seven colleagues from Stanford University, managed to pass themselves off as 
schizophrenics, and get committed to twelve mental hospitals in the United States 
simply by declaring that they heard sounds or voices saying the single words `empty', 
`hollow' or `thud'. Beyond complaining of this one `symptom' and falsifying details 
of their names and occupations no further alterations of their personal histories were 
made. Despite ceasing to complain of their symptoms immediately after 
hospitalization all, but one, were diagnosed as paranoid schizophrenics whose 
symptoms had temporarily `remitted'. The only people said to have been suspicious of 
their true identity were some of their `fellow' patients. The Rosenhan study points not 
only to the unreliability of psychiatry's diagnostic categories but also to the power of 
psychiatrists to label some individuals as mentally ill and others as 'normal '. 
26 
26 However, critics of Rosenhan argue that, far from decisively attacking the validity of diagnosis, his 
study merely demonstrates that a psychiatrist can be fooled when assuming that persons seeking help 
are being truthful in their descriptions about themselves. 
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Traditionally, psychiatrists have maintained a widespread and close control over the 
meaning of hearing voices with only a few radical 'anti-psychiatrists' such as Laing 
(1965), speaking up on behalf of those whom society labels `mad'. Notwithstanding 
his fall from prominence, Laing's great contribution to the post-war understanding of 
madness was his insistence that psychotics could (indeed should) be listened to in 
order that we might arrive at a more fundamental understanding of the (`normal' and 
`abnormal') individual. At the heart of Laing's critique of Western psychiatry is the 
argument that there exists a tendency `to translate our personal experience of the other 
as a person into an account of him (sic) that is depersonalised' (ibid: 22). In other 
words, practitioners of orthodox psychiatry tend, according to Laing, to ignore the 
actual lived-experiences of the mad, and to treat them as always inferior to the process 
of being mad. For their part, psychiatrists would counter that socio-psychological 
theories of voice-hearing are insupportable in the face of convincing experimental 
evidence that psychosis has a biochemical/genetic aetiology. 
Despite Laing's speculative views on the phenomenological nature of madness he 
remains a powerful source of inspiration for those who believe that psychiatry tends to 
approach the voice hearing experience as a symptom of psychosis and to disregard its 
meaning for individuals. Hearing `voices' is conventionally understood to be a 
symptom of `mental illness' and is therefore seen as an undesirable experience 
(whether the voice hearer thinks so or not). Inevitably, though, the concept of mental 
illness has accumulated a good deal of interpretative baggage. Hence, the label 
`schizophrenia' not only governs the interpretation of hearing `voices' (that it is part 
of a disease process requiring a medical response) it also functions to anticipate the 
behaviour of `voice hearers' who are judged as having an `illness'. Indeed, it is the 
social expectations surrounding the behaviour of schizophrenics that has resulted in a 
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dominant lay (and arguably medical) perception of them as `irrational' beings who 
are, at best mentally incompetent and at worst, violent and aggressive. 
This separation between a medicalized view of a psychotic's experience and the world 
as experienced by the mad themselves invites us to recognise that there is more than 
one way of knowing the phenomena of madness. At present the medical view that 
voice hearing is evidence of psychosis (a symptom of `illness') remains the dominant 
interpretation of the voice hearing experience. Nonetheless, there is increasing interest 
in the idea that `voice hearing' affects a considerable number of people who have 
never been diagnosed as psychotic, and that their `voices' are triggered not by 
biochemical or genetic `malfunctions', but by stress and other environmental factors. 
The national network of Hearing Voices self-help groups for example, reject the 
medical interpretation of voice hearing as evidence of `illness', preferring, instead, to 
interpret their own experiences from within their own life-world contexts. They reject 
objective psychiatric classifications in favour of a much more subjective approach to 
the voice hearing experience. 
Drug Treatment in Psychiatry 
The fact that drugs are the most widely used treatment for the control of psychiatric 
`symptoms' underlines the pre-eminence of the medical model and the medical 
profession within mental health services. Drugs have been used in psychiatry since the 
nineteenth century, but in the 1950s and 1960s the use of tranquillisors, sedatives and 
euphoriants became the basic tools of modem psychiatry. The emergence of 
Chlorpromazine (Largactyl) was hailed as a revolutionary breakthrough in the 
treatment of schizophrenia and has since been credited for helping bring about a 
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decline in the population of the mental hospitals. 27 The first anti-depressants appeared 
in the 1950s and became widely prescribed by both hospital-based psychiatrists and 
general practitioners. The new drugs had a significant impact on psychiatry and gave 
added impetus to the closure of asylums. Yet four decades later the enthusiasm of 
those who talked of a therapeutic revolution now looks misplaced. The widespread 
use of drugs has been deemed inappropriate for a community-based mental health 
system. For many, the use of drugs is seen as continuing psychiatry's incarcerative 
social function. 
Psychiatry's reliance on drug treatment has also led critics to claim that medication 
reinforces a narrow medicalized conception of `cure' as the only really desirable 
outcome of clinical practice and, by implication, denigrates all other (non-medical) 
attempts at `rehabilitation'. They argue that although the efficacy of many psychiatric 
drugs (e. g. minor tranquillisers such as Valium) is unclear beyond their short-term 
value in ameliorating the symptoms of acute mental distress, many patients remain on 
medication often for many years and only ever see their psychiatrist for `reviews' of 
their drug treatment. Such criticisms are echoed by patients, many of whom complain 
of being treated like objects by their doctors who instead of allowing them to talk 
about their experiences and feelings, simply prescribe powerful combinations of drugs 
to reduce the troublesome symptoms of their `illness' (Rogers et al. 1993). Moreover, 
frustration and anger at not being given time to talk is often interpreted as a symptom 
27 However the 'chlorpromazine thesis' has been challenged most forcefully by Scull (1977). He argues 
that the Open Door Movement in Britain had already begun in the late 1940s before the introduction of 
chlorpromazine. Moreover, Scull also notes that there is little evidence that psychoactive drugs have 
been very effective in curing mental disorders. In short, the liberal-scientific claim that a range of 
`miraculous' drugs emerged to further the cause of de-institutionalization is defective on the grounds of 
timing. Whatever the merits or demerits of Scull's argument chlorpromazine remains the drug of 
choice in the treatment of schizophrenia. 
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of illness and sometimes results in patients being given a cocktail of more powerful 
drugs. 
The toxic effects of psychiatric drugs - in particular, the `antipsychotics' (known as 
neuroleptics) used to treat the symptoms of schizophrenia - are a particular source of 
controversy. On average about one death per week is attributed to neuroleptic drugs 
(Sayce, 1995) and their use on patients has become a key concern for those convinced 
that drug regimes are part and parcel of a psychiatric system which routinely fails to 
understand why patients do not like taking them. Amongst the most severe side- 
effects (associated with long term use) are: motor restlessness (or akathisia) which 
compels the patient to pace the floor or shift their legs when sitting; severe 
involuntary `jerk-like' movements of the limbs; and repetitive oral-facial movements 
affecting the mouth, lips and tongue (known as `tardive dyskinesia'). Other common 
side-effects associated with neuroleptics include restlessness, sedation, hand tremor, 
dribbling, muscular rigidity (which together mimic the main symptoms of Parkinson's 
disease) and an increased sensitivity to sunlight. However, most psychiatrists argue 
that while neuroleptic medication does result in these side-effects the benefits of these 
drugs for many psychotic patients far outweigh the negative consequences of 
treatment (e. g. by reducing and often eliminating distressing hallucinations and 
tormenting delusions). 
Although drugs are the dominant mode of psychiatric treatment their legitimacy use is 
no settled matter. For example, the use of long-acting neuroleptics is widespread 
across the mental health service and in Britain they are even given to a small but 
significant number of patients detained in hospital against their will under certain 
`sections' of the 1983 Mental Health Act (relating to forcible treatment). However, 
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many patients regard forced administration of drugs as punitive and symptomatic of a 
system, which fails to meet their individual needs. It is not therefore surprising that 
post-discharge compliance with drug treatment is perceived by psychiatrists to be a 
problem. Consequently, the Royal College of Psychiatrists has actively supported the 
recent (1995) implementation of `community treatment orders', which enable 
psychiatrists to enforce treatment of `difficult' patients who come off their drugs after 
being discharged. Nevertheless, the emergence of campaigning organizations like 
Survivors Speak Out indicates that challenges to the legitimacy of medical 
intervention will continue. 
Racism and Psychiatry 
The public face of psychiatry, like other medical disciplines, is that of an objective, 
applied science. Indeed, the practice of medicine is often seen as the neutral 
application of knowledge by doctors within a clinical environment that is value-free. 
But because it has its origins in late eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe and the 
US psychiatry has, according to some, evolved as an ethnocentric body of knowledge 
and thus is a vehicle of implicit and overt racial bias. The tendency to deny the 
importance of race and culture in psychiatry has been termed the `colour-blind, 
culture-blind' approach (Fernando, 1991). Psychiatry's biologism regards social 
factors as `things' separable from a person's experience of illness. Consequently, they 
are rarely taken account of in clinician's `therapeutic' responses. The method 
employed by orthodox psychiatrists therefore excludes the possibility that the social 
and psychological experience of racism can be a factor both in the onset and 
subsequent treatment of mental illness. We noted above the (false) assumption that 
violence and mental health problems are intertwined and that this perception seeps 
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into professional attitudes and practice. But when the `service user' is black this 
assumption is at its most pervasive. The death in 1993 of Orville Blackwood, an 
inmate of Broadmoor Hospital, provides us with a case in point. 
Blackwood's death was caused by heart failure after receiving huge dosages of 
neuroleptic medication. The report into his death describes a context in which hospital 
staff were afraid of a large black patient and had inadequate awareness of issues of 
race and culture: `We have described previously a culture within the hospital that is 
based on white European norms and expectations. As such, there exists a subtle, 
unconscious on the whole, but nevertheless effective form of organizational racism' 
(Prins quoted in Sayce op. cit.: 136). Blackwood's management by staff at Broadmoor 
led the inquiry team to conclude that his anger at being incarcerated (unjustly in his 
view) and having medication forcibly administered to him led to increased anger and 
in turn increased levels of medication. In other words, his violence was seen as a 
symptom of his illness with the result that he died after being given a powerful 
cocktail of `anti-psychotic' drugs following a violent incident. 
Blackwood's size, colour and history of violent frustration at his treatment in 
Broadmoor fed into medical and nursing assumptions that his violence was part of a 
psychotic illness. More particularly, it fed into preconceived notions of the `dangerous 
Black'. This image is not new (assumptions that black men are more likely to rape, for 
instance, have been prevalent for centuries: Hoch 1979). But it has recently been 
powerfully reshaped into the image of the man who is `big, black, dangerous and 
mad', an image that has become part of a strong racist undercurrent in public debates 
on mental health. Thus, the generalised image of the `dangerous black' collided with 
professional psychiatric assumptions that black people are particularly `dangerous' 
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when suffering mental illness (Fernando 1991). However, the stereotype of the 
dangerous Black has begun to be challenged in recent years not only by Black 
organisations but also by psychiatric professionals from ethnic minority backgrounds 
and charities like MIND, all of whom express concern at the negative impact of such 
stereotyped perceptions on professional psychiatric practice. The focal point of their 
concern is the treatment of black patients whilst being compulsory detained in 
hospital. 
The Failure of Community Care: Back to the Future? 
This brief review of the mental health field in the 1990s reveals a contested and 
fragmented psychiatric system. The absence of consensus on how best to implement 
community care policies (let alone what the terms `community' and `care' actually 
mean28) has left `mentally ill people... at risk of being caught up in the middle of an 
ideological shoot-out' (Muijen, 1995: viii). Mental health professionals in their turn 
have been left feeling confused about whether their priority is to develop community 
care services for the mentally ill or to lock them up on behalf of society. This 
confusion over Community Care also reaches the highest level of government. Frank 
Dobson, the Secretary of State for Health, interviewed in the Daily Telegraph 
(17.1.98) recently gave a glimpse of the present Labour governments' position on 
Community Care. His view was that care in the community had failed because it had 
28 One of the basic difficulties of formulating policy in this area is the disputed character of what is 
meant by `Community Care'. `Community' itself is a term that is pervaded with ambiguity, and this 
renders discussion of policy particularly difficult. In sociological parlance `community' has some 
connotations of locality. However, current policy flies in the face of the fact that location is 
decreasingly the centre for the main social activities of many people in British society. Only a minority 
of people still have activities which are primarily constrained by the locality. Therefore to promulgate 
policies that are based on activities which are supposed to take place in the locality may be well be at 
odds with the social arrangement which in fact exist in society. One aspect of this is that in practice, 
`community care' for people with mental health problems usually means informal care by kith and kin 
(see Bulmer, 1987). 
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led to the deaths of innocent people. He also raised the possibility of the government 
creating more `secure' places for those mentally ill people who are unamenable to 
receiving mental health care in out-patient settings. There was, he stated a larger 
number of people still needing some form of 24-hour care than the system presently 
recognises. 
Yet in a later interview the Health Secretary repudiated his earlier statement. It was, 
he said, not true that Community Care had failed, what he meant to say was that some 
mentally ill people were not getting the level of supervision required. He then 
muddied the waters again by talking about the use of powers of treatment in the 
Community raising the spectre of compulsory powers for those who did not take their 
medication. This raised the expected protests. MIND for example pointed out that 
measures that concentrate on easing public fear about the mentally ill might breach 
the European Convention on Human Rights. In an attempt to sort things out Paul 
Boateng, a junior Minister of Health, stressed that there was no change in Community 
Care policy: 
There will be no return to the grim Victorian asylums. The old mantra `community good, 
hospital bad' is dead. We have to build a new basis of confidence in our mental health 
services. The public is entitled to nothing less. This means that every existing mental health 
closure is backed by a tough and credible alternative package that includes a mix of new style 
hospital care and community provision. We have got to secure the welfare of the mentally ill, 
while safeguarding the public (quoted in Bean and Keil, in press). 
Whether the Government is prepared to put more money into mental health services 
remains to be seen. But even if they do matters are from clear. Mental health care is 
difficult to deliver perfectly, and seems to produce scandals and moral panics 
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whichever way services are organised. Society needs to choose between safety and 
freedom, between custody and community support. The pattern over centuries has 
shown that these forms of care tend to lead to either abuse in institutions or neglect in 
the community. The quality of care and the extent of such abuse will depend to a 
degree on resources invested, including training of staff. However, the choice is 
political, and is influenced by society's values and beliefs at the time. Thus while the 
Daily Telegraph congratulated the Government on `taking the difficult decision that a 
whole generation of liberal social engineers was mistaken' (Editorial 17/1/98, p. 25) 
the paper conveniently forgot that asylum closures were a result of fiscal 
considerations which used the ideology of Community Care to provide its 
humanitarian face (Scull, 1989). 
Conclusion 
We appear to be at a crossroads in the 1990s, developing community-based services 
for mentally ill people when society's values are becoming more custodial. There is 
low tolerance of problems caused in the community that theoretically can be 
prevented with institutional care. Unfortunately, the complexity of mental health care, 
involving so many contradictory social policy areas and groups with opposing 
interests means that consensus is an unrealistic objective. Most parties will reject any 
compromise, since it can never go far enough in all opposite directions to satisfy 
anyone fully. One solution however, might be to base future mental health provision 
not on a compromise between professional and policy interests, but on a user-led 
perspective in which those with grounded experience of mental illness can shape their 
service. However, the user's view of the mental health system can easily be 
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`pathologised' in a power dynamic which obscures the user's perspective29- a fact 
wryly noted by the Restoration playwright Nathaniel Lee, following his committal to 
Bethlam Hospital in the sixteenth century: `They called me mad, I called them mad, 
and damn them they outvoted me' (Quoted in Porter, 1991: 1). As we shall see 
however, conceptualizations of madness as pathology are far from a purely medical 
concern. They also involve the overlap of historical and cultural representations, and 
are the focus of interest in the next chapter. 
29 To this can be added the difficulties of including the long-term mentally ill in discussion about their 
future. No amount of wishful thinking that a user-led perspective could include representatives of the 
persistent mentally ill will result in their voices being heard in their own behalf. However, wider use of 
mental health advocacy schemes might be one solution to this problem. 
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Introduction: The Iconography of Madness 
From Hieronymus Bosch through Francisco Goya to Edvard Munch, the idea that the 
mad look different has found expression in the artistic imagination. Never the less, 
representing visually what is an unobservable mental phenomenon presented a 
considerable challenge. Sander Gilman (1988) has argued persuasively that the 
iconography of illness is an indication of the way in which society deals with and 
conceptualises disease: `The portrait of the sufferer, the portrait of the patient is... the 
image of the disease anthropormorphized' (1988: 2). One key icon is dishevelment. 
Wild, unkempt, hair and tattered clothing has long provided an influential sign of 
madness. As Gilman observes, these representations are not necessarily accurate. 
Rather, they enable the intended audience to recognize that it is madness that is being 
portrayed. 
That we are able to recognise the `mad' as different from "us" reveals a deep rooted 
concern - perhaps anxiety - with knowing who the mad are. This applies as much to 
the psychiatric profession as to society at large. The lay assumption that you "know a 
lunatic when you see one" became a professional concern for those formally charged 
with managing and treating the mad. Mass incarceration in asylums (see Chapter 
Three) provided psychiatrists with an unprecedented opportunity for recording and 
documenting the physiognomy of madness (see Gilman, 1982). As psychiatry strove 
to shed connotations of quackery and turn itself into a legitimate science, the notion 
that clinicians could describe, define and even diagnose the insane according to their 
portraiture became increasingly important. Indeed, the ability to catalogue 
psychopathologies from outward appearances underpins psychiatry's `discovery' of 
madness as a phenomenon amenable to a `clinical gaze'. The blossoming of 
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psychiatric photography in the second half of the Nineteenth century (Showalter, 
1987) also bears witness to the embedded definition of madness as exhibiting distinct 
differences in physical appearance and behaviour which doctors could learn to 
recognise and label. 
Representations of madness as `difference' have continued virtually unchanged into 
our own century. Gilman (1988: 13) interprets this relatively stable mode of 
representation as conveying a reassuring message to the public, that the devastation of 
mental illness is not likely to happen to them or people like them: 
The banality of real mental illness comes in conflict with our need to have the mad 
identifiable, different from ourselves. Our shock is always that they are really just like us. This 
moment, when we say, `they are just like us', is most upsetting. Then we no longer know 
where lies the line that divides our normal, reliable world, a world that minimizes our fears, 
from that world in which lurks the fearful, the terrifying, the aggressive. We want - no, we 
need - the `mad' to be different, so we create out of the stuff of their reality the myths that 
make them different. 
He argues that by marking mentally ill people as different, images of madness operate 
at two levels: first, at the level of the social construction of categories of disease; and 
second, the internalization of such images by individuals or groups who are labelled 
`mad'. Thus, in his study he includes images of madness produced by artists labelled 
insane (e. g. Richard Dadd and Vincent Van Gogh), as well as by those claiming to 
represent the condition more `objectively'. This internalized mode of representation 
`is not merely a mimetic reflection of the daily world of the insane, but is also tied to 
the long Western tradition of representing psychopathological states' (ibid: 99). 
According to Gilman, the idea (fostered in particular by the Laingian antipsychiatric 
movement) that patients alone possesses true insight into their illness and treatment 
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and which is then rendered visible through their art, is naive. Rather, he suggests that 
a `continuity of representation' occurs in which visual representations of insanity by 
mentally ill artists reveal a borrowed `structure of expression' in which dominant 
icons of madness as difference, shape their own perception of their `difference'. 
Gilman's analysis points to the importance of 'difference' as the long-standing core of 
representations of madness. Certainly, images in our own era continually draw upon 
conceptualizations and representations from past times. As Wahl (1996: 114) puts it, 
`The creative professionals of today's media are, in some ways, just carrying on 
traditional depiction's of the past. Many of today's images are repetitions or residuals 
of long-standing popular beliefs'. In his discussion of US films involving the mentally 
ill for example, he notes how the portrayal of the "mad murderer" as looking 
distinctively different, activates artistic conventions that have evolved over centuries 
(see also Fleming and Manvell, 1985). Taking his cue from Gilman, he sees American 
cinema's representation of mental illness as a form of psychological reassurance: 
`Presenting mentally ill characters as different and dangerous may serve a 
psychologically self-protective function' (Wahl, 1996: 124). So, while the single 
paintings of Bosch have evolved into the multiple images and mass reproductions of 
cinema and television, the basic public image of madness as difference have remained 
remarkably constant. 
Over the course of the twentieth century, a number of films have dealt with 
psychiatrists and their patients. Gabbard and Gabbard (1987) identify over 250 US 
films. However, British films have generally avoided mental health topics. One reason 
for this neglect, we suggest, relates to the development of mental health services in 
Britain. We argued in Chapter Three, that access to asylum patients was severely 
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restricted and that an understandable uncertainty about what went on behind the 
institution's locked doors prevailed. Grounded testimony from those on the inside was 
therefore hard to come by which perhaps explains why Milos Forman's US-based 
film, One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest (1975), became synonymous with the British 
asylum experience. Based on the novel by Ken Kesey (1962), the film's account of 
authority and rebellion in a US State mental hospital is still often seen as a key 
moment in the discrediting of an ancien regime. However, its appeal to both British 
and US audience's belies larger national differences, firstly in relation to mental 
health systems and secondly, in relation to media systems. 
Mental Health and Broadcasting Systems in the UK and USA 
Public attitudes toward mental illness differ considerably between the UK and the US. 
Freudian theory for example, has deep historical roots in the US and for those who 
can afford to pay, psychoanalysis offers a popular alternative to medical models. The 
history of psychiatry in the UK on the other hand, has for the most part, been one in 
which patients are compelled to have treatment'. Analysands have opted to be treated 
and to enjoy personal, intimate, encounters with therapists in (usually) office settings. 
By contrast, British psychiatry has traditionally revolved around centralized structures 
(the asylum) and an authoritarian system of management, presided over by a 
superintendent. The psychoanalyst's interest in `neurotic' behaviour however, 
provided an alternative source of help for those whose mental (including sexual) 
problems put them beyond the province of the asylum doctor. As Porter (1991: 429) 
1 Before the 1983 Mental Health Act the rationality of the person with mental illness received little or 
no support in legislation, and mental patients were considered unable to give their informed consent. 
The 1983 Act gave consent a legitimate place in British law and allowed patients to legally withdraw 
their consent to treatment (see Barham, 1992: pp. 127-130). 
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puts it, `Amongst the lay public -far more than within the wider psychiatric profession 
itself - psychoanalysis was to acquire an extraordinary aura. In countless novels and 
films from the inter-war years onwards, the `shrink' was standardly depicted as the 
sage of the psyche, a wise man, magician, miracle worker, yet also a doctor: in short, 
the new priest of the twentieth century'. The British figure of the psychiatrist as a 
benign paternal authority vis-ä-vis the US emphasises the commercial relationship 
between analyst and patient, and mirrors similar differences between the two 
countries' broadcasting systems. 
Britain's broadcasting system has traditionally operated as a public service model, at 
arms length from government. The BBC, and later the ITV system, were cultural 
institutions whose management committee's (the BBC Board of Governors and the 
Independent Television (later Broadcasting) Authority, respectively) were drawn from 
the ranks of the Great and the Good. The system evolved into a centralized structure 
based on one-way communication, flowing from centre to periphery. The dominant 
US system by contrast, has operated according to a commercial model since its 
inception. Media policy is framed within a political culture that sees commercial 
activity as the cornerstone of individual freedom. Market theorists argue that because 
individual consumers express their preferences to suppliers (in this case, of 
broadcasting services) through the ratings system, commercially based stations are 
more responsive to audience wants and desires. This system was not installed without 
conflict and opposition however (Mosco, 1998). From 1928 to 1935, representatives 
from labour movements, intellectuals, the press, religious organizations and other civil 
society groups, opposed the commercial model. Although corporate interests 
eventually commandeered the key parts of the system, modest public service 
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requirements were instituted until weakened by broadcasting deregulation in the 
1980s. 
The importance of prime time (usually 7 pm to 11 pm) for broadcasters cannot be 
over-estimated. It represents the pivot of their daily schedule. Publicly funded 
broadcasting organizations, such as the BBC, are not directly subject to the same 
commercial imperative to deliver blocks of audiences to advertisers (though in 
practice, commercial and market criteria often influence programme making). Prime 
time television is made up, for the most part, of a stable and repetitive diet of drama, 
game shows, talk shows and commercials, designed to attract (and sell to) the largest 
possible public at the least possible cost. Its entertainment programmes often feature 
medical themes and medically-related shows have been a long-standing staple of 
commercial television (Turow, 1989; Karpf, 1991) It is therefore not surprising that 
mental illness has frequently featured in drama programming. Signorelli (1989) 
reports that since 1969, about twenty per cent of prime time drama has involved some 
depiction or theme around mental illness. This relative prominence has led a number 
of American academics to analyse television images of mental illness. 
In an early study, Gerbner (1959) noted that mass media depictions of mental illness 
tended to be inaccurate and that television in particular played a key role in 
perpetuating harmful misconceptions (see also Gerbner, 1980). Similarly, Nunally 
(1961) concluded that the image of mental illness in the US media was farther 
removed from the characteristics established by mental health professionals than the 
image held by the general public (c. f. Winick, 1978). Instead of mediating between 
experts and the public, media images recycled traditional popular stereotypes and 
prejudices. In a later study, Wahl and Roth (1982) organised a `Media Watch' of 
155 
Madness and Representation 
prime time television broadcasts in the Washington DC area in February 1981. The 
findings highlighted the generally negative stereotyping of mentally ill people. 
Similarly, Signorelli (1989) reported that while mental illness features strongly in 
dramatic programming, negative stereotypes dominated storylines. Taken together, 
these studies reveal that portrayals of mental illness on American mainstream 
television are often inaccurate, unfavourable and biased. Associations between mental 
illness with violence for example, are routinely featured in action-adventure 
programmes and US soap opera. Whilst I do not want to take issue with this 
conclusion, I would argue that US television's negative presentation of mental illness 
is largely explained by the restricted genres on prime time programming. 
The saliency of negative mental illness stereotypes has recently been discussed by a 
leading mental health advocate, Otto Wahl, in his book Media Madness: Public 
Images of Mental Illness (1995) which focuses on representation of mental illness in 
the US media as a whole. From children's cartoons through prime time drama to 
`slasher' movies, he illustrates how different forms of popular mass media ridicule the 
mentally ill and are inaccurate in their portrayal of common conditions, such as 
schizophrenia (repeatedly implying that it leads inexorably to violence). Whilst 
Wahl's book is a useful contribution to a generally sparse literature on the topic, we 
should not assume that his analysis is easily transferable to a British media context. 
The UK's shift from asylum care to a community-based mental health system requires 
that we view representations of mental illness historically. Recent changes in the 
organization of mental health care may have long-term implications for ways in which 
the mentally ill are publicly represented in the British media. In order to track past, 
present and future representations of mental illness, we need an approach that 
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acknowledges the different rules of representation governing media in different 
national and historical contexts. 
Mental Illness and Cultural Forms 
Deinstitutionalization involves- more than more than just the administrative 
substitution of one locus of care for another. It invites a radical reshaping of the ways 
in which we think about, describe and, in particular, relate to people with a history of 
mental illness (Barham, 1992). The Glasgow Media Group's Media and Mental 
Distress (1996) examines contemporary British media images of mental illness and 
explores their impact on public beliefs about the mentally ill through an audience 
reception study2. Like Wahl, they establish a general profile of media portrayals in 
which the mentally ill are represented in overwhelmingly negative terms. Their 
analysis of media content in April 1993 found that two-thirds of items dealing with 
mental health issues forged a link between mental illness and violence. This category 
of content outweighed the second most common category ('prescriptions for 
treatment/advice/recovery') by a ratio of almost four to one. Despite methodological 
differences3 between this study and Wahl's, it appears that on both sides of the 
Atlantic, a limited repertoire of mental illness representations is endemic across a 
range of media forms. 
2 The audience study consisted of six groups of approximately ten people. The intention was to explore 
the process by which media accounts of mental illness are interpreted and contribute to the formation of 
beliefs amongst the general population. Group exercises were conducted, prompted by still photographs 
taken from Coronation Street (a popular British soap opera). Participants were asked to provide 
dialogue to the photographs in which a mentally ill character attempts to snatch a child. Participants 
were also asked to reproduce `headline' newspaper stories about the mentally ill. These exercises 
revealed how easily participants were able to reproduce the style and language of television drama and 
the popular press (which according to the Glasgow group points to the possible formation of social 
attitudes towards the mentally ill). 
3 Wahl's `methodology' establishes the US media's portrayal of mental illness on the basis of one-off 
examples of misrepresentation. By contrast, the Glasgow group adopt a more systematic approach 
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However, assumptions of uniformity are misleading. We cannot assume for example, 
that journalists working on broadsheet newspapers in the UK represent mental illness 
in the same way as tabloid journalists in the US. Another important difference is that 
the US newspaper industry operates primarily on a city/regional basis and so, unlike 
the UK, has almost no recognisably `national' daily titles. As a consequence, US 
journalists' perceptions of mental illness may well be contingent on local 
circumstances and differ from region to region, state to state. Both Wahl and the 
Glasgow group fail to acknowledge the structural differences governing newspaper 
production in their respective countries, nor do they make any aesthetic distinction 
between tabloids and broadsheets. Indeed, the Glasgow research explicitly excludes 
broadsheets and focuses solely on tabloid representations of mental illness on the 
grounds that `they are a potential source of common-sense understandings and 
popular myths about social issues and have a very large audience' (Philo, 1996: 45). 
By concentrating on the `dominant messages' given about mental illness across 
tabloids, their method glides over differences in meaning-making within other types 
of newspapers. Thus, questions about the operation of textual or discursive forms are 
not addressed. This neglect is particularly problematic in relation to different 
representational rules governing broadcast television and film. 
While television and film share formal aesthetic properties (notably, image and sound 
combinations), they are distinct cultural forms (see Ellis, 1982). Consequently, they 
offer different possibilities for representing social issues, including mental illness. 
Differences in cultural form however, are acknowledged in neither Wahl's nor the 
Glasgow group's research. Both ignore the aesthetic differences between film and TV 
drawing on both quantitative and (to a lesser extent) qualitative research techniques. The Glasgow 
group's approach thus renders it more suitable for control and replication at a future point. 
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whilst noting that negative stereotypes of mental illness are dominant across a range 
of visual media. The Glasgow group for example, collapse all distinctions between 
factual and fictional representations and ignore the differences between children's 
cartoons, teenage drama, soap opera and films shown on TV. These elisions 
conveniently avoid the question of whether similarities in representations of mental 
illness are more significant than the differences arising from the particular genres and 
forms being employed. The present work is primarily concerned with the extent and 
nature of these differences and the ways they mediate representations of mental 
health. 
In their discussion of British television's presentation of discourses around 
"terrorism" Schlesinger et al (1983) note that `closed' formats do not constitute the 
sum of its output, and they point to more `open' programming in which various 
`alternative' and `oppositional' discourses are included. Even in the US, despite the 
prime-time imperatives that dominate mainstream TV's portrayal of mental illness, 
alternative voices sometimes do manage to obtain airtime and visibility, though the 
odds are very much against them. 
Frederick Wiseman's 1967 documentary, Titicut Follies is a notable case in point. Its 
fly-on-the-wall account of conditions inside Bridgewater, a Massachusetts prison for 
the criminally insane, presents a very different portrayal of the mentally ill and their 
`carers' to the one conventionally portrayed in prime time drama. Indeed, so 
challenging was the film, that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts upheld the prison 
authorities' call for it to banned from public display even though they had previously 
granted Wiseman permission to film in the prison. For over thirty years, it has had 
only limited distribution in the US (and has been shown only once on British 
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television, in 1993). Ironically, one of the central charges against the film is that it 
misrepresented prison life, by focusing on its more sensational aspects. Thus, while 
sensationalism is the stock-in-trade of drama, it is not supposed to be the motivation 
behind actuality-based programming. Amongst other things then, Titicut Follies fell 
foul of the regulating impact of genre. Its failure to avoid censure reminds us that 
cultural forms are important mechanisms for structuring public discourse (Golding 
and Murdock, 1991). It is for this reason, that the diversity of television programming, 
or lack of it, plays such an important place in the orchestration of national public 
debate. 
British Television Current Affairs and Mental Illness 
At this juncture we can pose a simple question: To what extent does the Glasgow 
group's blanket pessimism about the British media's representation of mental illness 
apply to the more uncertain and open genres of broadcast TV? In order to answer this 
question, the second half of the thesis will offer a number of case-studies of public 
talk about mental health issues on British television. Particular emphasis is placed on 
the manner in which different perspectives on mental health/illness have found 
representation within a range of current affairs programming. In approaching this 
issue, it is our belief that content analysis alone cannot adequately grapple with the 
complexities of unpredictable media forms. Whilst it usefully allows us to answer 
such questions as who spoke? and for how long?, such data only scratches the surface 
of television's operation as a communicative medium. To account more adequately 
for the communicative character of televisual representations we need a more 
interpretative approach to the dynamics of meaning-making. This, in turn, requires 
qualitative analyses capable of capturing the subtleties of the interaction between the 
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particular form of TV programmes and the general discursive space in which it 
operates. As we will see, understanding representation as a cultural practice 
demonstrates time and again, that achieving `visibility' and a voice is no guarantee of 
either sympathetic treatment or legitimacy. 
Television is not a mechanism for relaying discourses but for reorganising them. As 
they move from their original arenas into viewers' homes they are subject to the 
procedural and aesthetic rules governing particular forms of programming (Murdock, 
1991). At the heart of arguments over the application of these rules is the question of 
representation - in both its social and cultural sense. Socially, representation is a 
system of social delegation. The issues here include: 
" who speaks in their own voice and who is spoken about? 
" how are speakers accessed? 
" how are they treated - with sympathy and respect or hostility 
Culturally, representation is a system of signification. To understand the way 
television works in this regard it is necessary to keep firmly in mind that it organises 
both discourse and visual images. In exploring the organisation of discourse we need 
to pay attention to the relative openness of programmes, and in particular to how 
different voices are played against one another. The orchestration of images within 
programmes can reinforce the organisation of discourse (by confirming the authority 
of speakers and underlining what is being said) or it can cut across or undermine it. 
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In order to explore representation as a system of both social delegation and cultural 
forms, this thesis draws on insights from discourse analysts and semiotics in order to 
produce a detailed account of the ways that public discourse about mental illness is 
televisually constructed. This approach departs markedly from both Wahl's and the 
Glasgow group's analyses. However, despite differences in approach and 
methodology, this thesis accepts their challenge to researchers to engage more closely 
with professional and mental health service users. Focusing on current affairs TV 
enables us to test empirically Schlesinger et al's contention that negative images (in 
this case of mental illness) can be challenged in an arena commonly assumed to be 
`open' and 'accessible' to different points of view and perspectives. By attending to 
the voices of those speaking on mental health issues we also move away from an 
assumption implicit in Wahl's and the Glasgow group's analyses, that media are 
nothing more than discrete texts or messages. Instead, we view television as a domain 
of everyday social life in which the opinions and experiences of all citizens are 
entitled to expression within a variety of contrasting programme forms and genres. 
However, as we noted in Chapter Two, although the public broadcasting system may 
give people communicative entitlements, this is not the same as providing equality of 
access to a public voice. With this in mind we ask: "what is the condition of public 
discourse as played out in television current affairs' coverage of mental health 
issues? " In constructing an answer we have looked in detail at nine current affairs 
programmes chosen to illustrate the full range of programme formats currently 
available on British television. They differ significantly in terms of form, style and 
communicative intent. Comparative textual analysis allows us to demonstrate in detail 
how a particular issue or event is differentially mediated by the dynamics of 
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programme forms. Before turning to our case studies of televised talk about mental 
illness however, we need to briefly consider questions of method. 
An Outline of Methods 
The selection of current affairs programmes presented in the following chapters has 
been arrived at using a quota-sample. The aim of the present study is not to conduct a 
content analysis of everything on mental illness broadcast over a particular monitoring 
period. Rather, we have selected ideal-typical instances that illustrate the major forms 
of current affairs and documentary programming within the current British television 
system. 
The programmes selected for analysis have been chosen primarily on the basis of their 
position within a matrix defined by two dimensions, which plot the degree of 
discursive space accorded to lay speakers. They are: 
1. the degree of access given to programme participants 
2. the control over that access exercised by the programme makers 
Figure 4.1 provides a diagrammatic summary of where the nine selected programmes 
are located in relation to these cross-cutting dimensions. 
Although our first concern is with the ways the discursive spaces within the selected 
programmes is organised we would stress again that in analysing televisual texts it is 
also necessary to look in detail at the organisation of visual representations and their 
complex interplay with participants' talk. Consequently, the analytical questions we 
ask cannot be answered by counting the frequency with which particular 
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representations occur or the amount of time given to speakers. As the Glasgow 
group's research on images of mental illness show, these are indisputably important 
research questions. Our approach thus complements their work by pursuing other 
kinds of questions about the communicative form of programmes. Our approach aims 
to open up issues around the organisation of discourse and representation concerning 
mental illness in order to contribute to a general understanding of television's 
`distinctive mediating devices' (Corner, 1998: 240). Nevertheless, the content of 
individual programmes provides an important context for the analysis, and with this in 
mind we now turn to a synopses of the nine programmes we have selected for detailed 
analysis. 
Individual Programme Synopsis 
Kilroy, BBC1,24 January 1993 
Kilroy is a discussion programme in which lay people and experts debate issues 
related to topical news events. The edition examined here was broadcast following the 
Ben Silcock incident (see Chapter Three) and asks how schizophrenics are cared for 
in the community. It begins with footage of Silcock in the lion's den. A number of 
schizophrenics are then questioned about their experience of hearing voices. 
Following this, the host probes a psychiatrist about the causes of schizophrenia. The 
psychiatrist's' views on medication are then challenged by lay members of the 
audience who offer their own assessment of the problems of caring for mentally ill 
relatives. The host also seeks contributions from representatives of charitable 
organisations. Their testimony is critical of Community Care policies. At this point, a 
Conservative MP, Jerry Hayes, is targeted by Kilroy-Silk as someone partly 
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responsible for the failure of care in the community. Relatives are encouraged to 
oppose Hayes' views on this policy. Kilroy-Silk also raises the issue of compulsory 
treatment for schizophrenics living in the community and representatives of mental 
health charities and civil liberty organisations provide testimony on this issue. Finally, 
Kilroy-Silk ends the discussion by stating that if you are schizophrenic and need help 
you can always help yourself. 
Disguises: `A Place of Safety', ITV, 25 February and 4 March 1993 
In `A Place of Safety' Adam Holloway, the series reporter, impersonates a 
schizophrenic in order to investigate Community Care policies. In the first of two 
programmes he dons his `schizophrenic' disguise and practices his voice-hearing 
performance. His investigation begins at a derelict mental asylum. He poses questions 
about the quality of community care for the mentally ill now those asylums are 
closing. In Birmingham, he assumes his disguise and using a concealed video-camera 
records his unsuccessful attempts to get psychiatric help at various GP's surgeries. He 
then successfully convinces a duty psychiatrist in a local hospital that he is psychotic 
and needs `a place of safety'. Following a weekend in hospital he is discharged and 
given an accommodation list. He then recounts his failure to find temporary hostel 
accommodation. He then `experiences' success with the Salvation Army who offers 
him accommodation and long-term help. Finally, Holloway informs us that he will 
now investigate private sector care in Mayfield Court, a `hotel' described as being the 
`rock bottom' of community care. 
In part two of the programme, clandestine footage of Holloway's two-week 
experience of Mayfield Court is mobilised to illustrate how the private sector does not 
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meet the needs of its `customers'. We are shown extensive footage of a dilapidated 
building and its `guests' whom, we are told, receive virtually no care at all (a claim 
validated by testimony from a psychiatrist posing as a relative). After presenting 
`evidence' of bullying by hotel staff, Holloway (in-role) confronts the manager and 
leaves Mayfield Court for London. There, he maintains his disguise and attempts to 
find `a place of safety' in hospital. He fails to find a bed for the night and is advised to 
go to a hostel or contact the police. He is refused admission to a hostel and tries to 
attract the attention of the police by taking his clothes off in the street. Police officers 
fail to help him, though a sympathetic policeman does advise him to go to Hackney 
police station for help. After doing so he is advised to contact Hackney's emergency 
housing service. This is unsuccessful and the programme closes with Holloway 
joining other homeless people on the streets. 
Panorama: `Whose Mind Is It Anyway? ', BBC1,1 March 1993 
This programme focuses on the civil liberties issue surrounding Community 
Supervision Orders (CSO's) for ex-mental patients who refuse to take prescribed 
medication after discharge from hospital. The CSO plan is explored via three case 
studies of people discharged into the community who have subsequently committed 
violent or aggressive acts, including murder. The programme presents evidence from 
the United States, where a community supervision project (similar to CSO's) is in 
operation. It draws on testimony from various mental health professionals, 
representatives of mental health charities, politicians, service users and their relatives. 
The programme is relatively `open' in its provision of communicative space for those 
who either support or oppose CSO's. In addition, its format is `loose' in the sense that 
its argumentative structure does not converge upon one single preferred interpretation 
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of the issues (Although it does emphasise in its summing up that if stricter controls are 
imposed on mentally ill people living in the community they will support rather than 
restrain them). 
All Black: `Broken Poets', BBC2,20 August 1993 
`Broken Poets' focuses on the treatment of black people in Britain's mental health 
system. Its core theme is that mental hospitals are part of a white power structure that 
at best, is unresponsive to the black experience of mental illness and at worst, is racist. 
The argument is developed in three main stages. Firstly, it mobilises testimony from 
an orthodox (white) psychiatrist as well as ethnic minority psychiatrists in order to 
present orthodox psychiatry as `closed' around biological explanations. In contrast, 
the ethnic minority experts acknowledge social factors in the aetiology of mental 
disorder. Secondly, biological explanations are presented as helping sustain a system 
that victimises black people. The dynamics of this system are demonstrated by taking 
two particular `patient careers' that illustrate the general themes of the programme. 
Two aspects are given particular attention: black people's entry into the mental health 
system via forced incarceration (i. e. the `criminalization' of cries for help); and the 
use of strong drug regimes when in the system (regimes which fit well with biological 
explanations). Finally, forms of community care which return black people to local 
social networks and sources of support which understand their situation, are presented 
as offering a potentially positive alternative. 
Tom's Story, BBC2,7 April 1994 
Tom's Story recounts the events leading to Tom Leader's schizophrenic breakdown 
and subsequent recovery. His story is told through the testimony of Tom and his 
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mother, June. Both relate details of their family and social background culminating in 
their account of his voice hearing experiences and hospitalisation. The extent of his 
recovery is illustrated by footage of him performing the routine activities of daily 
living juxtaposed against testimony describing how his schizophrenic symptoms 
profoundly affected his everyday life. The latter stages of the programme follow 
Tom's preparations for a piano examination and a public recital to help publicise the 
issue of schizophrenia. Both events are presented as `milestones' on his road to 
recovery. His successful recital forms the final part of the programme. Tom's Story is 
more than just a straightforward `human interest' story. It operates with a 
metanarrative in which Tom is cast as a brilliant but bruised musician, who managed 
to nurture a hidden musical talent during the worst moments of his illness. In short, 
the programme recycles the popular myth that madness and creativity are intertwined. 
People First: `Black and Blue' BBC2,2 June 1994 
`Black and Blue' is a documentary focusing on institutional racism in Britain's mental 
health system. It explores white psychiatrist's' failure to understand and treat the 
black experience of mental illness. Its argumentative format is `tightly' organised so 
as to converge on the view that orthodox psychiatry is failing to understand the 
cultural milieu of mentally ill black people. In contrast, `Afro-centric' approaches to 
black mental illness are presented as offering more appropriate forms of treatment 
than Western medical models. A number of `alternative' treatments are assumed to be 
sensitive to black people's social and cultural experience (e. g. yoga, massage, 
rhythm). This argument is developed through the testimony of a number of black 
alternative therapists who offer various holistic forms of psychiatric `help'. At the 
epicentre of this narrative is the argument that orthodox psychiatry is dominated by a 
168 
Madness and Representation 
neo-colonial power relationship between black patients and their (usually white) 
psychiatrists. The dynamics of this relationship is then explored through the testimony 
of black ex-patients who have experienced what they claim are ethnocentric forms of 
drug `treatment'. 
Video Diaries: `Mad, Bad or Sad', BBC2,14 September 1994 
`Mad, Bad or Sad' is Sharon's personal account of being a black schizophrenic 
woman living in inner city Manchester. Throughout her Diary we are introduced to 
significant people and places in her life. It reveals the formal and informal network of 
support that surrounds her. A key figure in the diary is Mickey, Sharon's husband, 
also a diagnosed schizophrenic. Together, they offer a deeply personal perspective on 
the difficulties of living and coping with her schizophrenic diagnosis. Both are 
consistently critical of the mental health service for its racism and reliance on 
medication. The Diary reveals Sharon's routinized experience of hearing `voices' and 
having to take psychiatric medication. `Mad, Bad or Sad' also tells the story of 
Sharon's search for her mother who fostered her as a child and the stress that this 
causes her. She makes it clear that in her view, it is this experience which has resulted 
in her mental health problems. Her Diary reveals that she was conceived following 
her mother's affair with a black neighbour and that her mother is white and was 
married with six children. Sharon was fostered to avoid family embarrassment and 
learns that her mother and sister have been searching for her. It concludes with Sharon 
preparing to meet her mother. 
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Horizon: 'Hearing Voices', BBC2,24 April 1995 
Horizon is the BBC's `flagship' science documentary series. `Hearing Voices' has a 
clear argumentative format that challenges the orthodox medical view that hearing 
`voices' is a sign of severe mental illness. It offers an alternative explanation in which 
voice hearing is acknowledged to be a psychological phenomenon. Its approach 
hinges on differences of expert medical and psychological opinion. The argument is 
developed in three main stages. Firstly, conventional psychiatric accounts of voice 
hearing are shown as closed around biological explanations that ignore psychological 
factors like stress. Secondly, research is mobilised to suggest that voice hearing is 
linked to `inner speech' production, a finding which adds `scientific' validity to the 
traditional psychological model of voice hearing. This approach views drug treatment 
as problematic because it ignores voice hearing as a meaningful human experience. 
Thirdly, in contrast to orthodox psychiatry, the psychological approach is shown 
encouraging voice hearers to talk about the content of their voices and helping them to 
avoid potentially dangerous incidents. The voice hearing experience in `Hearing 
Voices' is mediated through the testimony of a number of voice hearers whose 
contributions are used to undermine the opinions of orthodox psychiatry and bolster 
support for experts advocating the psychological model. 
Taken together, these nine programmes represent the range of current British 
television current affairs programming, from `classical' documentary and current 
affairs formats such as Panorama and Horizon, to the most recent access forms 
represented by Kilroy and Video Diaries. They provide the raw materials for the 
detailed analysis of the ways cultural forms mediate public representations of mental 
health issues, which we now turn to 
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Introduction: The Shifting Status of Psychiatric Expertise 
The interpretation and treatment of mental illness has been the prerogative of the 
medical profession for over a hundred and fifty years. Secure in the closed world of 
the asylum psychiatrists' power to define, classify and treat mental disorders appeared 
monolithic and unassailable. This is no longer the case. The move to community care 
involves a wide range of professionals in the delivery of psychiatric care. 
Consequently, traditional deference to the expertise of the psychiatric profession is 
giving way to a valorization of non-medical knowledge about mental illness, 
underpinned by alternative professional orientations to the care and management of 
the mentally disturbed. 
The development of community care is closely related to shifting conceptions of both 
mental illness and the efficacy of the asylum. Medical interpretations of mental illness 
no longer have an a priori precedence in professional and lay discourses on the care 
of the mentally ill. Other discourses lay claim to authority but on the basis that they 
offer grounded `truths' and `mini-narratives' told by those whose professional and/or 
familial relationship with mental illness enable them to "tell it like it is". 
Consequently, their legitimacy is always provisional and contextual. 
The closure of mental asylums and the policy of relocating patients into the 
community has destablized the traditional knowledge claims of bio-medical 
psychiatry and the historical priority of expert `knowledge' over `experience'. For 
example, the notion that a patient's experience of voice hearing could be of value in 
understanding the concept of psychosis was dismissed within established psychiatric 
knowledge and until the 1960's and the onset of what became known as 
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`antipsychiatry' there were few voices willing (or able) to challenge its authority. In 
the mid nineties the babel of voices challenging psychiatric knowledge over the 
meaning of psychosis is almost deafening. The growth of the Hearing Voices network 
of self-help groups for example, indicates not only a groundswell of dissatisfaction 
with orthodox treatment regimes, but also a desire on the part of many voice hearers 
for an inversion of the established knowledge/experience dichotomy. At the core of 
this self-help movement is apolitical struggle to dismantle a hierarchy of discourse 
that many mental health professionals are also no longer willing to accept (Romme 
and Escher 1993; Barham and Hayward 1995; Rogers et al. 1993). 
In this chapter we examine discourses of expertise about mental illness, particularly as 
they relate to schizophrenia. In doing so we encounter many of the mini-narratives 
noted above. The absolute dichotomy between knowledge and experience of mental 
illness had its epistemic moment within the context of the large mental asylums. The 
relocation of mentally ill people into the community provides an opportunity to 
explore whether new frames of understanding have developed between mental health 
workers and those for whom they care, and the consequences of this shifting 
relationship for public talk about mental illness. 
The Dislocation ofPsychiatric Expertise 
With the closure of the asylums the historically contingent character of psychiatric 
practice has been strongly underlined and the structures which in an earlier period 
appeared to bind the `mentally ill' together as a homogenous group have collapsed 
bringing about a `marked diversification of experience among different social groups 
in their encounter with mental illness and European psychiatry' (Barham and 
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Hayward op cit.: 4). Ethnicity in particular has been shown to have distinctive and 
controversial consequences for the ways mental illness (especially schizophrenia) is 
identified and dealt with. Moreover, the weight attached to biological processes in 
understanding mental disorder is viewed with increasing suspicion by mental health 
professionals (including some psychiatrists), many of whom favour more inclusive 
biosocial or biopsychosocial models of disorder (Busfield, 1996). 
The shift to Community Care has produced a proliferation of mental health 
professionals. Many of these practitioners - counsellors, psychologists, psychiatric 
nurses - deploy skills and expertise often partly grounded in psychodynamic ideas. As 
a consequence, their adherence to medical models of mental illness is at best, 
provisional. Consequently, while psychiatrists, as medical specialists, still have prime 
responsibility for the care and treatment of the mentally disturbed, in the world of 
community care other professionals compete with them for influence and power. 
Underpinning this contest is a recognition that many of the services that fall under the 
umbrella of community care are delivered in practice by a range of formal and 
informal carers. Indeed, the imprecise definition of what constitutes community care 
`does not require that there be any professional service at all, and informal care by 
family and friends... can all fall within the framework of community care' (Busfield, 
op. cit.: 135). As a result, openings for more fragmented, contingent and unplanned 
approaches to mental health have appeared (Samson, 1995) within the already 
conflictual domain of psychiatry. 
The dismantling of the asylum system and its replacement with a network of 
professional and voluntary agencies might be interpreted as a sign that the psychiatric 
knowledge has been all but displaced by the weight of `alternative' ways of knowing 
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about mental disorder. However, while there is little doubt that the professional 
dominance of psychiatrists has diminished with the decline of the asylum 
Enlightenment convictions about the advance of medical knowledge still run deep and 
psychiatric medicine retains a key position within the community mental health 
system. Nonetheless, the growth of many different types of mental health service 
within the broad framework of community care means that no one professional body 
has an exclusive claim to knowledge, expertise and authority about mental disorder. 
Consequently, definitions of what constitutes `expertise' in an era of community care 
are increasingly contingent and can no longer be guaranteed by appeals to the 
traditional authority of bio-medical concepts of `mental illness'. 
The Dominant Discourse of `Madness' 
Those who point to the apparent levelling of knowledge among the psychiatric 
professions do not take account of the extent to which professional interpretations, 
perceptions and accounts of mental illness, although wide ranging, remain saturated 
with a vocabulary in which bio-medical explanations of illness are dominant. The 
psychiatric nursing lexicon for example, rests firmly on the familiar discourse of 
disease. Categorical notions such as `neurosis' and `psychosis' continue to govern the 
practitioners' conceptual landscapes and terminology. Many critics of psychiatry have 
noted the difficulties of articulating an alternative vocabulary of mental illness. In 
their pioneering work on the social genesis of schizophrenia within the family, Laing 
and Esterson (1984: 19) acknowledge a paradoxical dependency on the clinical term 
`schizophrenia' whilst rejecting the ontological validity of the concept: 
Although we ourselves do not accept the validity of the clinical terminology, it is necessary 
to establish the fact that the persons whose families we are describing are as `schizophrenic' 
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as anyone is. By `schizophrenic' we mean here a person who has been diagnosed as such and 
has come to be treated accordingly. Thus we have begun each account [of the eleven case- 
studies employed] by a description, couched in clinical terms, of the experience and the 
behaviour of the person to whom `schizophrenia' is attributed. We reiterate that we 
ourselves are not using the term `schizophrenia' to denote any identifiable condition that we 
believe exists `in' any one person. However, in so far as the term summarizes a set of 
clinical attributions made by certain persons about the experience and behaviour of certain 
others, we retain the term for this set of attributions. We put in parenthesis any judgement as 
to the validity or implications of such a set of attributions. 
The problem of finding a vocabulary that can precisely articulate an `alternative' 
concept of mental illness has resulted in a structural imbalance in the vocabulary of 
psychiatry, such that any attempt to displace medical terms is immediately regarded as 
either 'political' (and therefore suspect), or simply ignorant. The language and 
nomenclature of biomedical psychiatry, then, still shapes public discourse on mental 
health to such an extent that even its sharpest opponents and critics (such as Laing and 
Esterson) have to rely on it in order to appear informed and credible. To reject it 
completely risks appearing inarticulate and less than competent when discussing 
mental health issues in the public domain. 
The (Partial) Erosion of Bio-medical Authority in Psychiatry 
As noted earlier, bio-medical explanations of mental illness have traditionally been 
most secure within an asylum environment in which doctors hold legal and 
professional power over both staff and patients (Samson 1995). In an era of 
community care medicalized definitions, interpretations and treatments of mental 
disorder have become contested terrain. 
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While the voice of medicine no longer controls the discursive field surrounding 
mental illness and community care however, it still retains a significant presence in 
professional and public talk about psychiatry. Consequently, constructing an 
explanatory discourse on mental illness outside the voice of medicine is difficult. This 
is not simply a theoretical concern. For many psychiatric patients medicine's way of 
`knowing' about their `condition' has real material effects. This can sometimes 
involve them in conflicts with their psychiatrist over diagnosis and treatment plans to 
the extent that doctors may eventually rely on some form of physical restraint (such as 
forced incarceration in hospital) in order to `care' for them. The erosion of medical 
expertise in the mental health field is thus both a differential and partial process. 
Nevertheless, it can be seen as part of a more generalised collapse of trust in the 
authority of experts and `expert systems' of knowledge (Giddens 1990). For many 
commentators, this declining faith in expertise is part of a post-modem condition in 
which provisional, local and contextual `truths' have displaced outmoded `universal 
truths'. In this situation, the articulation of one type of knowledge need not be at the 
expense of other forms since there is no longer agreed ways of adjudicating on `truth 
claims'. The post-modem insistence on a plurality of heterogeneous claims to 
knowledge appears to have some validity in the context of modem psychiatry. In the 
UK the development of a multi-disciplinary approach to mental health care has helped 
give voice to a widening range of psychiatric professionals, pressure groups and 
interested lay people, all of whom want their points of view about psychiatry to be 
heard in the public domain. In short, the once privileged discourse of psychiatric 
medicine now has to take its place amongst a plurality of other ways of talking about 
mental health, none of which can be neatly assigned within a clear hierarchical order. 
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TV Current Affairs and the Voices of Psychiatric Expertise 
For those producing TV programmes about mental health issues this altered situation 
means that a range of voices might now be considered "knowledgeable enough" to 
contribute public testimony on psychiatric and community care topics. The extent to 
which different forms of current affairs programming accept or reject a traditional 
hierarchy of expertise - in which medical knowledge is placed firmly at the top - is the 
main focus of concern for this chapter. In exploring this issue two key questions are 
addressed. Firstly, how is `expertise' defined within current affairs programmes 
dealing with mental health issues? Are definitions grounded in medical models or do 
they extend to other kinds of professionals, and beyond them to others? Secondly, 
which kinds of current affairs formats are open (or closed) to differing interpretations 
of psychiatry and mental illness? We can begin to explore these questions by looking 
at `A Place of Safety' from the Granada Television series, Disguises. 
Disguises: 'A Place of Safety' 
Consider the following extract from Part One of `A Place of Safety' in which the 
reporter, Adam Holloway, outlines the key questions he hopes to answer in his role as 
a `schizophrenic': 
Holloway: Why are there so many mentally ill people roaming the streets of our cities? Mental 
hospitals are closing but what's been put in their place? To find out I'm going to pose as a 
schizophrenic on a journey starting from the Midlands ending in central London where more 
than one in a hundred people suffer from schizophrenia, the illness that can destroy a victims 
personality. 
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At this point the visual and voice tracks cut to the testimony of Dr David James of the 
Riverside Mental Health Trust: 
Dr James: The voices may criticise the person concerned or comment on their actions but 
more importantly they may actually give directions as to what the person should do. In some 
instances er these are fairly trivial things. People may be instructed to stand up and sit down or 
to take their clothes off and er feel obliged to obey. In other instances the consequences may 
be more serious. The voices may tell people to harm themselves or even on occasions to harm 
other people. 
By describing schizophrenia as an illness in which people `suffer' and are `victims' 
Holloway valorizes an orthodox medical model and displaces other possible (e. g. 
socio-psychological) explanations. It is necessary for him to do this because the 
coherence of his in-role behaviour depends upon his ability to authentically play the 
part of a `voice hearing' schizophrenic who is in need of medical treatment but is 
unable to get it. For example, when later in the programme, he fails to get medical 
help in seven different GP surgeries he comments: `It may be understandable when 
the public shy away from the mentally ill but it should be different in a doctor's 
surgery'. The significance of his failure to get treatment as a `schizophrenic' depends 
on the programmes' endorsement of a medical model of schizophrenia. There is no 
opportunity for this interpretation of schizophrenia to be challenged (including the 
taken for granted assumption that schizophrenics need treatment) because the 
programme's raison d'etre is a concern with community care for the mentally ill and 
not with the causes of schizophrenia per se. Nonetheless, Holloway's closing 
definition of schizophrenia as an illness `which can destroy a victims personality' 
invites some explanation as to why this happens. It is at this point that we hear Dr. 
James' testimony concerning `the voices'. 
179 
Knowing Madness 
By mobilising Dr. James' description of `the voices' immediately after Holloway's 
comment that schizophrenia can destroy a victim's personality, a complex and 
contested experience is reduced to an irrational and mechanical symptom. This 
reduction is pragmatic rather than ideological since Holloway's role as a 
`schizophrenic' centres primarily on his pseudo voice-hearing `experiences'. So, for 
dramatic - and therefore entertaining - purposes schizophrenia is rendered 
synonymous with hearing `voices' so that Holloway's `strange' behaviour can be 
understood by viewers (its strangeness is underlined by the tension-building music 
that accompanies Holloway, as in-role, he later begins to take his clothes off in the 
street in order to attract police attention). However, the main significance of 
Disguises' use of Dr. James' technical explanation of `the voices' lies not simply in 
the fact that his status as a psychiatrist is taken as giving him the authority to speak on 
this topic, but that his presence as an `expert' lends validity to the programmes' 
dramatic representation of schizophrenia as a visually strange, disturbing, and exciting 
`problem'. 
`A Place of Safety's' deployment of medical knowledge is not confined to `technical' 
explanations of schizophrenic `voices' however, it is also generalised to give authority 
to speakers on the topic of Community Care. Thus, in the following sequence from 
Part Two of `A Place of Safety', an `independent' psychiatrist (posing as a relative) 
has been asked to assess the medical care being provided to residents of Mayfield 
Court, the hotel in which Holloway has been living as a `schizophrenic': 
Psychiatrist: Right it's dirty. The people here look uncared for. They don't look as though 
they've had much treatment for for their illnesses. The majority of them have probably got 
some form of chronic mental illness such as schizophrenia. I should think some of them have 
probably got learning disabilities, which is what used to be called mental handicap. 
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Holloway: With er with seventy-five people in here how many nurses do you think would be 
able to appropriate appropriate number? 
Psychiatrist: For adequate adequate care you I would have thought you'd need probably about 
ten nurses per shift really not unless they wouldn't necessarily all have to be trained but 
certainly sort of like you know probably five sort of decently trained nurses (unclear). Its clear 
that a lot of these people haven't had baths for ages. 
By introducing the psychiatrist as an `independent' witness she is immediately 
signalled as someone without a particular axe to grind, and whose `assessment' of 
Mayfield Court's' medical care will be neutral and objective. The `assessment' 
comprises of five observations based on her inspection of the `hotel'. Each presents as 
the categorical `findings' of an expert who has investigated the `hotel' and uncovered 
severe defects (e. g. `The people here look uncared for'). The psychiatrist duly notes 
the existence of `chronic mental illness such as schizophrenia' as well as the presence 
of `learning disabilities, which is what used to be called mental handicap' 
(simultaneously re-emphasising her credentials as a clinician and further amplifying 
her status as someone we should trust). This latter point is important because the 
programme mobilises her testimony not simply to identify and label mental disorders 
but to provide authoritative `proof that community care is failing the residents of 
Mayfield Court. In the process, her medical knowledge is rendered secondary to her 
more general knowledge of what should constitute "proper" community care. 
Once the psychiatrist's authority to speak is established she is then asked about the 
`appropriate' number of nurses needed to care for seventy five people - an aspect of 
community care where others (most obviously nurses) arguably have more of a claim 
to relevant knowledge. However, her knowledge is simply assumed to extend beyond 
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medicine and to encompass knowledge of psychiatric nursing. By using medical 
authority in this way the programme makers not only validate psychiatric medicine as 
the dominant source of technical knowledge about mental illness (including 
schizophrenia), they also situate it at the centre of understanding community care. In 
doing so, the expertise of other mental health professionals working in this area (such 
as community psychiatric nurses) is ignored. 
Kilroy 
In contrast, Kilroy acknowledges the involvement of a whole range of people in the 
community care enterprise and opens up space for a number of non-medical voices. 
This is accomplished by presenting Community Care as a problem, not for the 
psychiatric profession, but for the families of schizophrenics. After listening to the 
experiences of relatives of schizophrenics Kilroy-Silk addresses Martin Eede, the 
Chief Executive of the National Schizophrenia Fellowship (NSF): 
Kilroy-Silk: A lot of people outside of the people here don't understand the impact it 
[schizophrenia] has upon the families and the devastation and what people are just going 
through and that in itself is important. Is this, Martin, a typical kind of thing (unclear)? How 
much I mean how much is this a part of the problem of schizophrenia, the impact on families, 
the lack of understanding, the lack of knowledge of how to deal with it? 
Eede: The National Schizophrenia Fellowship works with thousands of families who've 
experienced very much what these people here have. The problem with schizophrenia and the 
treatment of it is so often it is the family who has to provide the care and it tears families apart 
so that you end up with one carer having to look after someone whose ill, or at times no carer, 
so there is no community and you end up with no care, and you end with people wandering the 
streets and going through all the sort of terrible experiences that families here have gone 
through. 
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By widening definitions of the `problem' of schizophrenia to include its impact on 
families Eede is signalled as someone with specialist knowledge (e. g. `Is this, Martin, 
a typical kind of thing?... how much is this a part of the problem of schizophrenia, the 
impact on families... the lack of knowledge of how to deal with it? '). His status as 
Chief Executive of the NSF is presented as qualifying him to speak authoritatively on 
this topic. In particular, it enables him to re-define schizophrenia as a familial/social 
rather than individuäniological problem: `The problem with schizophrenia and the 
treatment of it is so often it is the family who has to provide the care and it tears 
families apart.. '. However, although Eede's formal status licences him to speak as an 
authority on the impact of schizophrenia on families, his interpretation of the situation 
does not go unchallenged. A range of other voices are called upon to participate in the 
discussion. In the following sequence, for example, Eede is joined by two participants 
with practical knowledge and experience of community care. 
Martin Eede: What I was going to say was that the the Salvation Army does wonderful work 
but we know that there are sixty thousand people in London alone who are either roofless or 
living in temporary accommodation. The government has only provided spaces for 73 people 
with planning for 77 more spaces so what we're ending up with is community care effectively 
being on the streets. 
Salvation Army spokesperson: That's right and our hostels are not appropriate places. 
Research that's been done shows that people in hostels are not as comfortable with themselves 
er they're more likely to depression, more likely to to become ill again. Also, we get the 
families, family members where there's a schizophrenia sufferer in the in the household, 
sometimes they end up in the hostel. We had a whole family come once because they couldn't 
get attention. 
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Audience member: My brother suffers from schizophrenia. He's 24 and he's got to the point 
where he's had hospital care and been on medication and he's going to a hostel. Now, I'm 
very concerned about the aftercare erm. It's not comprehensive in my mind. They have two 
weekly visits to start with at the hospital erm which then deteriorates down to a month, two 
months, three months. Now this is a time its an illness which erm has a lot of er relapse and it 
goes on there's a vicious cycle that goes on and goes on and for the family its really bad 
because you know you you're never safe in the knowledge that even though they're having 
treatment that this is adequate, it never is. 
This sequence is a good illustration of our argument, made earlier, that the transition 
from the asylum to the community allows a range of voices to be considered 
`knowledgeable enough' to contribute testimony to TV talk on psychiatric and 
community care issues. No single, overarching voice of authority is allowed to 
dominate this part of the discussion to the exclusion of other relevant voices. On the 
contrary, in this sequence, three different kinds of testimony blend together to form a 
critique of community care which Kilroy-Silk then uses to challenge a Conservative 
MP about his government's policy of closing the asylums. There is no boundary or 
clear hierarchy of credibility demarcating each speaker's contribution. Kilroy-Silk 
makes no attempt to bracket off the testimony of the final speaker as being too 
subjective and specific in contrast to the first two speakers, both of whom base their 
knowledge of the topic on their `professional' involvement in community care. This 
confirms experientially-based testimony as a valid contribution to public discourse 
concerning care in the community. 
However, in explaining schizophrenia, Kilroy, like Disguises, relies on an orthodox 
medical model. The only voice mobilised is Dr. Tim Crowe, identified as a consultant 
psychiatrist by an on-screen caption. His contribution is sought by Kilroy-Silk 
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following testimony from a number of schizophrenics who have described their 
experiences of hearing `voices': 
Kilroy-Silk: Is that typical of what we've heard schizophrenics go through? 
Dr Crow: There are many different features of the disease and I think we've heard some some 
of the spectrum so far erm we've heard examples of hallucinations, delusions erm disturbed 
perception. These are these are characteristic, these are these are the features that that define 
the disease. There are two big categories: hallucinations - disorders of perception; delusions - 
disorders of belief and er 
Kilroy-Silk: What causes it? 
Dr. Crow: We don't know what causes it erm er that's er a big problem. Probably there's a 
genetic factor. 
Kilroy-Silk: How how how much does hereditary play a part? Does it play a part? 
Dr. Crow: Certainly it plays a part, we don't know what part er we don't know that anything 
else is relevant so at the moment we think that probably the genetic part is over overwhelming 
but its unclear exactly how that how that comes about. 
Kilroy-Silk: But does it... 
Audience member: What about it being socially constructed? 
Kilroy-Silk: Say it again. 
Audience member: Er er er the theory, the the the er anti-psychiatric theory movement which 
sort of suggests that that these kinds of things are brought on through erm you know it being a 
social construct. 
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Dr. Crow: I think that's unconvincing. We know that the disease occurs in all societies 
probably at about the same rate erm it seems to be a characteristic of the human condition I 
think erm. 
Audience member: But there are many (unclear) there are some some some societies erm you 
now the the hearing of voices etcetera isn't classified as an illness. 
Dr. Crow: III think erm that that's er it seems as though similar erm psychotic conditions 
occur and I as far as I'm aware all societies would regard the sort of symptoms we've we've 
we've heard about as abnormal. 
Kilroy-Silk: Hang on. What about er it tends to be generally men. Is it is it there a greater 
propensity for men to have the ill the disease? 
Dr. Crow: That's not clear the onset is earlier in men... 
Kilroy-Silk: We've only talked to men so far of course. 
Dr. Crow: That's right erm and probably the outcome is a little bit worse but certainly women 
can affected with as severe illnesses erm. 
Kilroy-Silk: Is there a cure? 
Dr. Crow: Treatment the drug treatment we have is quite good. We've had it for thirty years 
erm it it improves the acute episodes and er it er prevents relapse which is very important. 
What is immediately apparent is that this extensive question and answer exchange is 
used to elicit purely medical information about schizophrenia. By engaging Dr. Crowe 
in this pedagogic way (within a format more usually given over to experiential based 
testimony) Kilroy Silk is clearly signalling him as a source of specialist knowledge 
about schizophrenia. That Dr. Crowe is indeed a specialist on this topic is then 
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confirmed as he proceeds to, define and classify the testimony of previous speakers in 
recognisably medico-technical terms: `we've heard examples of hallucinations, 
delusions... disturbed perception'. Indeed, the extract illustrates the extent to which a 
medical discourse is allowed to dominate the interpretation and experience of 
schizophrenia (a point underlined by the amount of deference that Kilroy-Silk gives to 
Dr. Crow's technical knowledge). Thus, when an audience member interrupts and 
challenges Dr. Crow, pointing to alternative interpretations of the `voice hearing' 
experience in other countries, Kilroy-Silk allows the interruption (in keeping with the 
programme's general aim of calling experts to account for their claims), but then 
returns to his dialogue with the psychiatrist and continues to probe for technical 
information about schizophrenia ignoring the implications of the challenge just made. 
The challenge to the psychiatrist's way of `knowing' schizophrenia is not pursued 
because it does not fit with the programme's main aim, which is to probe the 
provision of community care for schizophrenics (the corollary of which is that 
schizophrenics need care because they are ill). Thus, although Kilroy's debate format 
allows some scope for challenges to be made to the bio-medical view of schizophrenia 
such challenges have no opportunity to develop within a discursive arena in which the 
limits of the debate have already been set. 
Kilroy's closure around an orthodox medical explanation of schizophrenia reminds us 
that expert knowledge, while susceptible to criticism and rejection by the laity, 
remains an important tradable asset in audience discussion programmes. This is most 
apparent in relation to topics where highly technical or scientific matters are assumed 
to lie at the heart of the issue under debate. Because schizophrenia is treated as a 
complex medical/scientific phenomenon in the extract above, only Dr. Crow is 
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signalled as having the relevant knowledge concerning what it is, what causes it and 
whether or not there is a `cure'. Kilroy's representation of medical knowledge of 
schizophrenia as authoritative is conveyed then, linguistically, in Dr. Crowe's ability 
to medically define various features of schizophrenia ('we've heard examples of 
hallucinations, delusions... disturbed perception') It is also signalled by the amount of 
space which Kilroy-Silk gives him to define the `features' of the `disease' and then to 
reject the challenge made by a lay member of the audience. 
All Black: 'Broken Poets' 
At the same time, the brief appearance in Kilroy of the `social constructionist' view of 
schizophrenia reminds us that the meaning of the condition is no settled matter. The 
cause of the high incidence of schizophrenia amongst Britain's black population is a 
particularly fiercely contested issue, in which biological explanations of `disease' 
clash with alternative accounts of ethnocentric and racist diagnostic practices. In 
`Broken Poets', part of BBC2's All Black series, this disagreement is presented as a 
fault line separating two opposing camps of medical knowledge. In the following 
sequence from the programme, biological and social interpretations of schizophrenia 
are presented as contrasted ways to explain its high incidence in the black population. 
The sequence follows testimony from a black research psychiatrist that the higher 
incidence of schizophrenia amongst Britain's second generation black immigrants 
compared to the host white population remains unexplained: 
Presenter: It's this increase among black second-generation migrants that's most surprising. 
One school of thought believes that the human brain may provide possible answers. 
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Prof. Simms (identified by caption as a former President of the Royal College of 
Psychiatrists): That generation has got a very much increased incidence of schizophrenia and 
erm er its difficult to know exactly why this is so but most people now believe that 
schizophrenia is an illness like any other er only of course its effects are upon the brain. I 
would have thought that er it would be regarded by er most psychiatrists now as the evidence 
as being overwhelming. Er there are abnormalities shown er with er various erm new methods 
of imaging the brain er there are some neurological abnormalities and so on so ern there 
would be very few people who would argue with schizophrenia being a disease of the brain. 
Dr. Fernando (identified by caption as a Consultant Psychiatrist): Brain and the body you 
know has an effect on everything you know. If I get angry you can say well that's a disease of 
the brain. I mean it is - there are things that are different in the brain when we're angry but 
that's not er that's not the most er useful explanation for why I might be angry er especially 
when I hear things like that. 
Dr. Coker (identified by caption as a Research Psychiatrist): I don't think there's any evidence 
that ehm Afro-Caribbean people have more brain disease as such than white people. What 
we're seeing here is that there are factors causing Afro-Caribbean people to present with 
higher rates of severe mental illness like schizophrenia. And we're trying to find out what 
these factors are which could be several - from the social to the biological - we're not sure yet. 
Dr. Moodley (identified by caption as a Consultant Psychiatrist): Within psychiatry there are 
not many people who take a firm either/or view er but there are some people who believe that 
maybe the emphasis has been misplaced to put it on a biological theory and that it is more 
social causes er and racism being one those social causes. I think most practicing psychiatrists 
think it's probably a bit of both. 
The sequence begins with the presenter identifying, as `one school of thought', the 
orthodox bio-medical view (represented in the programme by Professor Simms) that 
abnormalities in the brain can explain the high incidence of schizophrenia amongst 
Britain's black population. Immediately following Simms' presentation however, a 
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counter-argument is mobilised that defines this point of view as racist. In this respect 
it is significant that Simms is a white psychiatrist whereas the three other speakers are 
from ethnic minority backgrounds. The framing of the biological model as racist 
stems from `Broken Poets" sequential construction of an `anti-biological' discourse 
in which each testimony builds upon the preceding one to produce a powerful 
counter-argument which establishes Simms' position as closed around a biological 
model which ignores alternative explanations. Simms therefore appears as a minority 
of one set against a majority of three more credible medical experts. 
The `anti-biological' argument takes as its point of departure Professor Simms' view 
that `there would be very few people who would argue with schizophrenia being a 
disease of the brain'. At this point the sequence cuts from his testimony and we 
encounter exactly the opposite of what Simms has just said: three people who do in 
fact argue with the idea of schizophrenia being a disease of the brain. The first two 
speakers are mobilised to establish two key counter-arguments to Simms: first, (from 
Dr. Fernando) that diseases of the brain are not the most useful explanations for the 
high incidence of black schizophrenia and second (from Dr. Coker), that there are a 
number of possible factors `ranging from the social to the biological' which might 
explain such a high incidence. However, the full significance of these two points only 
becomes apparent in the final contribution from Dr. Moodley. This begins with the 
claim that, `Within psychiatry there are not many people who take a firm either/or 
view... ' concerning the biological and social causes of schizophrenia. Here, the 
sequence turns full circle away from Simms' view that very few people would argue 
with schizophrenia being a disease of the brain, to one in which having a firm 
`either/or' view is, at best, dubious and, at worst, racist. 
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Rather than allowing Professor Simms" biological discourse to displace social 
explanations of the causes of schizophrenia, his viewpoint is itself marginalized in the 
course of the sequence. It is through the cumulative construction of the `pro-social' 
position as considered (e. g. Dr. Fernando: `there are things that are different in the 
brain when we're angry but that's not er that's not the er most useful explanation for 
why I might be angry), open to negotiation (e. g. Dr. Coker: `We're trying to find 
out... we're not sure yet'), and balanced (Dr. Moodley: `its probably a bit of both') 
that the labelling of Simms" biologism as marginal and racist is accomplished. In 
contrast, the three ethnic minority psychiatrists readily acknowledge the influence of 
social factors like racism on the diagnosis of schizophrenia, an acknowledgement 
which, as can be seen in the following comment from the `Broken Poets" presenter 
(immediately after Dr. Moodley's contribution above), the programme seems to 
support: `If there's more to schizophrenia than brain disease then this could account 
for the high rates among the second generation... '. 
By presenting the controversy surrounding black schizophrenia as more than a 
medico-technical issue, `Broken Poets' offers an `alternative' explanation in which 
racism plays a central role. But while the programme supports the view that racism 
influences the diagnosis of black schizophrenia, participation in the programme's 
debate is restricted to opposing camps of medical expertise. In other words, `Broken 
Poets" explanation of the issues is presented as the exclusive concern of the 
psychiatric profession rather than any other professional group working in black 
mental health. In doing so, the programme confirms a hierarchy of expertise in which 
the (albeit conflict-laden) voice of the psychiatric profession is privileged over other 
voices. 
191 
Knowing Madness 
This elevation of an authoritative medical voice is also evident in the programme's 
later presentation of the issue of the misdiagnosis of schizophrenia in the black 
population. Here the only voice heard is that of another ethnic minority psychiatrist, 
Dr Sashidharan. In the following sequence his testimony is used to problematize the 
process of psychiatric diagnoses and highlight the difficulty of diagnosing 
schizophrenia based on observations of black patients' behaviour: 
Presenter: Dr Sashidharan, a senior consultant psychiatrist in Birmingham, believes that the 
lack of diagnostic consensus among psychiatrists lead to further difficulties in the plight of 
black people. 
Dr Sashidharan: The problem with psychiatric diagnosis unlike a medical diagnosis is that er 
er such a diagnosis cannot be confirmed or validated by reliance on an external criteria. The 
level of agreement between psychiatrists for a diagnosis is somewhat poor, we cannot validate 
it, we cannot establish its presence using any other means so there are fundamental problems 
in the er in the in the process of psychiatric diagnosis and that is not erm a not a new problem 
within psychiatry. But when western psychiatry comes into contact with people who are non- 
European these problems are revealed much more clearly to us. 
Presenter: Patients' behaviour is an influential factor in the diagnosis of schizophrenia but 
more often than not it's the behaviour of black patients which is not always properly 
understood. 
Dr Sashidharan: Psychiatrists tend to attach aa pathological meaning to the behaviour of the 
black person, the distrust that is expressed by a black person more often than they would do in 
erm in a clinical situation with a white patient. And also the diagnosis of schizophrenia seems 
to be applied somewhat uncritically when black patients come into contact with psychiatrists 
even in the absence of some of the core symptoms of schizophrenia which er are usually 
required for such a diagnosis within Western psychiatric tradition. 
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As the sequence begins the presenter's opening comments are juxtaposed against a 
shot of an open window, which the camera then pulls away from revealing the facade 
of a large Victorian-built asylum (fig. 5.1). This image of the asylum together with the 
presenter's identification of Dr Sashidharan as a `senior consultant psychiatrist' is 
crucial to his construction as an authoritative voice. His authority to speak on the issue 
of misdiagnosis is grounded in his practical knowledge and experience of diagnosing 
psychiatric patients -a practice that traditionally occurs within an asylum/hospital 
setting and to which we are normally denied access. Dr Sashidharan's contributions 
provide our "access route" to the interior of the asylum and in particular, to the 
`clinical situation' in which the (usually) invisible process of (mis)diagnosis occurs. 
As we continue to look at the asylum's exterior we hear Dr Sashidharan's voice as 
though it were beckoning us inside. The image track then cuts to a shot of Dr 
Sashidharan seated in front of an open window within the asylum (fig 5.2) and we are 
now (literally and symbolically) on his professional territory. 
By anchoring the misdiagnosis issue within an asylum context `Broken Poets' 
inevitably mobilises the conventional view of psychiatric expertise in which the 
psychiatrist is assumed to "know best". No counter-argument is mobilised against his 
testimony in order to challenge the validity of his claims. On the contrary, his views 
are given precedence on an issue on which many psychiatrists and mental health 
workers would disagree. By allowing him exclusive access, other relevant voices are 
excluded from participation (most obviously, the voices of black people whose 
behaviour may have been wrongly diagnosed as `schizophrenic'). Because `Broken 
Poets' presents the issue of psychiatric misdiagnosis as something that happens to 
patients as a consequence of medical misunderstanding their voices become irrelevant 
to understanding the medical problem of (mis)diagnosing. Reproducing the silence 
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historically imposed on patients within mental asylums Dr Sashidharan is licensed to 
speak on their behalf. 
People First: 'Black and Blue' 
In contrast, `Black and Blue' presents its critique of psychiatric diagnostics (and other 
related issues) from outside the institutional boundaries of the asylum/hospital and 
orthodox psychiatry. In doing so it gives space to a number of non-medical voices. In 
the following sequence, the experience of receiving a psychiatric misdiagnosis is 
articulated through the testimony of Adrian, a black ex-psychiatric patient and Nicky 
Olaiton, a black mental health counsellor: 
Adrian: One doctor classed me to be schizophrenic, a next doctor just classed me to have a 
nervous breakdown, so I've got two doctors with two different opinions and the medication is 
the same all round. Some those with breakdowns, those with depression, its the same 
medication all round, well that's what I heard that's what I was cos when I asked the others 
what they're taking for medication they told me the same, Clo Clopixol. And I was trying to 
get off the medication and take counselling like talk talking therapy but that that didn't help 
because I got manhandled in the hospital erm when I suggest it. I was dragged and put in the 
seclusion room. 
Nicky Olaiton: Firstly there is the problem of misdiagnosis, mistreatment. Because 
psychiatrists and psychologists don't always understand the needs of black people, or why 
black people behave in a certain way in a given circumstance, and because the way they 
behave is different from what the psychiatrist would expect, then he terms that kind of a 
dysfunction. 
From a post-modem viewpoint the combination of Adrian and Olaiton's voices might 
be seen as an attempt to give a `post-medical', user-led perspective on psychiatry. 
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However while Adrian is allowed to speak about his experience of being 
misdiagnosed (e. g. `I was dragged and put in the seclusion room') he is not entitled 
(within the programme-as-broadcast) to express an opinion on that experience. This is 
the exclusive entitlement of Olaiton. Her knowledge of psychiatric diagnostics is 
mobilised so that Adrian's particular experience of psychiatry can be `correctly' 
understood as `misdiagnosis, mistreatment'. `Black and Blue's' strategy of 
authentication then, privileges Olaiton's voice and in doing so helps establish her (and 
not Adrian) as an authority/expert in the field of black mental illness. The issue of 
whether or not Adrian recognises his reconstructed experience remains a moot point. 
Despite his status as an `experienced person' (who has been accessed specifically to 
recount his experience of `misdiagnosis' and `mistreatment'), Adrian's grounded 
knowledge is rendered inferior to Olaiton's mode of knowing about psychiatric 
diagnostics. Olaiton's entitlement to speak is on the basis of her occupational status, 
as a community-based mental health counsellor who has specialist knowledge of 
psychiatry derived from practical experience of counselling the mentally ill. 
`Black and Blue's' basic argument is that culturally sensitive modes of healing offer 
black people a more appropriate mental health service than conventional hospital- 
based psychiatry. Consequently, Olaiton's access derives not simply from her 
professional `know-how' as a counsellor, but also from the thematic privileging of 
`the community' as a more appropriate space in which to provide psychiatric help for 
black people than the mental hospital. In the following sequence, her 
knowledge/experience of counselling is used to support `alternative' mental health 
therapies. Olaiton's contribution precedes the testimonies of a number of other 
community-based mental health workers: 
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Nicky Olaiton: I counsel and for me that really is about helping people to explore you know 
the issues which help which cause them to break down in the first place erm you can't just 
treat a er symptom with medication, it doesn't work like that, you also need to provide all the 
other things, the alternative therapies as they're called, such as counselling, erm relaxation 
techniques, massage those sort of things. It's about helping the whole person to get better, not 
just the person's mind. It's about their whole body. 
Isha McKenzie-Mavinga: Rakyiotherapy is an ancient healing art from Japan and it involves 
the transference of universal energy to heal the body, mind and spirit. It can be beneficial to 
people who are on medication because it enhances the effect of medication to calm them and 
relax them. Because this is a method of relaxation they would be able to eventually reduce the 
amount of medication they are taking and most of all when they come out of the therapy they 
usually wake up with a feeling of well-being and begin to find answers to some of the 
problems that are happening for them. 
Mark I: Psychiatry's only response has been to medicate people er and mask the symptoms 
without really having much idea or or way of tackling underlying er problems which include 
er social problems indeed. So what we've tried to do here at the Afro-Caribbean Mental 
Health Association is try and develop complimentary, alternative and holistic ways of looking 
at health and mental health. The interesting thing about holistic medicine is that harnesses the 
body's own self-healing capabilities and potential and which er are actually quite tremendous. 
So yoga's just one way then of giving people self-determination and a sense of hope that they 
could actually help themselves. 
Dr. Sashidharan: The project that I am involved with is called the West Birmingham Home 
Treatment Project. Our team which consists of doctors, nurses, housing support worker, social 
worker erm, a team largely consisting of er trained mental health workers, we are located 
away from the hospital in a building in the community and we respond to these crises or these 
referrals by getting engaged with individuals at their usual place of residence and ensuring that 
they are not likely to be taken into hospital. In other words we provide all aspects of what 
would be seen as conventional aspects of psychiatric care at the person's home. We stay with 
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individuals for long periods of time, we try and provide the individuals with support and 
counselling, we try and erm support individuals with the multiple problems that they might be 
experiencing in the context of their breakdown: social problems, material problems, financial 
problems. In other words we try and address the overall needs of the individual client in the 
context of their breakdown rather than emphasising psychiatric symptoms or mental illness as 
such. 
This sequence illustrates the extent to which the issue of psychiatric drug treatment is 
contested terrain. Olaiton's declaration that `... you can't just treat a... symptom with 
medication, it doesn't work like that... ', and Mark I's claim that `Psychiatry's only 
response has been to medicate people... and mask the symptoms [of mental illness] 
without really having much idea or... way of tackling underlying... [social] problems' 
are unequivocal attacks on the legitimacy of medical intervention. Olaiton provides 
the justification for this attack: `Its about helping the whole person to get better not 
just the person's mind'. Her opposition to the mind/body dualism of mainstream 
psychiatry is based on her practical experience of helping `the whole person', an 
experience which entitles her to identify the need for other, complementary, forms of 
therapy (i. e. `... you also need to provide all the other things, the alternative therapies 
as they're called... '). The absence of any challenge to her claims suggests that the 
programme's makers support her views on alternative modes of healing. The 
hierarchical positioning of her testimony gives the sequence an organising rationale 
that confirms alternative therapies as more appropriate for black mentally ill people 
than hospitalization and conventional drug treatment. 
Underpinning `Black and Blue's' support for alternative therapies is a loss of faith in 
the efficacy of psychiatric medicine and the bio-medical concept of mental illness. 
Thus in the sequence above, McKenzie-Mavinga proposes that relaxation therapy can 
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help mentally ill people `reduce the amount of medication they are taking' enabling 
them to `find answers to some of the problems that are happening for them', whilst 
Mark I claims that yoga gives people `self-determination and a sense of hope that they 
could... help themselves'. Within the context of the political struggle to define the 
`proper' meaning of psychiatric care for black people, and increasing popular support 
for alternative medicine, Olaiton, McKenzie-Mavinga and Mark I are each given 
space to redefine appropriate psychiatric help for black people as holistic, culturally 
sensitive, and rooted in `the community'. 
`Black and Blue's' antipathy towards orthodox psychiatry ensures that its 
representation within the programme `fits' its general thematic rejection of the mental 
hospital as the best site of care for the mentally ill. This is duly provided by Dr 
Sashidharan's contribution (he appears in both `Broken Poets' and `Black and Blue') 
which draws attention to a `Home Treatment' service, one sensitive to the `overall 
needs of the individual client in the context of their breakdown' and emphasises that 
the project team is `located away from the hospital in a building in the community'. 
In `Black and Blue' the voice of orthodox psychiatric medicine is a significant 
absence while the presence of a number of community-based ethnic minority mental 
health workers signals them as more relevant to meeting the socially-generated mental 
health needs of black people. However, whilst the programme acknowledges `the 
community' as the most appropriate site for the delivery of psychiatric treatment, the 
choice of what form of treatment to apply (if anything) is left open. Consequently, Dr. 
Sashidharan's `conventional' Home Treatment service is presented as one possible 
form of psychiatric intervention amongst many others. 
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The appearance in `Black and Blue' of a plurality of treatment approaches reflects the 
degree to which the bio-medical model no longer has a privileged place at the apex of 
psychiatric knowledge. The demise of the asylum system has in fact been a precursor 
to a more far reaching erosion of western medicine's power as the centre of 
knowledge and authority about mental illness and its treatment. At the core of this 
newly emerging situation lies the `legitimation crisis' of bio-medical psychiatry. No 
longer can it provide stability and continuity across the psychiatric arena by issuing 
all-embracing claims to knowledge. The plethora of treatment approaches noted above 
are a sign that the institutional structures which in an earlier period legitimised bio- 
medical psychiatry have collapsed. It is in this changed context, of psychiatry as a 
fractured field of knowledge, that Olaiton makes the following claim (mobilised 
immediately after the sequence above): 
`Our continuing role is one of education, we have to educate the psychiatrists er about what is 
mental ill health for a black person... '. 
The absence of any challenge to this claim indicates not simply that the programme 
makers accept the authority of her knowledge about the causes of black mental illness. 
It also underpins the degree to which `Black and Blue's' argumentative structure is 
specifically oriented to its black audience's interests. Olaiton's comments reflect a 
deeply held scepticism amongst many in the black population (the programme's target 
audience) about the legitimacy of bio-medical explanations of black mental illness. It 
illustrates in particular the degree to which the universal aspirations of the bio- 
medical model clash with particular local knowledge of the social and cultural 
contexts in which black people become mentally ill. Olaiton's insistence that `we have 
to educate the psychiatrists... about what is mental ill health for a black person' 
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indicates not simply a self-conscious authority on the specific issue of the black 
experience of mental illness, but the importance of black people's situated knowledge 
about the multiple and diverse causes of black mental illness. This stance 
subsequently enables her to re-define schizophrenia as a meaningful response by black 
people to their often difficult social and personal circumstances: 
Some people retreat so far into their (laughs) to their schizophrenia or their madness that its 
very difficult to bring them back and many of them don't want to come back into the real 
world because they see that (laughs) what has it got to offer them you know they're they're 
still black people at the end of the day, they're still you know the people who are gonna have 
the most difficulty getting housing, getting a job you know er maintaining relationships. Its 
like they're continuously battling against things that you and I just kind of like you know see 
as ordinary holes that you step over every day but to somebody with a mental health problem 
you know that little hill is a is a is an Everest. 
Here, Olaiton posits a direct causal relationship between the experience of being black 
and the black experience of schizophrenia. In doing so she (re-)interprets 
schizophrenia as an understandable `retreat' from the `real world' of racial injustice 
and black people's difficulty in getting housing and jobs. According to Olaiton `being 
mad' involves a deliberate choice for many black people (e. g. `... many of them don't 
want to come back into the real world because ... what 
has it got to offer them ... 
they're still black people at the end of the day ... 
'). This interpretation of 
schizophrenia as culturally and contextually intelligible acknowledges the validity of 
the black experience of madness in a white dominated world and in doing so allies 
Olaiton's views with the `anti-psychiatry' school of thought, associated in particular 
with R. D. Laing. However, it will be recalled that Laing and other `anti-psychiatry' 
writers remained dependent on the `official' medical lexicon. This dependency on the 
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official vocabulary of psychiatry is also clearly evident in Olaiton's re-interpretation 
of black schizophrenia. 
Thus, while making a case for black schizophrenia as a form of existential self- 
defence there is evident discomfort in her use of the term `schizophrenia'. This is 
suggested by the short (sarcastic) laugh she gives just prior to her use of the term. Her 
laughter appears to signal that she mistrusts the concept of `schizophrenia' but has no 
choice other than to use it in order to make her point. However, the tension apparent 
in her use of the term suggests that while the vocabulary of the medical model is still 
relied upon in public-oriented talk about mental illness, the authority of its premises is 
not unassailable (witness her use of the umbrella term `madness' - replete with its 
unscientific connotations - to further indicate her dissatisfaction and distance from the 
medicalized concept of `schizophrenia'). 
The difficulty of re-interpreting the black experience of schizophrenia from within a 
conceptual framework that always-already interprets it as an illness is apparent in 
Olaiton's testimony. That those labelled as `schizophrenic' are perceived by her as 
being ill is beyond doubt. What is disputed is the meaning of black people's 
`schizophrenia/madness' within the wider context of the social processes to which 
they are exposed. Underlying this dispute is a perceived ethnocentrism within the bio- 
medical model of mental illness, in particular, its depiction of illness and treatment as 
phenomena external to culture. Against this, `Black and Blue' presents a model of 
mental illness and treatment in which an `Afro-centric' perspective lies at the very 
heart of attempts to understand and help black patients: 
Dr. La Granade (identified by caption as a psychiatrist at the University of the West Indies): 
There is what is known as a medical model which very much views psychiatry in a certain 
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way, which classifies people in a certain way and which tailors treatment according to that 
classification. And then there are alternate therapies or alternative therapies erm and some of 
very can be very Afro-centric in their in their ethos, in what they give to the patient and I think 
that some patients may respond better to to one or the other or some patients may of necessity 
have to be in one system or the other but I think that there is room for both. And in fact I 
would go further to say that some of the things we will start off calling the Afro-centric 
models may in fact prove to be so valuable in their own right that they may be incorporated 
into mainstream psychiatry. 
Significantly, Dr. La Granade does not privilege the `Afro-centric' model over the 
`medical model'. `[T]here is', she says, `room for both'. In keeping with 
contemporary claims that we now inhabit a post-modern discursive order she signals 
that there is no single or unified voice articulating `true' or authentic knowledge about 
mental illness. Accordingly the medical and Afro-centric models are acknowledged as 
relative, existing side by side with some patients responding `better' within one 
system or the other. Nonetheless, there is a clear indication that the validity of the 
Afro-centric model is ultimately viewed as provisional. Thus, Dr. La Granade 
foresees the eventual assimilation of its more `valuable' aspects into mainstream 
psychiatry. Ironically, despite the programme's relativizing challenge to medical 
knowledge this leaves `Black and Blue' committed to a universalist view of 
psychiatry in which informal knowledge and local understanding of black mental 
illness is incorporated within an enlarged (and arguably strengthened) medical model. 
At the very least, it leaves the viewer with a sense that the psychiatric profession is 
amenable to change so long as it is in the best interests of patients. 
202 
Knowing Madness 
Horizon: `Hearing Voices' 
The medical model of mental illness is the object of a sustained and powerful critique 
however in `Hearing Voices', part of the BBC's Horizon series of science 
programmes. `Hearing Voices', explores the issue of voice hearing by giving 
precedence to the views of those who reject the orthodox medical interpretation of the 
experience as a symptom of mental illness (usually schizophrenia). As the 
programme's narrator puts it: `This film is about an alternative view of the 
phenomenon of hearing voices'. At various points throughout the programme the 
traditional medical approach to voice hearing is rejected in favour of a perspective in 
which the problem is not the hearing of voices, but rather psychiatry's refusal to 
ascribe any meaning to the voice hearing experience. In order to establish the 
legitimacy of this approach `Hearing Voices' has to undermine the traditional medical 
response to voice hearing. Thus in the following sequence, from an early part of the 
programme, orthodox medical knowledge is presented as stubbornly `fixed' in the 
face of compelling evidence that hearing voices is triggered by psychological trauma: 
Narrator: A number of recent studies have established a strong connection between traumatic 
experiences and the subsequent hearing of voices. Sexual abuse is one common trauma linked 
to the hearing of voices. Another, even more common, is bereavement. 
Ron Coleman: The last traumatic event I had really was erm losing my partner er who died 
and I think that although it didn't show itself as voices for a long time afterwards was actually 
the the beginning of erm a long period of coming to terms with that event. The voices being 
the erm if if you like the erm the whole event being brought to me er in a very real way 
because one of the voices I heard was the voice of the partner. Erm she ern she got herself 
into quite a state erm and and she she actually killed herself which was erm was probably the 
worst thing, erm the second worse thing being that erm I was the one who walked in on her 
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and I think that hitting you and having to actually find the person you love dead then you you 
get caught up in all this sense of guilt and anger and er allsorts so I ended sort of cutting off all 
relationship with parents and family and everything for quite a long time. 
Dr Adrianne Reveley (identified by caption as Consultant Psychiatrist, Maudsley Hospital): I 
find it very difficult to accept an explanation of voices that its a buried experience that is 
coming back to haunt somebody, perhaps a buried traumatic experience that then gets split off 
in in the form of a voice. I agree and its my very firm view that voices often have a very aa 
worst fear quality, that its the things the person is worried and anxious about which affect 
them in this way. But I don't think you have to postulate that its a an awful experience which 
is being split off and and comes back in the form of a voice erm I think that's an additional 
layer of explanation that we don't need. 
Dr Cosmo Hallstrom (identified by caption as Consultant Psychiatrist, Charring Cross 
Hospital): Schizophrenia is often caused by life events, life traumas but it triggers a process 
and I think that's the problem that er the the the psychological model fails to take into account 
that there is a disease process which then starts running on and even if you relieve the initial 
life trauma the patient doesn't get better. 
Ron Coleman: II think when I was first diagnosed I was quite relieved because erm then there 
was a reason for everything, there was the illness. I had an illness, it was treatable and erm I 
thought nothing of that. But later on when you begin to realise the implications of being called 
schizophrenic, like people's perceptions of you as a mad axe-wielding er psychopath or er 
people treating you as a pathetic person who can do nothing for yourself that changes, that 
changes into anger erm and then you end up being alienated within the system because you're 
called non-co-operative as a patient. 
In this sequence the two psychiatrists are mobilised to represent the profession's 
resistance to studies [referred to by the narrator] which have established a `strong 
connection' between voice hearing and psychological trauma. In support of this view, 
`Hearing Voices' introduces its own `case-study' in which Ron Coleman's traumatic 
204 
Knowing Madness 
experiences and subsequent hearing of voices is used to establish a firm `connection' 
between the two. Ron's testimony thus serves a useful double function. Firstly, it 
frames Dr Reveley's approach to voice hearing as a refusal to accept Ron's own 
interpretation of hearing his dead partner's voice as meaningful (e. g. The voices being 
the... whole event being brought to me... in a very real way'). Secondly, it undermines 
Dr Hallstrom's attack on the `psychological' models for its failure to recognise that 
those diagnosed as schizophrenic are able to `get better'. Ron's ability to reflect 
eloquently upon his traumatic experiences (including both hearing voices and being 
labelled `schizophrenic') reveals not only the insensitivity of orthodox psychiatry to 
the voice hearing experience. It also raises doubts about its knowledge. In short, 
orthodox psychiatry is presented as deeply territorial and unwilling to consider 
alternative interpretations of voice hearing despite `evidence' that it should. 
In a review of `Hearing Voices' one British newspaper noted the challenge that voice 
hearers pose to the medical model of mental illness: `Leading the charge [against the 
medical model] are the voice-hearers themselves, the vanguard of a novel kind of 
liberation movement - seeking rights for those labelled mentally ill, and demanding, 
for once, that their voices are heard' ('Hearing Is Believing', The Guardian, 22/4/95). 
However, it would be mistaken and overly sentimental to conclude (as The Guardian 
review does) that `Hearing Voices' allows voice hearers themselves to lead the 
challenge against psychiatry's (mis)treatment of their experiences. Rather, the 
programmes' challenge to the medical model comes from a number of carefully 
orchestrated sequences in which the traditional medical approach of voice hearing is 
decisively rejected. In the following sequence for example, the medical approach to 
treating voice hearers with drugs is marginalized against a backdrop of scientific 
support for a psychological interpretation of voice hearing. (A brief outline of the 
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sequences structure and organisation is provided immediately after the reproduction 
of participants' testimony. ) 
Narrator: Can research into the brain help us understand what's happening in the mind? At 
Hammersmith Hospital scientists have designed brain-scanning experiments to investigate 
what might be happening in the brains of people as they hear voices (long pause). The first 
step was to look at people who don't hear voices. 
Dr Philip McGuire (identified by caption as a member of the Institute of Psychiatry): What we 
found was that when normal people are thinking in sentences er which is er equivalent to inner 
speech erm the left frontal part of the brain around this area here [points to an area on a hand- 
held model of a brain] er was particularly active and this is an area classically associated with 
speech production, that is speaking out loud. So our studies suggested that the same parts of 
the brain that are involved in speaking out loud were involved in silent articulation or inner 
speech. That is, thinking the words rather than saying them. One of the experiments we went 
on to do was to study erm schizophrenic patients who hear voices very frequently and we 
studied them while they were actually experiencing these voices and we found to our surprise 
that erm a similar pattern of areas were active when they were hearing voices as if they were 
external erm, so that is we saw activity in these kind of areas [points to a computer simulated 
cross-section of a brain] in the left frontal er lobe and and also to a lesser extent in the left 
temporal lobe and these are areas normally concerned with language erm. So this er really 
confirmed what a number of people had hypothesised from a psychological perspective er for 
some time and that was that erm when people hear voices there may be a contribution from 
inner speech, that is thinking in words er, and we we think that that probably does er play a 
part in the experience of hearing voices. 
Narrator: Talking to ourselves whether outloud or silently is part of human experience. At 
Liverpool University Professor of Clinical Psychology, Richard Bentall, relates this to hearing 
voices. 
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Professor Richard Bentall: This process of talking to ourselves is something which develops in 
childhood. When we're children we learn to tell ourselves to do things and then to follow 
those instructions. In our adult life we do just the same although we do it silently inside of our 
own heads. What's happening when somebody is hearing voices is that same inner dialogue is 
taking place but unfortunately the person who hears hears voices is misattributing that 
dialogue to an external source. In other words, they don't realise that they are talking to 
themselves, they believe its coming from somewhere else. One of the things we noticed was 
that many er people who hear voices are advised by traditional psychiatrists that they should 
ignore those experiences, that those experiences are meaningless and this seems to increase 
people's anxiety about the voices. 
Dr Adrianne Reveley: I think that its very important erm when you're concerned with helping 
somebody who is hearing voices to try and reassure them and support them and to tell them at 
every step of the way that they have got an illness erm, that we are doing our very best to help 
it and that we will be trying to stop these voices. I'm also very clear that the first line of 
treatment when somebody is psychotic, has lost contact with reality, is hearing voices is to 
offer them drug treatment, medication. The aim of the medication is to make the voices fade 
away and very often somebody who is experiencing them and whose talking to you about 
them will tell you that exactly this is happening. Sometimes the voices just become softer and 
softer and softer and then a whisper and then a murmur and then they're gone. Sometimes they 
just go. Sometimes they're absent for longer and longer periods and and then they gradually 
just fade away. 
Alan Leader: None of the none of the medi medication I've ever received has ever affected the 
voices and I've told em that and they said well give it time. Well how long how long do you 
give it? Twenty years? You know time is (laughs) no its never, it has never ever affected the 
voices and I've told em that. It made me ill er the medication actually made me physically ill. 
Ron Coleman: I woke up one morning and II thought clearly to myself that's it, I've had 
enough. The voices are still there whether I take the medication or not. I'm gonna stop pitying 
myself, being a victim if you like, and start doing something about it and I think that's when I 
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changed and that was the day I stopped taking the medication. I just said no more and I 
haven't taken any since then, and that's well over a year now I would think, about eighteen 
months, yer sixteen months. 
Dr. Phil Thomas (identified by caption as a Consultant psychiatrist and Senior Lecturer, 
University of Wales): One often needs medication in order that the the individual's anxiety is 
reduced to such a point that they can usefully focus on really what are very difficult and in 
themselves distressing issues to have to deal with. So I think medication has a very important 
role to have play in this process but it has to be seen in its context, it has to be seen that it is 
not the only thing that the patient is offered. 
Outline of Sequence Structure and Organisation: 
1. Narrator's first commentary; sequence of shots of people in a scientific laboratory 
connected to technical equipment; shots of white-coated scientists operating computer 
equipment. Image track cuts to 2. 
2. Dr. McGuire's testimony; close up shot of hands holding a model of a human brain; 
camera pans backwards to reveal McGuire speaking in a laboratory setting. Image 
track cuts to 3. 
3. Narrator's second commentary; panoramic shot of (presumably) Liverpool 
University and surrounding streets; opening sentence of Bentall's testimony. Image 
track cuts to 4. 
4. Professor Bentall's commentary; close up shot of Bentall in (presumably) his 
University office; image track cuts to medium shot of Bentall at the point at which he 
begins the sentence: `One of the things we've noticed is that... '. Image track cuts to 5. 
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5. Dr. Reveley's testimony; medium shot of Reveley speaking in an office; image 
track cuts to 6 at the moment when Reveley comments on the aim of the medication. 
6. Remainder of Reveley's testimony; footage of Reveley and male colleague walking 
through a hospital corridor and entering a patient's room; camera holds the shot while 
the door slowly and firmly closes behind them; sound of door closing is emphasised 
against shot of empty corridor. Image track cuts to 7. 
7. Alan leader's testimony; medium shot of Leader speaking. Image track cuts to 8. 
8. Ron Coleman's testimony; medium shot of Coleman speaking. Image track cuts to 
9. 
9. Dr. Thomas's testimony; medium shot of Thomas speaking in a domestic context. 
In this sequence any difference between brain and mind is erased. Scientific 
knowledge of the brain is seen as an access route to understanding the psychology of 
the human mind (here computerised images of the brain play a key part in convincing 
the viewer that brain and mind are synonymous). In the process, the psychology of 
voice hearing becomes secondary to scientific knowledge of the brain's neuro- 
physiological structure. However, this is perhaps not surprising given Horizon's status 
as a science-led documentary series. Indeed, the sequence's visual support for the 
brain research at Hammersmith Hospital (shots of specialised technical equipment, 
people attached to monitors, white-coated scientists), coupled with the precedence 
given to Dr. McGuire's testimony, provides the psychological interpretation of voice 
hearing with the stamp of `scientific' validity. Moreover, Dr. McGuire's claim that 
psychologists have only been able to `hypothesise' about voice hearing suggests that 
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the latter are still in need of objective evidence to vindicate their claims. Significantly, 
`Hearing Voices' fails to challenge Dr. McGuire's authority on this point ignoring a 
growing body of empirical studies on the psychology of voice hearing (see Bentall in 
Romme and Escher, 1994), thus elevating neuroscience to the forefront of knowledge 
and understanding about voice hearing. 
Positioning Dr. McGuire's scientific discourse as the opening testimony is vital to the 
programme's ability to convince viewers that it has accurately (i. e. scientifically) 
answered the narrator's opening question concerning the usefulness of brain research. 
The suggested answer for viewers is "yes", scientific research into the brain can and 
does help us understand what is happening in the mind. There is, however, an irony 
here. It will be recalled that `Hearing Voices" raison d'etre is to provide a 
psychological interpretation of voice hearing that rejects the `medical model'. But by 
collapsing any distinction between brain and mind, the programme is able to produce 
"signs" of abnormalities in the brain/mind which viewers can see for themselves (and 
which Dr. McGuire duly points to). These physical "signs" of brain/mind dysfunction 
are what is measured by Dr. McGuire's laboratory procedures and communicated by 
voice hearers as an ordered set of complaints (i. e. their `voices'). The primary task of 
Dr. McGuire is thus presented as diagnosis - that is, the interpretation of symptoms by 
relating them to functional and structural abnormalities in the brain. Consequently, a 
distinctive medical hermeneutic presides over the interpretation of `voices' which 
legitimises the programmes' later concern with identifying the best mode of treatment 
for coping with them. 
In contrast, Professor Bentall's testimony hints at the ordinariness of voice hearing; 
something that occurs to people simply because they use language and engage in inner 
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speech. However, Bentall's testimony has little opportunity to develop this 
perspective before his testimony is put to a different purpose. Midway through his 
testimony (at the point at which he says: `one of the things we noticed... ') there is an 
editorial cut. At this point his testimony changes focus and becomes an observation 
about the traditional medical response to voice hearing (that voice hearers should 
ignore their voices) and the anxiety this apparently produces. There is thus an evident 
lack of `fit' between the two components of Bentall's testimony. At this point in the 
sequence the psychological approach to voice hearing is rendered secondary to an 
assault upon the traditional psychiatric practice of giving voice hearers drugs. Once 
again Dr. Adrianne Reveley is the target of `Hearing Voices" attack upon the 
orthodox medical approach to voice hearing. The attack occurs both visually (in the 
particular manner with which her testimony is imaged) and in relation to the 
organisation of voices surrounding her testimony. 
Dr. Reveley's testimony is mobilised in response (though not as a counter-argument) 
to Bentall's claim that voice hearers are advised by traditional psychiatrists to ignore 
their voices. Bentall's claim invites explanation from a `traditional' psychiatrist as to 
why this practice happens. It is at this point that we hear Dr. Reveley's testimony. The 
first part of her testimony (see point 5 above) is at one level a straightforward account 
of her role as a helpful and supportive psychiatrist. However, in the context of 
Bentall's criticism of `traditional' psychiatrists her testimony is used solely to redeem 
the validity of his claim that traditional psychiatrists are harming voice hearers (by 
increasing their anxiety about hearing voices) whilst under the illusion that they are 
helping them. `Hearing Voices' signals contempt for Reveley's treatment of voice 
hearing by the manner in which the second part of her testimony is imaged (see point 
6 above). Thus at the point Reveley begins to talk about the aim of medication the 
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image track cuts to a shot of her and a male colleague walking through a hospital 
corridor (see fig. 5.3) and then entering a room situated immediately off the corridor 
(see fig. 5.4). The symbolism of the corridor scene is particularly significant and as 
we shall see is used to undermine Reveley's `traditional' approach to voice hearing 
with devastating effect. 
Corridors are (literally) marginal spaces and Dr. Reveley's testimony concerning the 
use of medication occupies its own marginal space - both visually and within the 
wider thematic development of the programme. At the precise moment Reveley is 
shown opening the door and entering the room her testimony culminates in an 
elaborate description of the voices fading away. As she disappears from view the 
camera remains focused on the slowly closing door until it shuts firmly and loudly 
leaving the corridor empty and quiet (The whole scene is reminiscent of popular 
images of inmates being escorted to their cells). Her disappearance into the room 
amplifies the viewer's sense that her approach to drug treatment is not just 
`traditional' but irrational (perhaps even a little mad? ). Indeed, the footage of Dr. 
Reveley walking through the corridor and entering a patient's room trades on the 
popular genre of psychiatrist jokes in which the psychiatrist is made to seem madder 
than the mad. In the joke the psychiatrist ends up confined as an inmate in their own 
asylum. In the scene under discussion Reveley ends up inside one of her own in- 
patient rooms. She is thus (visually) "put away", out of sight and out of [the viewer's] 
mind. 
The final attack on Dr. Reveley begins immediately after she has finished speaking. 
Alan Leader's testimony is mobilised as a direct counter both to her claim that 
medication makes voices `go away' and her assuredness that `someone who is 
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experiencing them and is talking to you about them will tell you that exactly this is 
happening'. It is here that the double meaning in the programme's title is most 
apparent. `Hearing Voices" communicative design does involve listening to those 
who hear voices and by doing so reveals a radically different view of the value of 
psychiatric medication. Taken together, Alan Leader's and Ron Coleman's testimony 
undermine Reveley's truth claims by asserting that the exact opposite of what she says 
about the value of medication is true. In particular, Leader's opening comment that 
`None of the... medication I've ever received has ever affected the voices... ' reinforces 
Reveley's representative status as a `traditional' psychiatrist who does not listen to 
voice hearers' experiences. At this juncture the programme's sub-text is abundantly 
clear - psychiatric medication is not very fruitful in helping patients deal with their 
voice hearing experiences. 
However, despite `Hearing Voices' powerful and uncompromising demolition of Dr. 
Reveley the programme does offer a concession on the use of medication. It surrounds 
Dr. Thomas' claim concerning the `very important role' that medication can play in 
controlling the anxiety that voice hearers experience. The programme's sympathetic 
treatment of Dr. Thomas' views on medication stands in stark contrast to its harsh 
treatment of Dr. Reveley. This begs the question as to why Dr. Thomas' testimony is 
accepted given the degree of correspondence between his views and those of Reveley. 
A clue lies in the different emphasis that Dr. Thomas places on the role of medication. 
In contrast to Dr. Reveley's aim of using medication to make voices `fade away', Dr. 
Thomas claims that medication allows voice hearers to `focus' on their voices and the 
`distressing issues' that these give rise to. Thus the purpose of medication according 
to Dr. Thomas is as a first step towards helping people explore their voices by directly 
engaging with them rather than silencing them. In Dr. Thomas's words, `it 
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[medication] has to be seen that it is not the only thing that the patient is offered'. This 
provides the cue for a presentation of Dr. Thomas' approach to helping voice hearers; 
an approach which combines both medical and psychological elements in order to 
help people understand and cope with their voices. 
However, in order to illustrate Dr. Thomas' approach to voice hearing the programme 
first establishes the importance of talking to voice hearers about all aspects of their 
voices including how to communicate with them (an approach which viewers are told 
has been developed by Richard Bentall and is called `focusing'). Following a case- 
study in which a voice hearer describes how she attacked her neighbour with a knife 
the programme emphasises the dangers of not listening to the voices of the mad. 
Following the case study both the medical and psychological models are presented 
(though the psychological approach is given greater precedence). `Hearing Voices' 
then focuses on Dr. Thomas' approach to voice hearing. The pivotal sequence begins 
with an introduction by the narrator against which we see footage of Dr. Thomas 
driving an open topped car at obvious speed: 
Narrator: If the debate about voice hearing seems polarised between those who favour talking 
and those who favour medication in practice there are psychiatrists like Phil Thomas who are 
trying to reconcile the two approaches. (long pause) Phil Thomas has been putting into 
practice some of Richard Bentall's ideas about `focusing' through therapy sessions with a 
patient called Peg. Peg's problems appeared to stem from how she felt about looking after her 
elderly parents. 
At this point the image track cuts to a shot of Dr. Thomas in therapy with Peg. 
Extracts from the therapy session last for approximately two and a half minutes and 
touch on a range of issues related to the form, content and meaning of Peg's voices. 
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We then cut to an interview with Dr. Thomas in which he discusses his approach to 
Peg's voices: 
Dr. Thomas: It was enormously difficult for Peg to start on this process. She had been very 
comfortably adjusted to the whole idea that she was a schizophrenic, that she would need 
medication for the rest of her life. That has to be respected. It's not my place to go changing 
that willy-nilly. On the other hand its clear that she wanted to understand more about the 
voices and what the voices meant to her. So really what we're having to do is to try and run 
two models simultaneously. Keep medication going, she gets a lot of benefit from medication, 
she feels more confident taking medication she and that is important because its possible for 
her then to start exploring the emotional and psychological significance of the voices which is 
what we're doing. So we're really trying to run two models simultaneously but I think over a 
period of time hopefully one model - the psychological model - will supplant the medical 
model. 
At this point in the programme Dr. Thomas emerges in the role of psychiatrist-as- 
hero. The narrator's introduction signals him as someone who rises above the 
professional and conceptual differences separating `those who favour talking and 
those who favour medication'. His apparent attempt to `reconcile' both medical and 
psychological approaches to voice hearing make him a pragmatically - rather than 
ideologically - driven psychiatrist (thus enabling him to offer Peg a unique form of 
therapy in which he extracts the best from both traditional psychiatry and 
contemporary psychology). Moreover, the narrator's use of the term `reconcile' in this 
context implies that reconciliation between psychiatry and psychology is not only 
possible but desirable (perhaps even long overdue) and that patients will inevitably 
benefit. Underpinning Dr. Thomas' hero-like status is footage of him driving an open- 
top sports car (see fig. 5.5). The camera is positioned on the back seat and the 
impression is that Dr. Thomas is speeding towards his therapy session with Peg. The 
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car scene undoubtedly advances his construction as a man of `action' rather than 
`debate' and (by implication) inaction. Dr. Thomas' difference from Dr. Reveley 
could not be more explicit either professionally or personally. 
`Hearing Voices" heroic construction of Dr. Thomas is somewhat surprising in a 
programme avowedly committed to an `alternative' (psychological) interpretation of 
voice hearing. The choice of Professor Bentall as a candidate for this sort of heroic 
elevation might be thought of as more appropriate (indeed, Bentall is identified as the 
principal architect of Thomas' `focusing' therapy). What underpins Dr. Thomas' 
advantage, in terms of the programme's argumentative structure, is his ability to `run 
two models simultaneously'. Psychiatry is thus no longer bound to traditional 
orthodoxy's based on an outdated medical model but instead can develop as an 
eclectic discipline suggesting a promising future. Indeed, as Dr. Thomas finishes 
speaking the image track cuts to a shot of waves rolling onto a beach. The symbolism 
of the waves bolsters Dr. Thomas' hope that the `psychological model will eventually 
supplant the medical model' by evoking a tide of change, a cleansing of the traditional 
psychiatric approach to voice hearing in which the experiences of voice hearers are 
ignored. His desire to engage with as well as to respect Peg's own interpretations of 
her voices signals him as a listening psychiatrist, able to work in partnership with 
voice hearers and explore the meaning of voices on their own terms. However, the 
fact that Dr. Thomas gets the last word on the issue of voice hearing ensures that 
psychiatry retains its centrality both within the voice hearers' world and the 
programme's understanding of that world. 
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Conclusion 
Throughout this chapter the voices of psychiatric `experts' have occupied centre 
stage. What emerges are plural interpretations of contemporary psychiatry, 
community care and schizophrenia. The appearance of voices not usually heard in 
public discussions of mental health might be taken to indicate that the television 
system is reflecting an emergent post-modem discursive order in which more voices 
mean more argumentative possibilities. Perhaps. But it is important not to be swept 
along by simple delight in such heteroglossic possibilities. The question of the 
regulating impact of dierent programme formats on public discourse remains largely 
unexamined in most commentary. With this in mind this chapter has shown how 
shifting notions of `psychiatric expertise' impact on what `expert' participants are 
allowed to talk about within and across a range of current affairs programmes. In 
approaching the mediating role of programme forms and formats we have paid 
particular attention to their degree of discursive `openness' and explored the way 
relations between competing discourses are organised in order to understand how 
particular programmes orchestrate credibility and precedence. As we have hopefully 
shown, `expert's' participation in a television programme does not automatically 
result in their claims being treated with sympathy and understanding. However, as we 
shall see in the following chapter, if claims to legitimacy is an issue for psychiatric 
experts, it is all the more so for those speaking about mental health issues from the 
vantage point of direct experience. 
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Introduction: Relocating Schizophrenia 
For most of this century schizophrenia has been viewed as a hopeless, degenerative 
condition fit only for long-term confinement within the walled and locked asylum in 
which the `natural' course of the condition could be allowed free rein. However, de- 
institutionalization policies have brought this regime to an end and transferred 
mentally ill people from hospital settings to the community. As a consequence, the 
notion that the mentally ill embark on `careers' as institutionalized mental patients 
(see Goffman, 1961) might, like the asylum system itself, become a thing of the past. 
The rationale for this optimistic view is that since the hospital teaches patients their 
role as patients, with their closure the role of `mental patient' will become extinct. 
This begs the question, though, of how those with a mental illness diagnosis perceive 
their new situation after being defined as a career mental patient. If we are to take the 
inclusion of people with mental illness in social life seriously this is a crucial issue. 
The question of how schizophrenics renegotiate their re-entry into the everyday world 
has barely been answered (There is little research on what Community Care means to 
ex-mental patients). Anyone who is now admitted to a psychiatric hospital, whether as 
a new patient or a former long-stay patient, seldom stays for longer than a few weeks. 
Many return to their homes, where they can put an enormous burden of care on the 
family and other agencies. Many others go into group homes or hostels, or into 
bedsitters or boarding houses, which are often cramped or sordid. Thousands of ex- 
long-stay hospital patients are now homeless and sleeping rough on embankments, in 
shop doorways, or in reception centres. Many of these people have completely lost 
touch with psychiatric services while others finish up in prison because of petty 
offences. Despite this depressing situation, the desire to restore mental patients to 
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mainstream society, to remodel them as `ordinary people', is generally perceived to be 
a laudable one. However, as Barham (1984: 178) cautions, `we err if we suppose that 
administrative changes in the form of the transfer of those people from one category 
of sites to another necessarily indicate a deeper social change in the terms on which 
such people are to be regarded and permitted to participate in social life'. 
Schizophrenia and the Problem of the Person 
Barham's caution derives from a concern that the blunt reality of Community Care 
falls some way short of the rhetorical promises. Those with a mental illness diagnosis 
continue to be identified as `mental patients' as though this was a permanently active 
status. This predicament is particularly (though not exclusively) evident in the case of 
those with a schizophrenic diagnosis. A return to ordinary-agent status is not 
guaranteed by a simple re-entry into social life. Although a schizophrenic illness does 
not necessarily mean that a sufferer is constantly plagued by symptomatology, for 
many the closure of asylums represents a failure by the authorities (including 
Government) to care for people in the midst of illness. The mounting public pressure 
to return the seriously mentally ill to secure accommodation is testament to the pull of 
this "get back to your wards and take your drugs" attitude. As we noted in Chapter 
Three, schizophrenia has long been perceived as an incurable and hopeless disorder. 
Even if we do not subscribe to this doctrine in its strongest form, our most basic 
cultural reflexes towards people with schizophrenia remain tainted by it. As Barham 
and Hayward (1991: 2) put it: `Bluntly stated, we are not at all clear who has emerged 
from the asylum'. 
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The suspicion that ex-mental patients are `not one of us' is glaringly present in the 
popular lexicon of mental illness: "mad", "lunatics", "crazy", "nutters", "barmy", 
"crackers" "batty", "psychos", "basket cases", "dotty", "demented". This vocabulary 
of difference easily outweighs any attribution of social membership that we care to 
employ. Such terminology marks out the space between `us' and `them'. It drives 
home the strangeness, the remoteness, and above all the inaccessibility of mental 
disorder. The official aim of giving ex-mental patients "a normal life in the 
community" therefore has to contend with deeply embedded notions that these people 
are not normal, that they are different. Many ex-patients are themselves all too aware 
of their apparent difference. Some have had to take anti-psychotic medication for 
many years in order to reduce and mask the symptoms of their disorder. But drugs do 
not work for everyone. Many dislike taking (indeed, refuse to take) them both because 
of adverse effects (e. g. stooped posture, trembling limbs, facial grimacing) and 
because such effects publicly mark them out as different. But refusal to take 
medication presents its own difficulties. In some traditions of psychiatry the 
individual who refuses medication is announcing that they are ill (or are becoming ill) 
since only those whose minds are disordered would refuse `help'. Consequently, 
refusal is often interpreted as all the more reason why they should be forced to take 
their medication. 
At the present time, then, it is clear that ex-mental patients in the community are not 
easily able to shrug off the label `mental patient'. A common assumption is that many 
have been forcibly injected back into society despite being ill. Even where former 
patients might be said to have "got better" their recovery is easily put into question (if 
they stop taking their medication, for example). In this respect, the person labelled 
`schizophrenic' has a double affliction. They are designated `ill' in the sense of 
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having a biological disease of the brain/mind', but they are also identified as having a 
social illness. `Participation in the social system', Talcott Parson writes, `is always 
relevant to the state of illness, to its etiology (sic) and to the condition of successful 
therapy' (Quoted in Doubt, 1996: x). "Being sick" thus constitutes a social role and as 
such is inextricably bound up with beliefs, values and judgements. 
The behaviour that is called schizophrenic is, according to this perspective, an all- 
encompassing expression of `mental patienthood' in which the characteristics of the 
disease are of less importance in producing the schizophrenic than social responses to 
them. Thus, the typical course of the condition is inextricably linked with the social 
consequences of being schizophrenic. As a consequence, their foothold in ordinary 
life is precarious and their personhood constantly on probation. This means that ex- 
mental patients are second-class citizens, devalued and defined by their illness (or 
propensity to become ill). Despite their formal inclusion in society they have not 
achieved social integration. This leaves us in the alarming position that 
mental patients may be more of a mystery today, living among us, than they were when 
hidden away in the asylum. We do not know them, because they are neither outside society in 
the world of exclusion, nor are they full citizens - individuals who are like the rest of us. Being 
1 The issue of whether a `mind' can meaningfully be `ill' is of course the crux of the mental illness 
problem. Psychiatrists argue that a schizophrenic mind is the product of a biological disorder of the 
brain. The brain is part of the natural world and thus subject to the laws of nature. Biological 
disordering is something that may affect the brain and which manifests in illness-type behaviour. 
Critics counter by arguing that the mind-brain relation is not amenable to a scientific explanation. A 
`science of mental life' is always booby-trapped since we meet not brains, but people. We can therefore 
never arrive at a `purely' scientific understanding of mental illness because damaged minds (unlike, 
say, damaged arms) are impenetrable to human understanding (For a discussion of the `mind-brain 
problem' in the context of the `mental illness problem' see Healey, 1990: pp. 1-38). 
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neither other or self, they are a new kind of social construction (Lewis et al, quoted in Barham 
and Hayward, 1991: 143). 
But if they are neither other nor self then who (or what) are they? 
Lost People, Lost Voices 
Formally, the person with a history of mental illness is a citizen alongside others. 
However, they often carry with them an ambiguous and sometimes conflictual 
relationship with the meanings that have traditionally attached to the category `mental 
patient'. For those with a diagnosis of schizophrenia, misconceptions about the 
condition (that it means a `split personality', that they are dangerous and criminal, that 
they are evil or unpredictable, and so on) invokes a double burden. One aspect 
concerns `their incorporation within the role of mental patient, within a service 
dominated frame of existence in which there are only limited opportunities to practice 
as an ordinary social agent. The other is incorporation within a set of images and 
assumptions about schizophrenia and the mentally ill that put the person "off the 
map', outside the community of ordinary human beings' (Barham and Hayward, 
1991: pp. 74-5). These dual aspects of `incorporation' mesh with the structural 
problems and isolation often experienced by schizophrenics following discharge from 
hospital (in such spheres as housing, employment, and social relations). If the 
realisation of personhood means receiving equality of regard and entitlement, and a 
feeling that one exists as a person of value, the schizophrenic has a long road still to 
travel to achieve this. 
The tendency to identify severe mental illness in terms of a vocabulary of difference 
underscores the difficulties that many ex-patients experience in coming to terms with 
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life after mental hospitalization. Barham and Hayward (1990: 137) confirm this in a 
series of interviews with former mental patients. As one interviewee, Henry, 
commented, `with schizophrenia you're not living, you're just existing... I think that 
schizophrenia will always make me a second-class citizen'. His assertion is based on 
his experience of boredom and demoralisation following discharge from hospital. His 
situation is such that he feels devalued as a human being and because of his diagnosis, 
relegated to the margins of social life. These experiences are common amongst people 
with a schizophrenic illness. Equally common is the feeling that they are defined by 
their illness rather than as persons struggling to be taken seriously as agents in their 
own right (see Barham and Hayward, 1991). This confirms our earlier point that the 
person with a history of schizophrenic illness is perceived to be lost to the disorder. 
On this reading it is not surprising that efforts to attend to the voice of the (ex-) mental 
patient have been limited. This is borne out by the fact that public talk about 
schizophrenia is still to a considerable extent shrouded in a professional discourse 
concerned mainly with post-asylum mental health issues (e. g. lobbying for better 
services or more resources). We have little or no idea of what the experience of being 
schizophrenic is actually like for those ex-patients now receiving care in the 
community. 
One reason for this state of affairs is that psychiatry has historically done the talking 
on behalf of mental patients. This, Roy Porter (1987) observes, has been due primarily 
to the systems and structures erected for dealing with madness. Not far below the 
surface, however, has been an attitude that the mad have had very little of sense to 
say. For reasons outlined earlier, this assumption applies particularly to 
schizophrenics. They are often thought of as inherently incapable of giving either 
genuine informed consent or valid insights into aspects of their lives as (ex-) mental 
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patients. Psychiatric textbooks abound with representations of the schizophrenic as a 
reluctant, incapacitated and largely inarticulate actor who can only achieve anything 
through the patient ministrations of professional carers. This negative identification of 
schizophrenia results in their failure to be taken seriously as agents who holds 
legitimate views about the nature of their condition and treatment, and about their 
experiences of living with a schizophrenic diagnosis. This is not to deny that people 
with schizophrenia not infrequently put the frames of everyday life under severe 
strain: `Thus they may show scant regard for conventions of behaviour, exhibit 
peculiarities in conversational style, and demonstrate serious difficulties both in 
managing work routines and in forming and sustaining social relationships' (Barham, 
1984: 185). But this does not mean that we should automatically capitulate to the 
language of `patienthood' (albeit dressed up in a discourse of `caring') in order to 
make sense of their experience of being schizophrenic. 
Schizophrenia and Cultural Citizenship 
Nominally, the thrust of current mental health policy is to overturn the legacy of 
social exclusion and devaluation and confer upon ex-patients rights and recognitions 
accorded ordinary people. From this perspective `mental illness' need no longer be a 
barrier to ordinary human recognition and the entitlements of citizenship. Conceptions 
of citizenship are varied but Murdock (1994: 158) offers a useful general definition: 
`the right to participate fully in existing patterns of social life and to help shape the 
forms they may take in the future'. Murdock's broad insistence on a right to social 
membership and action includes not only familiar civil, political and social/economic 
rights but also cultural rights. `Cultural rights are comprised of entitlements in four 
main areas: information; knowledge; representation; and communication' (Murdock, 
225 
Experiencing Madness 
ibid). For our purposes the second and third of these - rights of representation and 
communication - provide a valuable acknowledgement of the relationship between 
media systems and effective citizenship. Cultural rights are not just for the few. They 
extend even to those with a diagnosis of schizophrenia. Indeed, given the degree of 
stigma, prejudice and stereotype attached to the label `schizophrenic' one might argue 
that rights of representation and communication are a vital component in any serious 
attempt at revaluing schizophrenic lives and helping them to forge empathetic 
relations with non-mentally ill others. Which brings us to the relationship between 
schizophrenia and television. 
In Britain, public service broadcasting has been based (amongst other things) on the 
principles of universality and equality of access. However, as we have shown earlier, 
rights of access to a public voice have persistently come up against professional 
notions of how best to organise public discourse. The result has been a continuing 
struggle over who has the right to speak about other people's lives, who participates in 
public discourse and who is excluded. In practice, the conditions of access to a public 
voice have fallen some way short of public broadcasting's idealised claims to provide 
a shared discursive space. `Minority views' and `alternative perspectives' have 
generally been confined to the outer edges of the schedule or excluded in favour of 
more `reasonable' voices (often speaking on behalf of those excluded). This does not 
auger well for those disadvantaged groups whose social status or position in the 
society is less than assured, including ex-mental patients whose forcible return from 
social exile in asylums forms part of the contemporary experience of a diverse 
citizenry. Theoretically, providing communicative entitlements for this vulnerable 
group of people forms part of an ethical commitment to an open and accessible 
broadcasting system. However, having acknowledged that those with a history of 
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mental illness are entitled to a public voice, we are immediately confronted with the 
problem of whose voice should be heard. Answering this question is particularly 
problematic in the case of schizophrenics. 
The terms on which schizophrenics should be given a public voice raises awkward 
issues. With the advent of community care, there is no longer a clear-cut distinction 
between patients who are `ill', and in hospital, or `well' and out of hospital. Many 
discharged schizophrenics receive care as day patients or out-patients. Some are long- 
term recipients of home-based nursing care and have only intermittent contact with 
hospital-based psychiatrists. Others, those who are homeless or socially isolated for 
example, may not be subject to any formal psychiatric intervention. Consequently, a 
history of schizophrenic illness (and for some, a continuing vulnerability to further 
periods of illness) means that many ex-patients' entitlement to talk about their 
experiences is uncertain or contestable. The blurred distinction between the 
hospitalized schizophrenic and the `recovered' ex-patient also creates difficulties for 
the criteria we might adopt in selecting which schizophrenic voice is worth listening 
to. As a result it is all too tempting to see those with a history of schizophrenia as 
speaking with an `inauthentic voice', because whatever views or opinions they may 
have, there is always a lurking doubt that what is being expressed is not their `true' 
selves, but their illness. Their right to speak about, say, previous psychotic 
experiences can therefore easily be countered with the claim that what they are saying 
is evidence they are `not well'. This reproduction of a medicalised way of seeing and 
understanding schizophrenic people under a new set of conditions may well turn out 
to be psychiatry's most potent legacy. 
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Television Current Affairs and Schizophrenic Voices 
The changing context of psychiatry has altered the discursive field around mental 
health in important ways. At the present time the significant debate is no longer 
between those who recognize the reality of mental illness and those who dispute it. 
Rather it is between those who are prepared to challenge the legacy of mental 
patienthood and those who settle for a more reductive view (Barham, 1992). Many 
former patients are involved in this debate and in areas such as `hearing voices', 
taking medication, and living in `the community' their points of view and concerns 
may well be different from those who have traditionally cared for them. The erosion 
of the paternalistic structures of institutional psychiatry has been accompanied by 
mounting criticism from ex-patients and their advocates that their views have not so 
far been taken seriously. In a media-based culture televised argumentation and debate 
is of crucial importance and in a still largely centralised television system the onus is 
on professional programme makers to provide the conditions of access that allow 
former mental patients to have a public voice. 
For TV programme makers interested in schizophrenic voices Community Care 
presents a range of opportunities but also challenges. As the length of stay in hospital 
shortens, and patterns of community care diversify, access to schizophrenics becomes 
easier than it was in the days of the asylum. They can be talked to and talk for 
themselves in a variety of settings. At the same time however, the conundrum to 
which we alluded earlier - that is in the case of schizophrenic's, their claims to speak 
authoritatively about their experiences are undermined by the dominant public 
perception of them as `unreliable' witnesses - makes them vulnerable to the charge 
that they are incoherent, unintelligible and unable to advance a coherent argument. 
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The analysis presented here looks in detail at the ways in which a range of 
contemporary TV current affairs programmes access schizophrenic voices. It seeks to 
address two key questions. Firstly, in what formats are schizophrenic people given 
space to articulate their experiences? and secondly, in what formats are they allowed 
to offer their own interpretations of these experiences. These questions produce a 
matrix made up of two cross-cutting dimensions - the amount of access given to 
schizophrenics and the control over that access exercised by the programme makers. 
Panorama: 'Whose Mind Is It Anyway? ' 
By way of illustration consider the following extract from the Panorama programme, 
`Whose Mind Is It Anyway? ' This focuses on the issue of Community Supervision 
Orders (henceforth, CSOs), which would compel mentally ill people in the 
community to take medication. According to the presenter, Margaret Gilmore, 
`particularly affected [by CSOs] would be severe schizophrenic's who often don't 
realise when they are ill'. Immediately after this statement we move to a question- 
and-answer sequence with a patient, Gordon Harding: 
Gilmore: Do you hear voices? 
Gordon: I've only heard one it called me a creep a big one like Mo- bigger than the one on the 
ten commandments. I'm still trying to find out who it was. My psychiatrist said it was my 
monad my higher self as in cringe as in doctor Monty Python but from the highest level. 
Gilmore: Are they always different voices? 
Gordon: No it's the only one I've ever heard never heard another one since that. I just tell it to 
watch out. 
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Gilmore: Do you feel that you need care? Does anyone supervise you at all? Do you see a 
doctor? 
Gordon: Oh yes I go to case management that's the new psychiatric thing. Kitchen meetings 
are very popular these days with politicians' acts so they introduce us all to kitchen parties and 
meetings in the afternoon which is very interesting and fulfilling and keeping up. You see the 
idea is the to let the undamaged parts of the brain come out and let them enjoy themselves like 
any normal person but the only damaged parts are the mental mental mentals and once the 
fingers are gone, we're alive again. 
This extract illustrates how evaluative judgements are used to undermine the 
credibility of schizophrenics as people worthy of being listened to and taken seriously. 
Gilmore's claim is that `severe schizophrenics' are `prime candidates' for CSOs 
because they hear voices and do not realise this is an illness (In other words, the fact 
that schizophrenics' hear voices is seen in itself as sufficient to render them incapable 
of recognising that they are ill). Gilmore's comments also throw into relief how the 
experience of hearing voices is mobilised as evidence of mental incompetence. In this 
case, to contribute meaningfully to the debate over whether or not schizophrenics in 
the community should be compelled to take their medication against their wishes. By 
situating Gordon's affirmative response to the question `do you hear voices' 
immediately after the statement that some `severe' schizophrenic's don't realise when 
they are ill, he is not only identified as a `severe schizophrenic', his admission to 
hearing voices is mobilised as prima facie evidence that he lacks "insight" into the 
severity of his condition. This initial representation of Gordon as incompetent negates 
any further contribution he makes before his voice is even heard. Instead of being 
presented as someone whose opinions need (indeed, deserve) to be heard on the issue 
of CSOs, Gordon's participation in the programme is deployed to confirm his 
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(presumed) inability to contribute anything meaningful. His license to speak is 
therefore conditional upon him articulating the sound/content of `severe' 
schizophrenia and nothing else. Thus, despite his more or less `appropriate' response 
to Gilmore's second question, Gordon's testimony is not used to advance the 
discussion over CSOs from a `schizophrenic perspective'. On the contrary, the fact 
that he hears voices (and is willing to admit it) is used to justify his non-participation 
in the programme's more substantive discussion of the political, legal and ethical 
issues surrounding CSOs. This is the preserve of more `credible', non-schizophrenic, 
participants. (The sequence quoted above is in fact Gordon's only contribution to the 
programme-as-broadcast. ) 
Gordon's exclusion from the CSO debate is even more explicit in the case of Mark 
Pearson, another schizophrenic participant in the same programme. In the following 
sequence Mark and his mother, Cindy Dowling, are juxtaposed talking about the 
impact of Mark's 'voices' on his behaviour. The sequence begins with footage of 
Mark walking on a beach. 
Gilmore (speaking in voice-over): Mark Pearson, a schizophrenic, is a classic candidate for 
Community Supervision Orders. He's what's known as a revolving door patient whose been in 
and out of hospital and has a tendency not to take his drugs. Three times he's been sectioned 
onto psychiatric wards, deemed to be a danger to himself and his family. 
Mark (speaking in voice-over): I had so much paranoia I couldn't sleep. There was lots of 
noise around me. And it was coming up to Christmas and er I gave the devil power over sound 
so he was controlling the world. He overtook my body. 
At this point the visual track cuts to an interview with Mark. 
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Gilmore: so what did you do? can you show me? 
Mark: yes it's there. (points to a scar on his neck) 
Gilmore: what did you do. 
Mark: erm I got a half-pint glass and I smashed it and I was just kept ripping at my throat. 
At this point the visual track cuts to testimony from his mother. 
Cindy: He was still hearing the voices. All the voices were telling him to do this. Then the 
voices said electrocute yourself so I believe he put his tongue in a socket so far as I can gather 
what he told me and that threw him across the room and still he was alive. The voices were 
coming in really strong and powerful and when the voices come he he has to go along with the 
voices. 
At this point the visual track cuts back to Mark. 
Mark: Basically in the bible it says I am standing for God, God the Father, I am you know. 
But the way I see the world today it's very confusing. 
Gilmore: Do you think you are God? 
Mark: (long pause) I could be (laughter). I could be I might be I don't know. I have certain I 
have I've had certain things happen to me. I've seen the spaceships. 
As this extract shows, Mark's participation in the programme is dependent upon the 
programme maker's classification of him as a `classic candidate' for CSOs. This 
status is confirmed by references to him as `a schizophrenic' who has been `sectioned 
three times' and has a `tendency not to take his drugs' and further reinforced by his 
own descriptions of himself such as `I had so much paranoia... '. As a consequence, his 
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appearance is restricted to a brief supporting description of his `paranoia' and a 
graphic account of a suicide attempt with broken glass. Along with his mother's 
explanation that `voices' caused this and another suicide attempt involving electricity, 
Mark's description of paranoia and self-harm is mobilised as evidence of the danger 
presented by a schizophrenic who stops taking drugs. The juxtaposition of Mark and 
his mother's testimony creates a harrowing tale of schizophrenia and its impact on 
their lives. But by focusing upon the severe impact of Mark's failure to take his drugs, 
as evidenced by two suicide attempts, it leaves viewers in little doubt about the danger 
that Mark and his family are presently exposed to. 
The final phase of the sequence is given over to establishing the extent of Mark's 
`confused' mental state. It concludes with what is in itself a bizarre question: `Do you 
think you are God? '. But it plays an important role in the programme's argumentative 
structure. Although the programme employs a `problem-solution structure' the 
question and Mark's response contribute solely to the `problem' element (the 
difficulties and dangers that schizophrenics present when they refuse to take their 
medication) not to the `solution' (whether CSOs would break the cycle of mental 
health deterioration and relapse). Mark is in fact erected as a straw man. His response 
is included simply in order for it to be undermined. This is most apparent in the cut 
immediately after he says that he has seen `spaceships' (indicating the `need we say 
more' attitude by the programme makers). The visual track cuts from Mark to a shot 
of Cindy's home and precedes a discussion of family anxiety about Mark's suicidal 
behaviour. In other words, neither the question nor the response is given any further 
consideration. Both speak for themselves, as it were. Thus although Mark, like 
Gordon, is licensed to speak in the programme it is only to illustrate his incompetence 
and hence the problem he presents for carers. 
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The full significance of Mark's positioning as part of the `problem' becomes clear 
when the issue of compulsory medication is explored later on, using Mark's `tendency 
not to take his drugs' as a case-study of the civil liberties issues raised by CSOs. In 
the following sequence Mark's apparent reluctance to take his medication is presented 
as evidence that his judgement is impaired. The sequence begins with a contribution 
from his psychiatrist, Dr. Angus McPherson: 
Dr. McPherson: I believe that Mark needs and would benefit from a closer degree of 
supervision to enable a better monitoring and better treatment of his mental state to be carried 
out. My own view is what we need is some order which will enable us to readmit patients to 
hospital if they are breaking down, if they're becoming ill again, in order to reassess and 
restabilize their condition and to enable us to discharge them again. 
At this point the visual track cuts to a shot of carers in Mark's community home 
preparing to administer medication. 
Gilmore (speaking in voice-over): The [community] home [where he lives] supervises Mark's 
drugs. If he refuses them there's little at present anyone can do unless he becomes dangerous. 
But he doesn't like taking them. 
At this point the visual track cuts to Mark. 
Mark: You go in to see a psychiatrist and erm they say you've got to take these pills or 
sometimes they don't even say that. They you just wake up in the morning and you've got 
some new pills to take you know. It can be demoralising' 
Gilmore: do you mind having treatment forced on you? 
Mark: yes I do. 
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At this point the visual track cuts to Mark's mother. 
Reporter: do you think there should be a law then to force people like Mark to take their 
medication? 
Mark's mother: definitely definitely should be yes. They're not capable of making a decision 
like that themselves really. 
In this sequence Mark's appearance is sandwiched between his psychiatrist and his 
mother. Accordingly, his testimony is framed by the viewpoints of both. In Dr. 
McPherson's contribution Mark is presented as a problem-patient: `I believe that 
Mark needs and would benefit from a closer degree of supervision to enable a better 
monitoring and better treatment of his mental state to be carried out. ' The means by 
which he could achieve `better monitoring and better treatment' is an `order' (a 
Community Supervision Order). Significantly, neither Gilmore nor Mark himself 
challenges McPherson's view of what Mark needs. Instead, Mark's dislike at having 
medication forced upon him is mobilised as an `alternative' view. However, such 
indirect opposition to McPherson's view fails to elaborate on why Mark dislikes 
taking medication (other than a vague explanation that waking up and finding his 
medication has been changed is `demoralising'). In the context of an agenda set by 
others Mark is not licensed to speak on this particular issue. This stands in stark 
contrast to McPherson's contribution in which he is allowed to express his view on 
what should happen to patients who are `breaking down' ('My own view is what we 
need is... '). In short, McPherson is licensed to contribute to the debate about CSOs 
whilst Mark is not. 
235 
Experiencing Madness 
Mark's appearance as a problem-patient hinges on his history of refusal to take 
medication. This is a crucial issue for (ex-) mental patients and one that goes to the 
heart of the CSO issue. Control over the type of drug and/or dosage that is 
administered to them is a major concern for many (see Barham, 1992: pp. 47-49). 
Under CSO legislation a patient would have no rights to refuse their medication. 
Bearing in mind the problems associated with taking anti-psychotic medication (in 
particular, the powerful side-effects) Mark and Gordon clearly have a stake in getting 
their voices heard on this issue. However, in the programme-as-broadcast neither is 
given an opportunity to present their point of view on CSOs and it is left to 
representatives of mental health pressure groups to speak on their behalf. This, as we 
noted above, is because they have been chosen to perform a quite different discursive 
function; to illustrate their mental incompetence. The nearest either of them comes to 
direct involvement in the CSO debate is Mark's confirmation, in response to a direct 
question from Gilmore, that he does mind having treatment forced upon him. At this 
point, though, his credibility as a person capable of providing a rational perspective on 
his situation is already in tatters. We know that he hears voices and thinks he might be 
God. We are therefore encouraged to assume that it is his incompetent/irrational status 
- as someone unable to judge what is in his best interests - which denies him the 
opportunity to expand on his opposition to forced treatment. 
If Mark is not capable of recognising what is good for him, others certainly are. Thus, 
following Dr. McPherson's claim to know what Mark `needs and would benefit 
from', his mother is allowed to express a view on whether or not there should be a law 
to force `people like Mark' to take medication. However, it is the way in which her 
response is juxtaposed against Mark's reply to a different question that is perhaps 
most revealing about his status within the programme. Following immediately after 
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his confirmation that he does mind having treatment forced upon him, Cindy's 
statement has the effect of undermining his response. Although they are responding to 
quite different questions Mark appears to have given an inappropriate response, 
which further undermines his claim to be someone whose views we should take 
seriously. Moreover, by ending the sequence with Cindy's testimony the programme 
makers appear to endorse her opinion that people like Mark are `incapable' of making 
decisions as to whether or not they should take their medication. As a consequence, 
they do not take his stated dislike of compulsory medication as an issue worth 
exploring further. 
Kilroy 
`Whose Mind Is It Anyway' is built on strong assumptions about the nature of 
schizophrenia as a disability in which Gordon and Mark's disabilities (voice hearing, 
delusions) are invoked to foreclose any exploration of their `schizophrenic' point of 
view. In contrast, Kilroy avoids an openly evaluative approach to the experience of 
being schizophrenic. In the following sequence for example, the host, Robert Kilroy- 
Silk, is interested in establishing what `schizophrenic voices' actually say to those 
who hear them: 
Kilroy-Silk: Can you describe the voices? 
Audience member 1: Yer the voices are like er another person speaking in your head. 
Kilroy-Silk: What kind of things are they saying? 
Audience member 1: They persecute you. They can do, they can tell you jokes and you laugh. 
You listen to them. You sit for hours just listening to your own thoughts. 
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At this point a second unidentified member of the audience interrupts and continues 
thus: 
Audience member 2: I agree with that. Its certainly not a split personality er even most 
Consultants agree on that er. With me its its the voices are real when its when it happens to 
you, they're actually real erm they torture you, they torment you er to me they are from hell as 
the chap over there said. Its in my mind at the time its to do with evil, for instance er alien 
forces, the devil rising. 
Kilroy Silk: What kind of things are they saying to you? 
Audience member 2: Er one chap was an old man. I mean I had up to 30 voices, young people, 
old people. 
Kilroy Silk: Were they voices of people you knew or recognised? 
Audience member 2: No. Some some of them I recognised as arguing in my favour to keep me 
alive er they were arguing that I should die of cancer or die of an heart attack er. But on one 
particular occasion I was coming back from Liverpool with my father to London where I now 
live and er I knew I was running out of petrol and I wouldn't stop at a motorway service 
station. I was doing twenty-five miles an hour on the Ml and er it's quite dangerous actually 
going so slow. I was recognising people who were passing me as people I knew in the other 
cars er I wouldn't stop at a service station for the simple reason I thought they were alien 
bases, they were alien people there. Consequently we ran out ran out of petrol er it was winter 
time my father er thought I'd got out the car to ring the AA. In actual fact I'd got out just to 
walk round I was going to leave him there. I got back in the car and said they'll be here soon. 
We waited two hours and my dad said `when's the AA coming? ' I said we're not waiting for 
the AA, we're waiting for the spaceships to take us home cos I thought we were going back to 
our original planet where we came back from. 
Kilroy-Silk: And what did your dad say? 
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Audience member 2: Well my dad phoned the police and the police I smoked tobacco roll ups 
at the time and the police checked the roll ups (laughs). 
In this sequence Kilroy-Silk asks the two schizophrenics to describe their `voices' 
whilst avoiding the kind of evaluative judgement Panorama attaches to Gordon and 
Mark. He is able to do this because both speakers are mobilised not as `mental 
patients' but as persons with a particular experience of hearing voices. This is an 
important difference. It means that their status as `experienced' people (and 
experience is the main form of cultural capital supporting entitlements to speak in 
Kilroy) overrides their identity as `voice hearing schizophrenics' (which might, in 
other contexts, present a barrier to their being taken seriously as speakers). Thus 
Kilroy-Silk's line of questioning actively encourages the second speaker to talk both 
about his experience of hearing voices ('What kind of things are they saying to you? ') 
and later, how he experienced his voices ('Were they voices of people you knew or 
recognised? '). The programme is able to mobilise these testimonies (and provide 
space for them to develop) because its principal aim is to access anecdotal accounts of 
everyday experience (including, as this example shows, an amusing story about the 
experience of hearing `voices'). 
A crucial difference between a `classic' television documentary, such as Panorama, 
and the discussion format of Kilroy is that the former adopts a problem-solving 
agenda whilst the latter does not. In the Panorama extracts quoted above, Gordon and 
Mark's terms of access undermine their credibility as speakers. However, this does 
not mean that schizophrenic participants enjoy equitable discursive opportunities in 
Kilroy. They are mobilised as witnesses to the voice hearing experience but not given 
an opportunity to speak on any other issue raised in the programme. The significance 
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of this exclusion becomes apparent when we consider that a full 38 minutes elapses 
between the end of audience member 2's testimony and the next `schizophrenic' voice 
heard at the close of the programme. (Here, Kilroy-Silk asks another schizophrenic 
accessee to say how he helps himself in the community but then interrupts his 
testimony after 10 seconds to close the programme). In the meantime, a range of `non- 
schizophrenic' voices has been called on to discuss various problems raised by caring 
for schizophrenics in the community. Consequently, across a range of current affairs 
formats as disparate as Kilroy or Panorama, schizophrenics are represented primarily 
in terms of the problems they pose for mental health policy. In neither programme are 
they seen as having a coherent overall view of their situation, nor are they invited to 
speak for themselves about the implementation of community care and how they think 
current policies should best work for them. 
Disguises: 'A Place of Safety' 
In the two part programme `A Place of Safety', broadcast as part of Granada's series' 
Disguises, the restrictions imposed on schizophrenic people speaking for themselves 
are built into the expositional structure. The basic idea of the series, it will be recalled, 
was to employ hidden cameras as an aid to reporting areas of public controversy, and 
to use reportorial disguises as a way of obtaining clandestine footage. This involves 
the series reporter, Adam Holloway, acting out different roles, often over a period of 
weeks. It is this in-role activity that forms the `core' footage of each programme 
which is then made sense of by Holloway's address to the audience. The footage in `A 
Place of Safety' is presented as unmediated evidence that community care is 
working/not working, conclusions then confirmed by Holloway's claims that his 'on- 
the-ground' experiences guarantee his status as truth-speaker. Thus, while concern 
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about Disguises' format has rightly focused on the ethics of using deception to get to 
, the truth' (see Dugdale, 1993), an equally problematic element of the series' format 
is the status of Holloway's `experiential testimony' generated as it is out of that 
deception. In the following extract Holloway's taking the role of a schizophrenic is 
explicitly acknowledged: 
Holloway: So still acting the part of a schizophrenic I arrive at the Accident and Emergency 
department of a main Birmingham hospital. I'm going to pretend that I'm hearing frightening 
voices - voices that direct me to go to a `hazard free zone', a place of safety. The act that I'm 
adopting has been rehearsed with the help of two psychiatrists who believe it's authentic. It's 
doubtful however as a schizophrenic whether I'd be able voluntarily to submit myself first to a 
GP then to a hospital. Someone would probably have to help me. 
Holloway's performance at the hospital is his first public `test', both of his acting 
ability and the structures of community care designed to help homeless 
schizophrenics. It is therefore essential that his portrayal of schizophrenia is credible 
in two senses. Firstly, it is obviously vital that Holloway's act is believed in the 
hospital (and elsewhere). Secondly, it is essential that viewers see his act as credible. 
However, given that Holloway is not a genuine schizophrenic, and that he has to 
exercise creative license in order to obtain core footage, audience members might be 
tempted to question the credibility of what they are told is happening. If left 
unacknowledged these doubts might subvert the veracity of the visual evidence 
obtained. Thus, Holloway needs to reassure them that there is verisimiltude between 
his performance and what he claims has happened to him (or others) whilst he was in- 
role. In the extract quoted above queries about his performance as a schizophrenic are 
resolved by him telling us that although he is only pretending to hear voices, 
psychiatrists who can vouch for its authenticity have validated his act. The message is 
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clear: "because my act has been endorsed by those who know about schizophrenia 
viewers need have no doubt that what they are about to see happen to me would in 
reality happen to a genuine schizophrenic". 
The `truthfulness' of Holloway's testimony then, relies on his ability to convince 
others of the credibility of his performance. Since his act is not discovered to be an act 
(on camera) one is invited to presume that what he tells us and shows us happened to 
him would in fact happen to a genuine schizophrenic. In this way, his performance 
aims to combine an extended view of schizophrenic experience `from the inside' 
while retaining the credentials provided by expert analysis and `objective' 
commentary. Consider the following extract from part two of `A Place of Safety'. 
Holloway (speaking in voice-over): If Mayfield Court were a registered mental home it would 
have to provide substantially more medical help. But by calling it a hotel the owner, Andrew 
Knight, need provide the minimum of care. In return for plugging the gap in Birmingham's 
care needs he makes a handsome profit from the £120 in weekly state benefits he gets from 
each resident. There's nothing to do here but vegetate and succumb to one's own delusions. 
Like this man who endlessly tears paper (see fig. 6.1). Or Archie who stands all day in the 
same spot with his back to the wall (see fig. 6.2). Or Eric, the schizophrenic who talks to his 
own voices (see fig. 6.3). [My emphasis] 
Holloway's commentary implies that residents at Mayfield Court (a private `hotel' 
housing ex-mental patients in which he has been living) are victims of community 
care policies which allow them to be neglected so that their mental health deteriorates. 
As the image track progresses, clandestine footage shows various residents sitting 
slumped in chairs with apparently `nothing to do'. Visual proof of the claim that the 
hotel provides only a `minimum of care' is provided by a close-up shot of an elderly 
woman sitting in a chair smoking. As the camera approaches the woman it moves 
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downward onto her bare legs and the frame is momentarily frozen (fig. 6.4). The 
sequence is accompanied by a musical score of the type associated with horror films 
and builds to a climax at the exact moment that Holloway says, `by calling it a hotel 
the owner, Andrew Knight, need provide the minimum of care'. We are thus 
presented with the reality (the horror? ) of community care: elderly people left with 
nothing on their bare feet (while the hotel owner reaps his `handsome profit'). 
Towards the end of the extract Holloway's commentary briefly switches from an 
`objective' to a subjective mode (the italicised part of the extract) which invests his 
analysis of Mayfield Court with confirmation derived from his own experience of 
staying there. At the point where he says, `There's nothing to do here but vegetate and 
succumb to one's own delusions' we see a shot of Holloway in-role, slumping into a 
chair apparently joining his fellow residents (fig. 6.5). By incorporating his own 
experience of being left to `vegetate', an almost imperceptible blurring of boundaries 
occurs between his roles as an investigative journalist and as a participant. 
Consequently, Disguises"truthfulness' can rely either upon Holloway's integrity as a 
reporter going to elaborate lengths to uncover `the truth' about community care, or 
alternatively, it can make its case from subjective testimony grounded in lived 
experience. Either way, the view given of conditions in Mayfield Court is 
overwhelmingly negative. But while stark images of neglect such as bare feet might 
appear to indicate that community care is failing the residents, without further 
documentary proof Holloway's truth-claims remain weak. In an effort to supply this 
evidence the programme makers exploit (literally) the appearance of three Mayfield 
Court residents. 
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The extract quoted above, is accompanied by a visual track that `targets' three 
residents in order to confirm Holloway's claim that `there's nothing to do here but 
succumb to one's own delusions' (see figs. 6.1-6.3). They are given no opportunity 
either to confirm or deny his description of their mental health status. Instead, they are 
positioned in a role judged by Holloway to be suitable to their situation: as victims of 
a policy that is failing to protect their mental health. Their inclusion is used to signify 
the inadequacy of community care policy by showing them doing what they 
apparently do every day (tearing paper, standing in one spot against the wall, talking 
to `voices'). In other words, their behaviour is pathologized in order to illustrate the 
extent to which they have been abandoned by a community-based psychiatric system. 
The questionable ethics of this approach is well illustrated in the case of Eric whom 
Holloway engages in conversation immediately after he has been introduced as `the 
schizophrenic who talks to his own voices': 
Holloway: How many times have you seen a doctor since you've been here? 
Eric: I'm all right, I get by without it I'm all righted (unclear). I'm all right. Are you a social 
worker are you? 
Holloway: No I'm a resident. 
The extract is a good illustration of the argument, alluded to earlier, that a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia often results in the patient's personhood being eclipsed. Thus we meet 
`Eric, the schizophrenic who talks to his own voices' rather than Eric the person 
labelled as a `schizophrenic'. The label `schizophrenic' licenses Holloway to treat 
Eric as a patient although he is not now in hospital ('How many times have you seen a 
doctor...? '). As a result, Eric's response that, `I'm alright, I get by without it' jars 
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uncomfortably with Holloway's assumption that he needs medical help. The 
implication is that Eric's claim to be `alright' is mistaken because the `normal' 
reaction to hearing voices is that one should see a doctor. Underlying this, we would 
argue, is a view that Eric's mind is in some way faulty because he is `schizophrenic'. 
In other words, his belief that he is `alright' is a false belief indicating both his 
irrationality and incompetence (to "think straight" about needing medical help). But 
the justification for Holloway's concern is not immediately recognizable as being 
grounded in an assumption about Eric's faulty mind, since it is presented in terms of 
sympathy for Eric's suffering as a voice hearing schizophrenic. We may or may not be 
able to understand what causes Eric's schizophrenic mind to hear voices and harbour 
false beliefs (that he is `alright'), but that is beside the point. In the context of a 
narrative exposing the failing policy of care in the community it is enough to know 
that he is a schizophrenic, hears `voices', and has not seen a doctor. 
Granada, the company that produces Disguises, promoted it as the series that can `get 
to parts of a story others can't reach' (Granada TV publicity material for Disguises, 
March 1993). But as `A Place of Safety' illustrates, wearing a mask in order to 
unmask is an unsatisfactory basis on which to claim a purchase on the real. After all, 
when Holloway replies to Eric's question as to whether he is a social worker, he is 
clearly being economical with the truth. Despite his intermittent first-person testimony 
we never come close to knowing what its actually like to be a schizophrenic living in 
the community. (The best we can hope for is perhaps a voyeuristic pleasure in 
thinking we are seeing something of the experience of the other. ) 
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Tom's Story 
This extract illustrates well our earlier argument, that a diagnosis of schizophrenia 
often results in an eclipse of the person within a frame of mental patienthood. In 
contrast, Tom's Story attempts to foreground the eponymous Tom as someone battling 
to overcome his entry into mental patienthood. In the following extract, Tom's 
mother, June, offers an insight into her son's pre-illness personality: 
June: The man that Tom thought of as a father, we first split up when he was only thirteen and 
Tom was devastated by this. But then unfortunately, and I would take the blame that this 
person kept coming back into our lives for the next few years. And so it only ended erm about 
this time we're talking of, when Tom was becoming very ill. So I think it may not have 
affected certain people but I think Tom has a very thin skin and er a very artistic person. 
Here, Tom's identity as a special kind of personality is signalled, one whose artistic 
tendencies are a clue to the continuities between his pre-illness and post-illness 
personae. Its appearance at an early point in the programme draws on the notion that 
Tom is especially prone to (mental) illness because he is an `artistic person'. The 
description/explanation of him as `very artistic' begins to account for his 
schizophrenic breakdown ('Tom has a very thin skin') whilst hinting that he was 
never completely lost to the illness. Shortly after the extract quoted above, we 
encounter the following sequence: 
Narrator: When Tom started an English degree at Keele University he found the pressures too 
much retreating within himself and neglecting his work. But his mother was amazed to 
discover that he was finding an escape in music. 
June Leader: I was just knocked out by this lad who could just sit there and he'd taught 
himself to read music and play and nobody knew it. He was somehow able to just concentrate 
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on that one sphere of his life and he seemed like he was blocking out all the other awful things 
that were happening to him. 
The story of Tom's `escape' from all the `awful things that were happening to him' is 
essential to the programme's construction of him as an heroic individual. 
Consequently, some account of what exactly was happening to him becomes 
necessary. In the following sequence, Tom and June's testimonies jointly describe his 
voice hearing experiences: 
June: We were coming back in the car and Tom said to me "do you hear voices in the flat 
mum? " And I said, "no Tom II don't hear anything in that flat apart from people around us". 
And he said that just recently he had been hea hearing voices and they were voices that were 
telling him how awful he was. The insults were all directed at himself. 
Tom: The main one was that they would shoot me or cut my fingers off if I played the piano 
again or erm calling me you know insulting me and calling me er calling me a bastard and 
(pause) and erm just being really really cruel, implacably cruel, that's how it seemed to me. I 
thought there were people actually saying these things so I personified these sort of voices in 
my mind. 
June: And if he was in a room it was like they were just outside the window and that he never 
got to sleep because they were there all the time. 
Tom: It was it was really bad [unclear]. It was like being in hell I can imagine. Its having all 
these demons sort of erm tormenting you and torturing you for all the day you know. When 
you slept it was okay but once you got up you'd hear these you'd hear these the voices would 
would start. And you you know I actually felt quite suicidal at one point well a few points so 
I'd never go through with it but II did you know hit my against walls and things like that. 
247 
Experiencing Madness 
The story of Tom's voice hearing is told through a series of binary oppositions in 
which the visual track plays a crucial role. As June's testimony begins we see a shot 
of her and Tom chopping onions whilst talking about remedies for the onions' 
pungent effects (fig. 6.6). As he speaks, the camera cuts to a shot of him using a knife 
to cut onion (6.7). The image track then cuts to a long-range shot of them both, 
revealing the flat's interior (fig. 6.8). At this point, June begins the first of the two 
contributions quoted above. The cut-away signals the beginning of a visual 
exploration of the place where Tom first heard his `voices'. As she begins to speak, 
her testimony coincides with a shot of a miniature bird cage whose position next to a 
photograph casts a shadow over the image in the frame. It is a picture of Tom as a boy 
being carried on his mother's shoulders (fig. 6.9). The meaning is explicit: she is 
recounting the moment when her son's illness rendered him once again dependent on 
her. It confirms a comment made by the programme's narrator at the beginning of the 
programme, `To Tom's mother, June Leader, its [schizophrenia] a burden. She must 
help her son cope to with the condition through his life'. The image of the birdcage 
makes it clear that she is viewed by the programme maker's as much a prisoner of 
schizophrenia as her song. In contrast with June's representation as a mother burdened 
by her son's condition, the next image shows Tom comfortably ensconced in a sitting- 
room drinking and reading. A glow from a lamp behind his head radiates a warm 
sense of domesticity (fig. 6.10). The image appears at the point in the verbal track 
where she says, `And he said that just recently he'd been hearing voices... '. The 
2 That June is represented as a prisoner of her son's illness can be clearly seen in her following 
testimony: `Well, for some time I didn't live live any kind of personal life. For the first months of Tom 
coming out hospital I think we held ourselves up together and sort of hugged together for comfort. 
Perhaps not in a physical sense but we actually were very close in keeping the world out. Gradually, I 
picked up on my life and you get to know who your friends are'. Shortly after this extract, we see June 
setting off in a taxi for a weekend break in London with her boyfriend. The suggestion is that as Tom's 
mental state continues to recover she can become less of a prisoner. 
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tranquillity of the scene stands in strong contrast to June's previous account of Tom's 
voice hearing experiences in the flat. At this point the significance of the earlier image 
of Tom handling the knife becomes clear: he is now able to be trusted with a knife 
(providing his mother is there to supervise him? ). This interpretation draws on the 
myth that schizophrenia is a dangerous condition in which the sufferer cannot 
generally be trusted. In the context of a story preoccupied with his recovery however, 
the ordinariness of the domestic images (chopping onions, relaxing in the flat) signify 
the extent to which Tom has regained his normality. That he is able to use the knife to 
chop onion gains added significance once his first contribution begins. His description 
of the voice that threatened to cut off his fingers if he played the piano suggests that 
during his earlier voice hearing phase, the knife might have been used as a weapon. 
The image of him using the knife "normally" reassures viewers that this is no longer a 
possibility. 
Another significant image is mobilised during both phases of Tom's testimony quoted 
above. As he speaks of the threats issued by his voices we see him seated in front of a 
piano (fig. 6.11). The lid is open and a sheet of music rests on the stand indicating 
that it has recently been played or is about to be played. The image of Tom and the 
piano together, signifies its central role in his recovery. If we return to the 
programme's romantic metanarrative, Tom's heroic struggle against madness reaches 
its crisis point at this particular juncture: `It was like being in hell... Its having all 
these demons... tormenting you and torturing you all the day... '. Following Vladimir 
Propp's influential study of Russian fairy tales, Morphology of the Folktale (first 
published in 1928), we can argue that the piano functions as a magical agent in the 
story of his recovery, a helpful device that allows him to escape from the 
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voices/demons surrounding him. As Tom himself says immediately prior to the 
sequence quoted above: 
Certainly when I was ill II I'd play play a piece that would transport me to another world you 
know. Say if it was a Russian-sounding piece you know I'd be in Moscow with all the snow 
snow flakes coming down. Or a Spanish piece you know I'd be sitting on a beach in Spain or 
something. Music's got a great power to transport you and er it certainly helped me in that 
way. 
The significance of the piano in Tom's Story should not be underestimated. It is 
represented as the principal resource through which his recovery from schizophrenia 
is achieved. Indeed, as he prepares to perform his piano recital, the narrator tells us, 
`It's time for Tom to prove to himself and others that he can overcome his illness'. 
The recital is the key to his victory over illness. 
The final segment of the programme documents the success of his piano recital and, 
by implication, provides proof that he has indeed overcome his illness. We see shots 
of Tom dressed formally for the occasion, smiling and laughing with guests. The next 
images we see are of him performing at the piano (figs. 6.12-6.13). As the images 
appear on screen, the voice track continues thus: 
June: Tom underneath everything is a very gutsy, strong, individual. I feel I'm worried more 
about not his future, but the way people perceive people like Tom. So okay, he may not be the 
Tom Tom was, but another person has emerged no less a person. Tom is different. 
Tom: Well I hope to go back to University now that now that I'm sane and ern and I'll study 
music and I hope in ten years time you know if I like practice a lot every day to be able to be 
er at least er an average concert pianist you know. Its er its one of my ambitions. 
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Tom's Story thus arrives at its resolution. Tom has emerged as `another person' 
(Images of Tom in formal dress confirm this transition). This new person is one 
whose sanity is beyond doubt and whose resurrected personhood revolves around 
ambitions to return to University and become an `average concert pianist'. 
Nonetheless, June's testimony reveals a note of concern. She expresses anxiety not for 
her son's post-illness personality (as in traditional medical accounts of schizophrenia 
where the post-illness person is said to still bear the marks of a "personality 
disintegration") but for his `difference'. In keeping with her representation as a 
mother who must bear the burden of her son's illness she can foresee other, non- 
medical, difficulties arising from the application of the schizophrenic label. This 
however, is beyond the concern of the programme's makers. Their interest is in 
representing Tom as on the verge of a new life in which the future is all that matters. 
Video Diaries: `Mad, Bad or Sad' 
In contrast, `Mad, Bad or Sad', aims to reveal the experience of coping with the after- 
effects of being labelled `schizophrenic'. Consider, for example, Sharon's opening 
address to viewers spoken in voice-over: 
You probably don't think you'll crack up. The chances are you might then you'd be a nutter 
like me. A doctor will give you a label that sticks to you for the rest of your life. Mine was 
schizophrenic. Making this diary was hard sharing all my secrets but I really wanted you to 
see me the person I am behind the label. Most of my life I've spent in institutions until I met 
Mickey. He's a schizophrenic too. Now we live together in Manchester - me, Mickey, my two 
cats and my voices. I hear voices, echoes from my past. This is the root of my madness. 
This perfectly illustrates the remit of Video Diaries: to allow ordinary members of the 
public to tell their own stories in a way that gives us new insights into the `reality' of 
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their situation. For Sharon, her story is one of being permanently marked by the label 
`schizophrenic'. Watching her `diary' however, we are not asked to distance ourselves 
from her but to identify. We are offered a sense of intimate engagement with the 
otherness being portrayed. Sharon's narration draws us into her personal world of 
`Mickey, my two cats and my voices'. The subjective camera and first-person voice- 
over, allow us to view the world entirely through Sharon's eyes: `Making this diary 
was hard but I really want you to see me the person I am behind the label'. This 
intense involvement may have been `hard', but it enables her to explain the `root' of 
her madness from within her own life-world perspective: `I hear voices, echoes from 
my past. This is the root of my madness'. The Video Diaries' format allows Sharon to 
not only set and control her own agenda, but to speak authoritatively and at length 
about the `reality' of her schizophrenic experiences (including her and Mickey's 
interpretation of these experiences). She is able to represent herself as someone whose 
mental competence is not in question. This, for example, is Sharon's first direct piece 
to-camera: 
I don't believe I'm schizophrenic. I think a lot of black people get labelled schizophrenia with 
schizophrenia. My cats love me, I love my cats. Mickey loves me and I love him. The main 
thing is these voices and I hear them about eighty per cent of the day slagging me off winding 
me up, making me depressed. Sometimes they get so bad I have to go to bed and take a 
sleeping tablet and go to sleep but they wake me up, the voices. 
What is immediately apparent here is Sharon's seemingly incongruous belief that she 
is not schizophrenic coupled with her open admission that she hears voices `about 
eighty per cent of the day'. One might interpret this as evidence of her lack of insight 
into the nature of her condition. Indeed, one might go further and suggest that it is 
evidence of a `faulty' schizophrenic mind that is unable to recognise (or rationalize) 
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the `obvious' correspondence between her psychiatrist's diagnosis of schizophrenia 
and her own experience of hearing `voices'. However, the Video Diaries' format 
depends on diarists giving their own view of their world. All that matters is Sharon's 
opinion; that she is not schizophrenic, but that she hears `voices'. Because of the 
insistence on individual diarists testifying to their experience and telling their stories 
`Mad, Bad or Sad' is able to 
competence/incompetence. 
side-step the issue of Sharon's 
Unlike the other programmes selected for analysis, `Mad, Bad or Sad' offers a deeply 
personal account of what it's like to be a schizophrenic. Even so, we are only able to 
glimpse fragments of a life lived with a diagnosis of schizophrenia rather than a 
schizophrenic life. The distinction is important because we also witness aspects of 
Sharon's life in which her schizophrenic label is not a defining characteristic of her 
experience. For example, Sharon and Mickey spend her birthday at Blackpool 
Pleasure Beach and we see them both having fun on the rides and eating candyfloss - 
in other words, doing `normal' things. Nevertheless, her schizophrenic life does 
occupy a significant proportion of the programme. In the following extract she 
explains her daily drug regime to viewers: 
Sharon (talking to-camera whilst taking boxes of tablets out of her medicine cupboard): These 
are my tablets. I'm on eleven a day. I'm on this one, Carbamazipine, which is for a mood 
disorder and I take this one three times a day and it makes me tired. I also take Procyclidine 
for the side-effects of the injection that's four times a day. What else? I'm also on these tablets 
for migraine called Migrelief. Prothiadine yer, that's an anti-depressant and Largactyl which is 
er its full name is Chlorpromazine Hydrochloride, it's an anti-psychotic and I take that at night 
and Mellerill. This is Mellerill. No that's Largactyl - well Largactyl and Mellerill are similar 
and I take four of those a day. And that's about it. (pause) I feel drugged up most of the time. 
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By filming the contents of her medicine cabinet, and explaining to-camera what her 
drugs are prescribed for, this sequence signals the extent to which Sharon herself 
considers drugs to be a defining feature of her everyday life. A more `professional' 
telling of her story might have resulted in re-shooting the moment when she gets 
confused over whether her drugs are Largactyl or Mellerill. In the Diary context 
however, her confusion underlines her difficulty in trying to cope with so many drugs 
The amateur and obviously inexperienced way in which she finishes telling us about 
her medication (`And that's about it') jars with the significance of her final comment: 
`I feel drugged up most of the time'. Having just recited a long list of drugs this 
poignant comment - delivered in a tone that suggests it is as much a private reflection 
on her situation than a deliberate `public' expression of how she feels - conveys very 
strongly how Sharon experiences her daily life. 
Video Diaries' thus enables Sharon's feelings and emotions about medication to be 
articulated in the public domain. The programme's format also provides space for 
topics outside the traditionally defined area of current affairs interest. Consider, for 
example, the following sequence from `Mad, Bad Or Sad': 
Sharon (speaking in voice-over whilst the visual track shows her receiving an injection): 
Every two weeks I get an injection of Depixol. Mickey gets one every month. He says it helps 
him but it doesn't work for me. I suppose the way they [psychiatrists] see it, I'm so drugged 
up I can't give them any trouble. (pause) But it just leaves me with no energy for life at all, 
then because I'm bored the voices I hear get worse. 
At this point the visual track changes to a shot of Mickey speaking direct to-camera 
Mickey (speaking to-camera): The psychiatrist is the expert and if he says your aa 
schizophrenic for example, you you believe him and you don't see yourself in the same way 
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any more. It changes your whole life by simply saying that word. And experts are not always 
right. Sha Sharon has has thought of herself as being ill since she was thirteen years old but 
because she thought she was ill she did mad things er. II did mad things because I thought I 
was ill. I did more mad things after the like the label from the psychiatrist was put upon me 
than II did before. II feel really that that psychiatry attacked me in in in retrospect. III felt 
that they no well the best word is attacked. They they they er set about me with their expertise 
and its taken me years and years to get back to normal you know. 
At this point the visual track cuts to footage of Sharon and Mickey entering a building 
and congregating with other people. 
Sharon (speaking in voice-over): Every week we go to the Manchester Hearing Voices group. 
These groups are starting up all over the country. (pause) Many people who come here are 
outside the psychiatric system. They're not diagnosed schizophrenic but they hear voices too. 
(pause) It's a self-help group with no professionals. Because we all hear voices it makes it 
easier to talk about them. My voices are bad memories, personalities from my past who call 
me wog, black bastard, coon and whore. 
Sharon and Mickey3 take advantage of their editorial prerogative to voice their 
distrust of psychiatric professionals. In the context of another programme format, 
Sharon's interpretation of her Depixol injection might easily be mobilised as evidence 
of her "faulty" mental state (that she is "paranoid" about her medication). But in the 
context of her diary, her interpretation stands as an accurate reflection of what she 
feels to be true. Similarly, Mickey's view that psychiatry `attacked' him with its 
`expertise' is presented as a legitimate opinion in the sense that it expresses what he 
feels. As we noted in Chapter Two, Video Diaries revolves around the viewpoint of 
3 In `Mad. Bad Or Sad' Mickey is continuously involved in all aspects of recording `diary' material to I 
the extent that he functions virtually as a co-diarist 
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its diarists and allows them to present their own arguments in their own words and in 
their own way. Despite what others might make of Sharon and Mickey's views, the 
fact that they interpret psychiatry in this way is what they themselves think. As 
Kilborn (1994: 437) puts it: `Not only does the diarist have editorial control over what 
is shown, but also the material screened makes a special claim on our attention, since 
it represents an attempt on the subject's part to come to terms with events in, or 
aspects of, their lives which they consider significant' (emphasis in the original). At 
the very least, when watching `Mad, Bad Or Sad' we are forced to acknowledge 
(though not necessarily concur with) the fact that both Sharon and Mickey distrust the 
very people charged with their care. 
Video Diaries' ability to raise political and social questions within an access format 
has been welcomed by some commentators as an important contribution to 
democratizing the public sphere. The series' use of verite-style footage, detailed 
personal experience, and vernacular modes of reportage have brought into public view 
many `alternative' or marginal issues. `Mad, Bad Or Sad' contributes to this tradition 
by touching on the contested terrain of voice hearing and psychiatric intervention. As 
we noted in Chapter Three, many voice hearers reject medical intervention preferring 
to interpret the meaning of their voices from within their own lived experience. In the 
final part of the sequence above Sharon does precisely this. `My voices', she tell us, 
`are bad memories, personalities from my past who call me wog, black bastard, coon 
and whore'. The series' insistence upon the integrity of personal points of view means 
that she can interpret her voices in this way without fear of challenge or contradiction. 
However, the representation of Sharon's personal perspective cannot be properly 
understood without acknowledging that Video Diaries is also a professionally-assisted 
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documentary. Accompanying her final contribution above is footage of Sharon's 
participation in the Hearing Voices group. Watching the footage we are offered a 
sense of intimate engagement with the `otherness' being portrayed. The image track 
cuts to different members of the group as they speak about their voices (figs. 6.14- 
6.16). Sharon's comments concerning the meaning of her voices ('My voices are bad 
memories, personalities from my past... ') are spoken contemporaneously with footage 
of her participating in the group (fig. 6.17). Although her voice-over has been 
recorded during the editing stage it complements the action of the image track (her 
being in the group) and connects her description of her own voices to the supportive 
context of the group. Here, the marks of professional intent are apparent. Immediately 
Sharon's commentary concludes, another member of the Hearing Voices group is 
shown (fig. 6.18) speaking thus: 
Hearing Voices group participant: What I see it as I don't see it as another person's voice, I 
see it as myself talking to myself inside my head and I can hear that. And if I'm in a bad mood 
then I can wind myself up and I can be on the edge of a bridge thinking I hate I hate you, I'm 
gonna throw you off the bridge you know like. That is going through my mind kind of thing. 
But then I stop and I have control over the voices cos then I think its only me talking to 
myself, so its only me that has to deal with it really. 
The extract quoted above concerns the individual's idiosyncratic understanding of her 
voices. Its inclusion at this point in the programme forms part of a broader obligation 
to Sharon, to ensure that her perspective as a voice hearer is understood. Here, the 
camcorder itself comes into view. Our engagement with Sharon's view of the world is 
mediated through the camera. As Dovey (1996: 121) points out, `The camera is 
actually an accepted part of the event itself, neither outside, controlling and 
structuring, nor inside lost in the flow, but mediating for us between these positions'. 
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Video Diaries fig. 6.14 
Video Diaries fig. 6.15 
Video Diaries fig. 6.16 
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Video Diaries fig. 6.17 
Video Diaries fig. 6.18 
Experiencing Madness 
Thus, the subjectivity mobilised here is more a product of the programme's form 
rather than what a particular diarist might say. 
Video Diaries also gives diarists an opportunity to speak at length, in the context of 
their everyday routines, and at times chosen by themselves. The value of this flexible 
mode of self-presentation can be seen in the following two, separate, pieces to camera 
made by Mickey. The first is delivered in an armchair, the second whilst having a 
bath. 
If I go in to a pub er and and I say er well II had a nervous breakdown. I [unclear] spent some 
time in hospital you know then people are likely to say "oh yes, John had a nervous 
breakdown' and "somebody's wife had a nervous breakdown" or or even, "I've had a nervous 
breakdown myself'. But but if you go into a pub and say er, "Well I'm a schizophrenic", if 
you even mention the word it's not gonna be forgotten. It's a terrible word er socially er. I 
mean schizophrenic's run about with axes you know according to public opinion you know. I 
mean it's the the media that's painted it like that. But er it's not something you admit to, it's 
not something you admit to you know. There's very little sympathy for anyone described as a 
schizophrenic. 
Well some people would say you live the life of bloody Riley because you get that little bit 
extra cos you're on the sick you know rather than just being unemployed. But er there's a 
price to pay you know. I mean if if you end up in the loony bin you know somewhere in your 
head that erm you're being talked about cos you know that erm when you were out there 
before you got that label well you were one of them. You'd be talking about people. You'd be 
saying, "oh, such and such is in the loony bin" you know. "A right nutter" and all this you 
know. I mean if if you were to mention it to your shrink he'd probably say you were paranoid. 
But I know. I know what we used to say about people and II know the jokes that were made. 
And consequently, II know the jokes that are made about me and Shaz. 
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Such pieces to camera enable diarists' to reflect upon aspects of their life within the 
context of their domestic milieu. They give diarists' an opportunity to speak at length 
on issues that are (usually) ignored by other current affairs formats. Thus, both pieces 
quoted above enable Mickey to reflect on the stigma of a schizophrenic label. Being 
tainted by the label `schizophrenic' is an experience that many of those diagnosed feel 
strongly about, but is rarely articulated in the public domain. Even though the label 
refers to a bona fide mental illness it nevertheless carries with it a whole set of 
negative assumptions about the person thus labelled. For Mickey, its application has 
meant that he prefers not to admit socially that he is a schizophrenic since it carries 
with it all sorts of pejorative assumptions. His antipathy towards the label is 
predicated on a feeling that he is "less of a person" because of his diagnosis, a feeling 
shared by Tom in Tom's Story: 
Tom: I never thought of schizophrenia as being you know an easy thing. I've learnt yer you do 
find who your friends are, who are your real friends you know, not just fair-weather friends. 
Because because of the er nature of the illness it it does carry a lot of stigma. It's like 
admitting that you're a homosexual or you've got AIDS, it's one of those kind of things. 
The experience of being labelled `schizophrenic' from the schizophrenic's point of 
view has rarely been explored in the psychiatric literature (The work of Barham 
(1992) and Pilgrim et al (1993) being notable exceptions). In the era of community 
care however, this is profoundly unsatisfactory since the effects of a `schizophrenic 
identity' impinges on the lives of many now living in the community. 
In the second of the two extracts quoted above, Mickey expresses his dislike for the 
schizophrenic label based on his pre-illness experience of judging people according to 
their status as a mental patient. The candid nature of his testimony draws on the 
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popular terminology used to exclude schizophrenics from social life. Instead of 
avoiding derogatory words such as "nutter" and "loony bin" however, he deliberately 
appropriates them in order to contest the validity of such (mis)representations. 
Moreover, by playing with the `shrink/paranoid' joke he signals how his own pre- 
illness attitude towards the mentally ill impacts on his present schizophrenic identity. 
He is talking to viewers as a `schizophrenic', but also as someone ingrained within a 
culture that sees schizophrenics as different. The apparent deficiency of the 
schizophrenic ("A right nutter... ") is turned on its head and becomes the deficiency of 
society at large; one that fails to recognise their humanity. As his testimony concludes, 
the image track cuts to a shot of Sharon asleep with a cat lying on her. The image of 
vulnerability this conveys adds to the poignancy of Mickey's acknowledgement that 
they are seen by others as abnormal. The final message of the Diary thus appears to 
be: "There but for the grace of God go I". 
Horizon: 'Hearing Voices' 
However, it is not only an access format like Video Diaries that can allow voice 
hearers extended space to talk about their experience of being labelled. Consider the 
following sequence from the Horizon programme, `Hearing Voices': 
Narrator: Alan Leader's first encounter with the mental health system began after he was 
continually distracted by voices as a child. His mother took him to see a psychiatrist. 
Alan Leader: He just sat there with a pipe and just [pause] an empty pipe, I always remember 
him having an empty pipe, and sucking air through this pipe. "Hmmm, aha, hmmm, hmm, 
interesting, aha, hmm". And I thought to myself "what's this pratt talking about" you know. 
"This is the worse than the voices this guy. He's just sitting there, he's just patronising me" 
you know. He said to my mother he said to my mother, "I think this guy's got a problem". 
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And my I remember my mother said, "well of course he's got a problem, that's why we're 
here" you know. "I don't need you to tell me he's got a problem, that's why we're herel" 
"Hmmm, interesting" you know. So the next thing I [unclear] happened after that is I ended up 
in er an adolescent adolescent unit in a psychiatric hospital in Hill End in St. Albans. And er 
well my psychiatric career started really. [emphasis in the original] 
Alan Leader's testimony is forthright in its contempt for the orthodox psychiatric 
labelling process. His condemnation of the `patronising" psychiatrist who interviewed 
him ('... what's this pratt talking about... This is worse than the voices this guy. ') 
underlines the programme's rejection of orthodox psychiatry. His account of the 
psychiatrist's assessment forms part of the programme makers' attempts to represent 
voice hearing as a phenomenon unamenable to traditional medical 
interpretation/intervention. Against the prevailing psychiatric assumption that 
auditory hallucinations are devoid of significance, the argumentative orientation of 
`Hearing Voices' constitutes voice hearing as an inherently meaningful experience. 
Consider for example, the testimony of voice hearer, Susan Clarkson: 
Susan Clarkson: I had a small cleaning job and I used to go clean at this private house. And 
one day I was there cleaning and I were vacuuming up er and I heard this voice sort of like aa 
thought you know not an actual voice and it said, "whose she? ". Then a moment later it began 
to talk to me again and it said erm "you don't know who you are do you? " and er I was 
thinking at the time a furniture polisher (laughs), what room I was gonna clean next and er it 
didn't fit into my thought pattern at all and er I can remember thinking what is this you know, 
what is this happening to me. I was in utter despair about myself and confusion you know er 
and there were situations in my life at that time. I were having problems er with me older 
children er and with me husband and erm the feelings that were there underneath er about my 
neighbour were feelings of anger what I'd subdued and I tried to be a nice neighbour and this 
anger come from nowhere er just in my very being you know towards her. Over a matter of 
months er things had been happening like her dog was coming round and whoopsying all over 
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the garden and I had small children and was worried about it. The voices sort of said "you 
know what she's like" erm "if you don't do anything your children could become ill" we this 
erm you know muck that's around and various other things and they made me feel inadequate 
as a mother because I'd let it go er and they were on and on at me constantly erm solid for 
about 24 hours. I didn't get any sleep er until erm the following day they were on at me again 
and again. And then finally in the early hours of the morning I went round you know and er 
smashed the windows and hurled abuse and become very violent and everything you know 
which really wasn't me you know. II didn't have any sense as though I were in control er and 
then there were this sudden realisation of oh my God!, you know, what have I done? 
[emphasis in the original] 
Susan's testimony is mobilised mid-way through the programme in order to illustrate 
the complex social dynamics underpinning her particular voice hearing experience. 
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of her testimony is that she is allowed to articulate 
at length the stresses in her domestic life in the weeks and months prior to the onset of 
her voices: `... there were situations in my life at that time. I were having problems 
with er me older children and er with me husband... ' and `... things had been 
happening like her dog was coming round and whoopseying all over the garden. I had 
small children.. '. However, while Susan is given an extensive opportunity to talk 
about the content of her voices in the context of her life-experiences, what 
distinguishes her testimony from Sharon's in Video Diaries is that control over how it 
is presented remains firmly in the hands of professional programme makers. So, 
although personal testimony is a prominent feature of `Hearing Voices', the lived 
experience of voice hearing is not the programme's central concern. Instead, it draws 
back to an `outer' ring of expert interest in voice hearing and which effectively 
relegates experiential discourse to a subordinate position. This can be clearly seen in 
the sequence immediately following Susan's testimony quoted above: 
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Narrator: Susan Clarkson was arrested later that night and spent some weeks in a psychiatric 
hospital. If she'd had the chance to talk about her voices before things had got out of hand 
could events have taken a different course? 
Professor Marius Romme (identified by caption as Professor of Social Psychiatry, University 
of Limburg): There the danger always is that people always say yer when people want to kill 
somebody and the voices tell him to kill somebody, I think the best thing is to accept that the 
person has a voice and who tells him to kill a person. Because if I talk about that we can also 
talk about how to prevent that happens because the person also says it's not me telling me to 
kill somebody but it's somebody else. So we acknowledge that it's somebody else but its very 
important to get much more defence against that other person in your head who tells you to 
kill. And in that sense we can make a joint venture to prevent that killing [unclear] from 
happening. If we don't do that the voice keeps on telling that he has to kill and then this 
person lives forever on a [unclear]'vhich on a certain moment might get out of control and 
then he kills somebody. So not talking is much more dangerous than talking. I have never met 
somebody who did some aggressive things after explorative talking about it but always with 
people who never got a chance of talking. [emphasis in the original] 
Dr. Adrianne Reveley (identified by caption as Consultant Psychiatrist, Maudsley Hospital): I 
think messages that people when people are seriously ill and have messages that they should 
harm someone else or kill somebody else I think that that is a very serious area indeed. And I 
don't believe that relying on psychological intervention erm is a very good thing at all. I 
would be very worried trying to persuade somebody that they shouldn't do it by exploring 
their voices erm because I believe that alternative reality is something that we we're not there 
with the person. We don't know what's affecting them from minute to minute and while you 
might well be able to persuade somebody that really they don't need er to kill their mother, if 
you're leaving them alone with their mother then for weeks on end erm, the alternative reality 
may well come back in in full force and your words of of advice and and explanation may 
well be gone. So I think it's a very serious area indeed. 
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Narrator: Its two years since Susan Clarkson left hospital. She's actively trying to promote 
awareness and understanding about voice hearing in her area and the hospital now refers voice 
hearers to her for support. Does she understand now what drove her to act as she did? 
Susan Clarkson: A lot of the emotion was the frustration and the desperation of not knowing if 
it was real, what was real and what wasn't real erm. Because I were I knew it was real, that the 
voices were real. I never doubted that they were real because I were experiencing them er. I 
know that sounds pretty bizarre but I mean when you're experiencing something you know 
that it's real whatever level people want to measure that er and this was erm And I just 
nobody would understand or taken it on board er and that's really when the desperation set in. 
[emphasis in the original] 
Professor Richard Bentall (identified by caption as Professor of Clinical Psychology, 
Liverpool University): If I'm confronted with a patient who says, and I have been confronted 
with patient's who say, er that the voice for example is asking them to assault somebody or 
attack somebody or perhaps even kill somebody, then er I can pay attention to the voice and I 
can encourage the patient to pay attention to the voice without encouraging them to do what 
the voice says erm. An important point to make to people who hear voices under these 
circumstances is that there's a difference between erm understanding the content of one's own 
thoughts and where one's own thoughts come from, and just following them. 
In this sequence Susan's voice is rendered less important than other `expert' voices. 
Her account of the onset of her voices during a period of intense stress is revealed as a 
prelude to professional disagreement about the pros and cons of focusing on the 
content of auditory hallucinations. The narrator's opening question ('If she'd had a 
chance to talk about her voices before things had got out of hand could events have 
taken a different course? ') is directed, not to Susan, but towards those deemed to 
know about such matters - i. e., psychiatrist's such as Professor Romme and Dr. 
Reveley. Susan herself is not given an opportunity to respond to the question which, 
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by implication, signals that she does not have an answer (or that others have a more 
informed answer). Consequently, her account of hearing voices and becoming violent 
is deemed to be the intellectual and professional property of psychiatry. In other 
words, her testimony becomes a case-study of voice hearing/aggression, an 
introduction to conflicting medical opinions. Despite the programme's sympathetic 
orientation to the voice hearing experience then, the experience itself is ultimately less 
important than discussion of the therapeutic strategies designed to overcome them. 
Although `Hearing Voices' accepts Susan's experience of the voices ('I never doubted 
that they were real because I were experiencing them') it situates it within a discourse 
of professional support for psychological intervention. Thus, in Professor's Romme 
and Bentall's contributions the emphasis is on how to help patient's communicate 
with their voices in order to cope with them. Susan's contribution is framed within the 
parameters established by their expertise and confirms the value of `talking' about 
voices vis-ä-vis Reveley's medical (op)position. The narrator's second question 
provides an opportunity for her to give her unqualified support for "talking therapy" 
('Does she understand now what drove her to act as she did? ) which she duly 
provides. Her participation at this point is not only designed to add weight to 
Romme's argument that to ignore the content of a voice hearer's voices is potentially 
dangerous. It is used to undermine Reveley's opposition to the talking approach: `... 
nobody would understand or take it on board... and that's really when the desperation 
set in. '. The impression given by the programme maker's is that they value the 
psychological approach because it prioritises voice hearers' own interpretation and 
understanding of their voices over that of the traditional medical approach. But in 
order to illustrate this for viewers, they have to subordinate the testimony of voice 
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hearer's to those of expert speakers. The irony of this situation is perfectly illustrated 
in our final extract: 
Ron Coleman (speaking whilst participating in a Hearing Voices self-help group): [unclear] 
yer, especially in psychiatry. They kept on saying it wasn't really happening, ignore it and it'll 
go away. And I was thinking it's not going way. So yer you do get angry but I think that anger 
is sometimes justified erm. It's [pause] to deny anybody's experience is bound to create anger. 
Dr. Phil Thomas (identified by caption as Consultant Psychiatrist and Senior Lecturer, 
University of Wales): It seems to me really that erm one thing that the Hearing Voice Hearing 
Voice network is saying is that "these are our experiences, for God's sake treat them with 
respect". And what we have to do is to say to people who hear voices, "here you are, they're 
your experiences. Let's see what sense you can make out of them with our help". 
In this extract, Ron Coleman's position is clearly stated: `to deny anybody's 
experience is bound to create anger'. In the context of the programme's argumentative 
orientation it registers as an appeal that the voices of voice hearer's be heard. But 
instead of allowing Ron's appeal to stand on its own merits, the programme insists on 
maintaining the link between voice hearing and psychiatry. So, although Dr. Thomas 
hands the voice hearing experience back to voice hearer's, he does so on condition 
that psychiatry remains centrally involved in the process of helping them make sense 
of their experiences. While this may be a suitable arrangement for Dr Thomas, the 
question of how his benevolence is interpreted by voice hearer's themselves is not 
explored. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter the voices of diagnosed schizophrenic's feature prominently. Across a 
range of TV programmes, public discourse about mental illness includes the 
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testimonies of people whose experiences have historically rendered them alien and 
incommunicado. However, while the (temporary? ) restoration of schizophrenic's into 
the community means that new channels of communication with them are opened, the 
legacy of their mental patienthood looms large. In giving accounts of their 
experiences, people with a history of mental illness continue to be confronted with 
entrenched perceptions of their incompetence and vulnerability vis-A-vis "normal" 
people. In this sense, the traditional relationship between schizophrenic and 
psychiatrist, in which the latter sees only illness, is reproduced in contemporary 
relations between schizophrenic's and professional programme makers. It would be 
naive though, to advocate that schizophrenics should be given unmediated access to 
the airwaves as if this could restore a century's habit of not listening to the mad. Some 
people with a diagnosis of schizophrenia are more able to speak for and represent 
themselves than others with the same diagnosis. So, while the German literary critic 
Walter Benjamin's view that "experience is the source of all authority" has a ring of 
truth, it clearly does not hold up in all cases. In the case of people with a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia, their experiences appear to be the very source of that which puts their 
authority as speakers into doubt. 
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Introduction: Discourse and Imagery 
`Television's ability to produce moving images, live or recorded, is clearly the single most 
important defining feature of it as a medium' (Corner 1995: 13). 
Acknowledging television as a visual medium immediately renders one open to the 
accusation of courting banality. The reply is usually swift and direct: of course 
television is a visual medium. That is why it is called television! Nonetheless, 
academic study of television's `most important defining feature' remains surprisingly 
undeveloped. This is curious because in other ways the analysis of television as a 
significatory system is very well developed within the humanities and social sciences 
(see for example the range of perspectives in Allen (ed. ) 1992). One of the most 
fruitful avenues of recent enquiry has been the use of `discourse analytical' 
perspectives. These view television - along with other social institutions such as 
courtrooms or doctors surgeries - as an important site of discursive activity in which 
participants' talk is mobilised for particular argumentative or rhetorical purposes (see 
Fairclough, 1995; Tolson, 1995). 
Critical discourse analysis is closely bound up with the study of ideology. It is 
important to view discourse and ideology in conjunction since even in an increasingly 
image saturated cultural system, language remains the principal medium of ideology. 
As John Thompson notes, `The analysis of ideology is fundamentally concerned with 
language, for language is the principal medium of the meaning (signification) which 
serves to sustain relations of domination' (Thompson 1984: 131). Consequently, 
analysis of television (and other media) discourses is in large part the analysis of 
expressions and utterances considered within the framework of a general critique of 
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ideology. However, in discursively analysing television's ideologically constructed 
messages there is a tendency to operate with a linguistically grounded conception of 
`text'. This has led to a marked neglect of the role of visual images in organising and 
conveying meaning. Murdock (1994: 114) summarises the problem thus: 
Most work on discourse, including most writing on television's handling of social issues, 
treats it as a purely linguistic phenomenon, analysing the utterances of participants and 
interviewees and the questions and comments of the programme's presenters. This misses the 
obvious but decisive point that television is also a visual medium. Arguments and debates 
therefore proceed along two dimensions: the voice track which operates as a sequence of turn 
taking and the image track which works by juxtaposition acrd association. [my emphasis] 
This privileging of language over image is all the more surprising when one considers 
for example, the degree to which a non-fictional television programme's' arguments 
are anchored in the accompanying imagery. Consequently, `an analysis of television 
[form] will not get very far if it fails to keep alert to television's visualisations' 
(Corner, ibid: 14). Recent developments in actuality television (such as the 
deployment of secretly shot footage, the use of verite material, or dramatic re- 
enactment's) have tended to re-emphasise the visual in relation to the verbal 
presenting the `dramatic' aspects of events as both the central communicative feature 
of the programme and, increasingly, the prime guarantor of its `truth claims'. Thus, 
whilst not wishing to overstate the prevalence of clandestinely shot images within the 
television system as a whole, the emergence of new (or partially new) modes of 
visualizing actuality do underline the importance of image analysis as a central 
component of television analysis. 
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The case-study presented thus far has confirmed the importance of visual images in 
television's representation of mental health issues on several occasions. In the 
previous two chapters the study of `form' in relation to `content' has meant attending 
to the visual and aural `shape' of particular programmes. In this chapter, the form- 
content relationship is further explored by giving primacy to the role of visual images 
of mental illness. Exploring the visual depiction of mental illness on television offers 
us an opportunity to reconnect contemporary images of madness to those of earlier 
times. For example, the idea that the mad look different from other people mobilises 
artistic conventions for depicting madness developed over many centuries. Such 
depictions are not necessarily accurate, however. In the context of our argument that 
mentally ill people have difficulties being taken seriously in the public space of 
broadcasting, they may even be unhelpful. In television programmes, claims to 
plausibility and authority depend as much on what speakers look like as on what they 
say (Murdock, 1994b). Consequently, visual images of mental illness need careful 
attention if we are to properly understand the circumstances surrounding mentally ill 
people's access to a public voice. 
Representing Schizophrenia as 'Difference' 
Sander Gilman's work on images of madness (see Chapter Four) provides a useful 
point of entry into television's depiction of mental illness. Following Gilman, we can 
ask how TV programmes involving schizophrenia represent visually what is basically 
an unobservable mental phenomenon such that viewers can recognise that 
schizophrenia is what is being portrayed. For many programme makers 
communicating the condition is not just a question of accessing grounded testimony 
about the experience of being ill. It is often a matter of visualising that experience, of 
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imaging the illness so that viewers can see what it looks like. This representational 
challenge links contemporary television producers (and other visual artists) to painters 
and sculptors in earlier centuries. The idea that schizophrenia can be visualized invites 
consideration as to how this is achieved across a range of TV programmes. To this 
end, images of mental illness from four of the sample programmes are considered. 
The programmes are: `Tom's Story'; `Mad, Sad or Bad' (Video Diaries), `A Place of 
Safety' (Disguises); and 'Whose Mind Is It Anyway' (Panorama). 
Tom's Story 
We begin with an image from Tom's Story (fig. 7.1). It will be recalled that the 
programme is an account of Tom's schizophrenic breakdown and his recovery 
through music. The image is taken from the opening scene and shows Tom playing 
the piano surrounded by darkness. However, it is only later, when the story of his 
breakdown is being told, that the meaning of the image becomes apparent. It is a 
visual metaphor for the schizophrenic illness that once engulfed him. The darkness 
surrounding Tom is the `other world' of schizophrenia, a world that for him holds a 
particular terror: `It [schizophrenia] was... really bad. It was like... being in hell... Its 
having all these demons... tormenting you and torturing you for all the day'. In order 
for viewers to understand the significance of the image however (i. e. the degree to 
which his `demons' engulfed and disabled him), it is necessary to underline the 
difference between his `other' (schizophrenic) self and his present ('recovered') self. 
Consequently, the second half of the programme is taken up with a series of vignettes 
in which Tom's recovery is conveyed visually and verbally in relation to his ability to 
now do the "normal" things that he was incapable of doing during his illness. 
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For example, in one sequence Tom is shown riding on a bus (fig. 7.2). The narrator's' 
voice-over tells viewers that as his illness intensified, `living a normal life became 
impossible'. Tom, speaking whilst on the bus, then explains the significance of the 
bus journey: 
Tom: Well, I used to hear voices on buses er. People were talking, they'd be talking about me 
er. I used to get paranoid about it and it became very distressing so I decided to to walk into 
town and back again. But now its fine you know, its just like getting on a bus. It's just 
ordinary. 
In another sequence, he is shown in a bookshop (fig. 7.3). Again, he explains the 
significance of the context in which he is speaking: 
Tom: During the sort of the heyday of my illness, you know its, when it was full, when its 
rampancy was full, I wouldn't have been able to come out to a bookshop. I would have been 
too, I would have been too apprehensive of of er of the voices and er and the paranoia as well. 
The story of Tom's recovery is told in a series of images in which the difference 
between `now' and `then' conveys the extent of his recovery. Such a binary mode of 
representation however, presents difficulties in terms of fully conveying what it was 
actually like for him to be suffering from schizophrenia `then'. The problem is how to 
retrospectively depict Tom's illness. To overcome this Tom's Story draws upon a 
well-established narrative device for re-presenting past events -a diary - in this case, 
one written by Tom's mother, June, in which she recorded the events of his 
breakdown as it happened. Her account provides retrospective access to the day that 
Tom's illness reached its climax. Through a combination of visual imagery (Tom 
sitting at a piano surrounded by darkness) and a diary reading from June, the depth of 
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Tom's breakdown is revealed. The image of Tom at the piano is juxtaposed with 
June's testimony: 
June: This episode that I have recorded in my diary was really when his illness reached crisis 
point and so this is Sunday 20th December 1992. He is quite groggy on the tablets but after a 
first few days he began to seem a little bit more lively. But on Thursday night he said the 
voices were very loud and aggressive and as we were sitting in my room he started beating his 
head with his fist. He's actually answering the voices back. This is really awful for both of us. 
As June begins to speak we see Tom's hands playing the piano. At the point she says, 
`He is quite groggy.. ', the image track cuts to a shot of Tom deep in concentration 
(fig. 7.4). The camera moves slowly in towards him and then pans outwards into the 
darkness above his head at the very moment June describes how `voices' caused Tom 
to beat his head with his hands (fig. 7.5). The symbolism of the darkness achieves its 
full effect when she says: `He's actually answering the voices back'. At this point the 
camera moves deeper into the darkness until that is all that the viewer sees (fig. 7.6). 
We are now immersed in the darkness of Tom's schizophrenic world. Through a 
combination of June's diary-based testimony and the symbolism of the darkness, the 
viewer is drawn into the private, `other-world' of schizophrenia, a world to which 
only sufferers and their families usually have access. In this way, Tom and June's 
inner emotions are given public expression both verbally and visually. This way of 
organising the narrative of Tom's Story forcefully conveys to viewers what Tom was 
like during the worst moments of his illness. In order that his recovery from 
schizophrenia can be fully appreciated (indeed, celebrated) the programme makers 
must show its extent. Simply telling viewers that Tom is a recovered schizophrenic 
does not adequately convey the special nature of his recovery. The point of recounting 
the story of his breakdown is that viewers can see for themselves the degree to which 
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he has emerged out of the darkness of schizophrenia and is once again amongst "us", 
being 'normal'. However, his journey back is signalled by much more than his ability 
to perform ordinary tasks. Tom's return to 'normality' is underlined by his extra- 
ordinary ability to perform a public piano recital in order to publicise the issue of 
schizophrenia. According to the narrator, this event will signal his full recovery from 
the illness: `Its time for Tom to prove to himself and to others that he can overcome 
his illness'. No longer is he playing the piano alone, surrounded by darkness. Instead, 
he is performing publicly, in the full glare of lights and in front of an audience (fig. 
7.7). He has emerged into the light and become one of "us" again (fig. 7.8). 
Tom's Story is a reworking of the long-standing myth of the mad as travellers, a myth 
which still enjoys considerable currency in Western representations of madness. For 
example, the recent and critically acclaimed film, Shine (1996) recounts the story of 
David Helfgott, a brilliant pianist, whose schizophrenic breakdown and recovery 
closely resembles the narrative construction of Tom's Story. A number of themes from 
Tom's Story and Shine overlap: the idea that madness and artistic genius are entwined; 
the revelation that both Tom and David could play the piano brilliantly throughout 
their illness; their heroic 'recovery' symbolised by a public piano recital. The film's 
title, Shine, captures the notion that Helfgott has emerged from the darkness of his 
madness/schizophrenia and that his musical genius (indeed his very humanity) 
`shines' through intact. Shine does however convey a sense that Helfgott remains 
different, but that it is his genius that marks him out, not his madness. Tom is 
presented as `different' as a result of his journey through madness. As Tom's mother 
puts it during film of the piano recital: 
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`[H]e may not be the Tom Tom was, but another person has emerged, no less a person. Tom is 
different'. 
Paradoxically, her acknowledgement that Tom is different overrides earlier attempts 
to show that he is now `normal'. However, the precise meaning of this `difference' is 
something that the programme maker's leave unresolved. His difference may be a 
consequence either of his illness or of his musical talent, or a combination of the two. 
It is this ambivalence about Tom's `difference' which unites Tom's Story with Video 
Diaries. 
Video Diaries: 'Mad, Bad or Sad? ' 
Sharon's Diary, `Mad, Bad Or Sad? ', is presented as a search for her mother who 
gave her up for fostering as a baby and whom she has never met. Sharon identifies the 
trauma caused by this as a source of mental distress: `I hear voices, echoes from my 
past, this is the root of my madness. This diary is a journey from where it all started 
and it's a search for the mother I've never seen'. The implication is that by exploring 
the circumstances of her adoption and perhaps meeting her mother, she might be able 
to lay to rest those 'voices' from her past which torment her present. The notion that 
Sharon is a traveller/explorer is drawn upon throughout her diary as she takes viewers 
on a journey back to significant places in her personal development: a family home in 
which she was fostered as a child; the asylum where she was institutionalized as a 
mental patient; the prison she was sent to following an arson attack as a cry for help. 
By showing these places she provides a visual map that pinpoints the principal 
settings of her unfolding `career' as a schizophrenic. Consequently, the possibility that 
her diary has been purposefully (i. e. professionally) constructed in the form of a 
journey of `self-discovery' cannot be discounted. 
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Despite unease surrounding the editorial circumstances of its construction, the Diary 
provides a tangible opportunity to explore Gilman's assertion that stereotyped images 
of madness are internalized by those individuals labelled as mad. It is perhaps worth 
emphasising that Gilman is not using the term `internalized' to refer to an ideological 
fog that descends upon and envelops those labelled as `mad'. Rather, his thesis is that 
the artistic work of the mentally ill reveals `highly symbolic representations of 
internal states for which a structure of expression has been found in the representation 
of the idea of madness' (ibid: 99). In other words, images of madness produced by the 
mad convey traces of the dominant modes, of representing madness as difference. 
Stereotypes of madness as difference may shape the mad person's self-representation 
of their illness experience but they may also open up the possibility that they can 
either accept or deny the charge of being different. Sharon appears to embrace both 
possibilities simultaneously. Consider again, her explanation for making the Diary: 
`You probably don't think you'll crack up. The chances are you might then you'd be a nutter 
like me. A doctor will give you a label that sticks to you for the rest of your life. Mine was 
schizophrenic. Making this diary was hard sharing all my secrets but I really want you to see 
me, the person I am behind the label'. 
Sharon's use of the term `nutter' reveals her own internalized recognition of her 
difference from `non-nutters', a difference she conveys throughout her diary (For 
example, when she introduces friends from a mental health social club she says: `a lot 
of people don't want to know us so all us nutters stick together'). At the same time, by 
using the term `nutter' she reveals her willingness to engage with (though not 
necessarily contest) the popular terminology which marks her as `different'. It 
deliberately unsettles the fixity of the binary opposition `nutter/non-nutter' as a 
distinction between two opposites. By using it in an address to viewers, Sharon 
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intentionally enters into a dialogue about the labelling of `difference' from which she 
(as a `nutter') is usually excluded. This enables her to publicly affirm her `sameness' 
to other `non-nutters' whilst acknowledging her `difference' from them. This apparent 
contradiction suggests ambivalence towards her internalized sense of difference, 
which is encapsulated in her choice of `Mad, Bad Or Sad' as a sub-title for her Diary. 
That her schizophrenic label is something she both acknowledges and resists gives the 
viewer an insight into the difficulties of living with and within this powerful 
categorisation. 
Sharon's sense that she is visibly `different' is articulated at the end of a sequence in 
which she, Mickey and a friend dance in front of the camera. Their dancing is self- 
consciously hammed up as the camcorder focuses on each of them in turn (figs 7.9- 
7.11). Their behaviour is recognisably `normal' in the sense that it is a party scene and 
people very often exaggerate their `performance' when being filmed by a camcorder. 
At one level the sequence conveys the obvious "normality" of their fun in playing to 
an audience (both real and imagined). On another level however, it reveals something 
fundamental about Sharon's internalized sense of `abnormality'. Following her dance 
she collapses exhausted into a chair (fig. 7.12) and directly to-camera says, `The 
lunatics have taken over Stretford'. This comment reflects her self-acknowledgement 
that their behaviour can be seen as something other than strictly "normal" camcorder- 
related behaviour. This verbal `anchor' renders the meaning of what is shown (the 
dancing) in at least two distinct ways. 
Firstly, her comment is a deliberate pun on the widely used aphorism, `the lunatics 
have taken over the asylum'. This is something many viewers would immediately 
recognise as a broadly comical reference to the madcap humour/dancing often 
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generated by the presence of a camcorder at parties, weddings and other social events. 
At the same time, the comment appears to fix the behaviour exhibited by Sharon, 
Mickey and their friend in relation to her own internalized perception of what `mad' 
people look and act like. In other words, she articulates her sense of difference at the 
same time that "normal" camcorder-related behaviour is being engaged in. That the 
ambiguity is not resolved reflects not only the amateur status of the Video Diary 
format, but Sharon's ambivalence towards her own identity as `schizophrenic/not 
schizophrenic'. The absence of an authoritative interpretation of the sequence leaves 
the viewer with a sense of uncertainty about the status of the images as 
representations of `lunatic' behaviour. How viewers respond to this uncertainty of 
meaning depends on the fixity of their own internalized myths about the public (and 
private) behaviour of those labelled as 'schizophrenic'. 
Disguises: 'A Place of Safety' 
The public behaviour of a homeless `schizophrenic' forms a key part of Disguises' 
attempts to visualise the failure of Community Care. The behaviour in question is that 
of the series' undercover reporter, Adam Holloway, in his in-role journey to find a 
suitable place of safety in which to live in the community. The verisimiltude of his in- 
role behaviour is crucial to the success of his performance as a homeless 
`schizophrenic'. To authenticate his performance as homeless and mentally ill, 
Holloway first establishes that many homeless people do act `strangely' in public 
places and that this is a visible sign they are mentally ill and are not receiving proper 
medical help. Using footage obtained by his hidden camera, he presents the public 
behaviour of a number of apparently disturbed homeless people in Birmingham as 
icons of the failure of care in the community. His camera offers a series of brief 
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vignettes. His voice over commentary is minimal as the images are allowed to "speak 
for themselves": 
Certainly, as in any big city, there are people acting strangely on the streets. Some are clearly 
homeless. Are they getting medical help? Like this girl (fig. 7.13). Or this man (fig. 7.14) Or 
the man who endlessly plays on a pipe that fails to produce sound (fig. 7.15). 
These images of the homeless mentally ill provide an essential guarantor of the 
truthfulness of Holloway's own later public performance as a schizophrenic acting 
strangely in a London street. The girl in figure 7.13 appears to be behaving `strangely' 
by gesticulating wildly with her hands for no apparent reason, whilst the man in figure 
14 is seen exhibiting `strange' jerk-like movements of the body, hands and arms. The 
'strangeness' of the man in figure 7.15 lies in the fact that he `endlessly' fails to 
produce sound from his pipe and more particularly in his failure to recognise that he is 
never going to produce any sound from the pipe. The three images serve as a 
document of pathology, a visual topography of what mentally illness looks like in its 
natural, `raw', state beyond the cordon sanitaire of the asylum and the `medical help' 
within. Showing viewers visibly `strange' mentally ill type behaviour is a crucial part 
of A Place of Safety's' aim of giving them access to the `real'; in this case, the reality 
that community care policies are failing the people they are intended to serve. 
However, in the second part of `A Place of Safety' care in the community is shown to 
be failing more than just the mentally ill. 
Holloway arrives in London and acts out the role of a homeless schizophrenic. 
Following his failure to find accommodation he explains his decision to move to 
Hackney and impersonate a disturbed schizophrenic: 
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With three hundred per cent more schizophrenics in this borough than the national average, 
there should be help here (pause). I impersonate a schizophrenic shouting at his voices in the 
street (pause). Nothing happens. Are people used to this kind of thing here? 
Holloway's in-role plight is signified by the increasingly dramatic nature of his 
actions (Throughout the sequence tension enhancing music is used to heighten the 
sense of drama as the action unfolds). The visual track shows his attempts to attract 
public attention by firstly shouting at his voices in the street (fig 7.16), then lying 
down in the middle of the road (fig. 7.17) and finally, stripping off his clothes (fig. 
7.18) with the aim of being sectioned (i. e. forcibly detained) by the police under the 
Mental Health Act. The veracity of his in-role behaviour is guaranteed by the 
`realism' of his strange and potentially dangerous behaviour, a realism given 
authenticity by the earlier use of footage showing real homeless people acting 
`strangely' in Birmingham. Underpinning Holloway's performance is a presumption 
that without medical help schizophrenics will inevitably engage in unpredictable, 
bizarre and dangerous acts of `madness' (e. g. lying down in the middle of the road). 
This presumption reaches its climax in his impersonation of a schizophrenic whose 
behaviour eventually attracts the attention of the police (fig. 7.19). Holloway 
introduces the sequence thus: 
To attract attention and get help I begin taking my clothes off in the street. As a last resort I try 
to get the police to section me using their powers under the Mental Health Act. The police 
have powers to take a mentally ill person to a place of safety, either a police station or a 
hospital. 
Holloway's failure to get help from the police is certainly the most dramatic moment 
of `A Place of Safety' and perhaps justifies the programme's use of a disguised 
reporter impersonating a schizophrenic (though this is arguable). The police's 
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unsympathetic reaction to his in-role expression of fear about hearing `voices' (one 
officer sarcastically tells him to put his clothes back on and `go and hear your voices 
somewhere else' while another waves at him from close quarter and says `bye bye' in 
a childish voice) provides visual and verbal confirmation that care in the community 
does not work (at least in Hackney) and that the public cannot rely on police 
protection from disturbed schizophrenics. It is here that the failure of Community 
Care is rendered alarmingly visible in the image of a `mad' and potentially dangerous 
schizophrenic left to wander unsupervised. The policemen's actions introduce the 
programme's final scene as Holloway admits to-camera that his attempts to find a 
place of safety have been `patchy' and that he is now forced to join the ranks of 
homeless mentally ill people sleeping rough. However, the social implications of the 
policemen's actions are left to the viewers' own imagination. 
`A Place of Safety's' claim is that the closure of mental asylums leaves 
schizophrenics unsupervised in the community. De-institutionalization thus provides a 
catalyst for the programme's generation of anxiety about the public behaviour of 
schizophrenic people. It is the concern that they will eventually `turn' their madness 
on us and hurt us, which underpins the programme maker's decision to cast Holloway 
as an increasingly desperate and (by implication) increasingly dangerous 
schizophrenic. Whilst the danger posed by Holloway in-role is self-directed, the 
implication established by the wider thematic development of the programme is that it 
is only a matter of time before self-harm becomes transformed into harm to others. 
Thus, the main `finding' uncovered by Holloway is not that the mentally ill roam the 
streets unsupervised, but that they are allowed to do so despite their recognisably 
disturbed and disturbing behaviour. 
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Panorama: 'Whose Mind Is It Anyway? ' 
The notion that the mentally ill pose a threat to public safety forms a key element of 
Panorama's presentation of the debate about the use of Community Supervision 
Orders (CSOs) to control those who fail to take medication after discharge from 
hospital. `Whose Mind Is It Anyway' examines the controversy surrounding CSOs 
against a backdrop of concern about asylum closures and an apparent lack of 
community supervision of the mentally ill. The programme opens with the case-study 
of a woman who murdered her two children within weeks of being discharged from a 
mental hospital. It reveals that she was not receiving support from the hospital and 
was left to supervise the children alone. The story of the double murder sets the tone 
of the programme by constructing violent criminality as an inevitable consequence of 
asylum closures and lack of close community supervision of the mentally ill. The 
popular image of the `mad' as aggressive, out of control, and unable to control their 
actions, finds support in the programme's images of the mentally ill as criminal and 
potentially dangerous. Like Disguises, `Whose Mind Is It Anyway' generates anxiety 
about the public behaviour of mentally ill people no longer cared for in asylums. 
The programme provides a concrete illustration of potentially dangerous mentally ill 
people who would be affected by the CSO scheme: 
Only those regarded as a threat to themselves or others would have Orders imposed. The 
charity MIND estimates as many as four thousand sufferers could be affected. 
As the narrator's voice-over proceeds, the image track shows one of the apparently 
`four thousand sufferers' who represent a possible threat to self/others. We see a man 
playing pool (fig. 7.20), followed by a close up of his face (fig. 7.21) at the moment 
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the narrator says that CSOs would only be imposed on those regarded as a threat to 
`others'. The man's facial expression and dishevelled appearance are presented as 
keys to his identification as a possible threat to others. The image of the dangerous 
madman with dishevelled hair and tattered clothes is a long-standing icon of madness, 
which is fully exploited, in this particular shot. The notion that violent or dangerous 
mad people can be identified by their facial appearance has a long history in Western 
representations of madness, and according to Gilman (1988: 11) derives from `an 
anxiety tied to a perceived tenuousness of life'. By picturing those who are liable to 
harm us we are reassured that we can identify danger before it befalls us. In the 
context of Panorama's concern about the community supervision of schizophrenics, 
the idea that we can see who is dangerous has obvious appeal. The CSO scheme thus 
finds support in the programme's representation of the pool player as an identifiably 
dangerous mentally ill person. 
At the heart of Panorama's concern about community care is the apparent absence of 
a proper monitoring system to ensure that potentially dangerous mentally ill people 
take their medication (the corollary of which is that mentally ill people will not 
become dangerous if they take their medication). Underpinning the controversy 
around CSOs however, is the degree of force needed to successfully implement the 
scheme. According to Panorama, this entails balancing a mentally ill persons' civil 
liberty (to refuse medication) against the public's right to safety from those people 
who refuse to take medication and who then become dangerous. In order to explore 
this issue the programme makers mobilise evidence from a CSO scheme operating in 
the American city of Madison. The scheme is described by the presenter as offering 
`better care [than in Britain] combined with greater force'. In the process of 
presenting the `greater force' of Madison scheme the equation of mental illness with 
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danger is visualised in the form of Roger Tollerson. He is represented as exactly the 
type of schizophrenic whose potentially dangerous behaviour necessitates the use of 
force in order to protect the public. In Madison, we are informed, the implementation 
of force to control the mentally ill is the responsibility of specialist police officers. 
The sequence in question begins with the programme's presenter inside the car of one 
of the specialist officers as he takes an emergency call. To-camera, the presenter 
explains that a `mentally disturbed man has been seen brandishing a knife at a local 
restaurant' and that `if this man needs medication, as is highly likely, then come what 
may the police will see him put on treatment tonight whether voluntarily or by force'. 
We then see a shot of a police car (with siren sounding) moving at speed (fig. 7.22). 
In the next shot we see Tollerson in the back of a police car apparently talking to 
himself (fig. 7.23). The presenter describes the scene thus: 
A chronic schizophrenic has been arrested. It looks like Roger Tollerson has not been taking 
his medication. 
The myth that schizophrenics are likely to be dangerous is amplified by the dramatic 
image of the speeding police car and the loud flashing police siren, both of which 
signify immanent danger. A sense of disaster narrowly avoided is generated in the 
very next shot where we see a knife on the dashboard of a police car (fig. 7.24). At 
this moment Tollerson is transformed into a potentially homicidal schizophrenic 
whose unobservable violent intentions are rendered graphically observable in the 
image of the knife. The presenter's own (patronising) assessment of the situation ('It 
looks like Roger Tollerson has not been taking his medication') provides a simple 
cause and effect explanation in which Tollerson's dangerous behaviour is the result of 
a failure to take his medication. The clear implication is that without medication 
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schizophrenics are compelled to act in a potentially dangerous and criminal manner. 
The connection between schizophrenia and violent criminality is fully realised 
(indeed, resolved) in a final image where we see Tollerson in handcuffs being 
escorted back to hospital by the police (fig. 7.25). The use of this image to close the 
sequence conveys a strong sense of resolution: Tollerson is about to receive 
appropriate and deserving punishment for his dangerous and menacing public 
behaviour. For the programme's viewers however, the image of Tollerson being led 
away handcuffed puts in question the wisdom of current British mental health policy 
in which dangerous schizophrenic's are living amongst us unsupervised. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, TV images depicting schizophrenia as `difference' have been 
discussed. Such images confirm that schizophrenia is an identifiably different illness, 
for the most part because of the `strange' public and private behaviour of 
schizophrenics. Our discussion has not disputed their `difference'. Rather, it has 
sought to understand such images as part of a continuity of representation that has 
been enshrined in the public imagery of madness over centuries. Today's programme 
maker's (including the amateur Sharon) are, in some ways, simply reproducing 
traditional depictions. Nevertheless, televisual representations of schizophrenia carry 
a heavy burden for those who are assigned the role of being different. New 
opportunities for schizophrenics to participate in TV programmes about mental health 
issues -a clear dividend of Community Care policies - are tainted by enfolding the 
subject in a iconographic web that generally depicts how ill they are rather than how 
normal they are. Such depictions make it especially difficult for schizophrenic voices 
to obtain a fair and sympathetic hearing. If we want to improve the citizenship 
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prospects of those with a history of long-term mental illness then images suggesting 
that psychiatric disabilities persist, even after the patient has left the asylum, can 
easily undermine a speaker's claims to credibility. In short, they not only impoverish 
those speakers whose `schizophrenic' experiences are valuable in themselves, but the 
quality of public discourse as a whole. 
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Public Debate in Post-Modern Times 
The much publicised disagreement between Habermas and Lyotard on the condition 
of contemporary public discourse, outlined in Chapter One, set the scene for an 
exploration of the state of public debate in late capitalism. The intention then (as now) 
was not to produce a final adjudication between Habermas and Lyotard. Rather, the 
more modest aim has been to explore the implications of the debate that they initiated 
for analysing discursive practices within the major institution of the contemporary 
public sphere; broadcast television. 
Despite their fundamental difference on the question of what constitutes a "legitimate 
consensus", both Lyotard and Habermas alert communications scholars to the 
conditions for ensuring plurality in public debate, and it is against the political 
background of increasing vocal claims for greater plurality, that the analysis offered 
here has sought to understand television's performance as the pivot of the public 
sphere. 
However, the argument between Habermas and Lyotard about the proper constitution 
of a public model of rationality overshadows its relationship to individual rationality. 
Because they debate the question in overtly abstract and general terms, their argument 
does not easily account for shifting or contested notions of rationality (and 
irrationality) at the level of everyday social dialogue and how these affect in turn, the 
process of public debate. In the case of the mentally ill, their return to `the 
community' not only breaks the silence imposed on them within the asylum but 
focuses attention on the criteria by which they are given (or denied) a public voice. 
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Rationality, Responsibility and Personhood 
What the asylum system produced was not merely confinement for large numbers of 
people but a whole way of seeing and understanding irrationality at the individual 
level. Consequently, medical accounts of mental illness have given rise to powerful 
cultural narratives that have historically devalued the social and political competence 
of the person with `mental illness'. In practical terms this has meant the denial of 
mentally ill people's civil and political rights including, for example, the right to voice 
their refusal of psychiatric treatment or the right to express political preferences in the 
form of a vote. The legacy of mentally ill people's incarceration in asylums can thus 
be extended to include their exclusion from the wider political community. 
Whilst the 1983 Mental Health Act currently allows mentally ill people the legal right 
to refuse psychiatric treatment (up to the point at which they are judged a danger to 
self or to others) the present Labour Government has signalled that compulsory 
treatment for mentally ill people who refuse medication whilst in the community will 
soon be legally enforceable. At the same time moves allowing mentally ill people 
detained in hospital the right to vote are also gathering political momentum. Together, 
these contradictory developments signal uncertainty (perhaps even ambivalence) 
about the criteria for judging the mentally ill as irrational/rational people. 
Both these moves reflect doubts about what is meant by `irrationality' (for example, 
whether it is a permanent state). Indeed, the tension generated by the encounter 
between `rational society' and `irrational individuals', now relocated within that 
society, illustrates how far personhood remains vulnerable to moral judgements about 
`the responsible self. 
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It is this tension, I would submit, that governs our desire to fashion the mentally ill 
both as people like ourselves, equal members of our political community, whilst at the 
same time ensuring that their difference from `us' - their irrationality - is dealt with at 
the medico-legal (pharmacological) level. In short, if mentally ill people are to be 
given civil rights then we can and must expect certain responsibilities from them - at 
the very least, that they will act responsibly and take their medication. 
Despite the unresolved relationship between rationality and irrationality our 
understanding of mental illness are continually susceptible to historical and cultural 
representations that pivot on a categorical separation of the two spheres. On this point 
I am reminded of Gordon and Mark, the schizophrenics whom we encountered in 
Chapter Six. Their treatment by the Panorama production team illustrates the ease by 
which mentally ill people can be made to appear irrational and how this can prevent 
them from speaking on issues pertinent to their situation. Rationality is not indivisible 
but, as Gordon's and Mark's contributions to Panorama illustrate, it can appear so. 
The binary opposition between irrationality and rationality conveniently obscures how 
individuals may be irrational in some respects whilst maintaining a `rational self in 
others. This may be hard for `normal' society to accept but is something we must 
countenance if we are to overcome the limitations that this regimented opposition 
currently imposes on mentally ill people's encounters with non-mentally ill others. 
Once again, I am reminded of Gordon. 
In his encounter with the Panorama presenter, Margaret Gilmore, he articulates his 
recognition of the co-habitation of rationality/irrationality in the context of his `case 
management' by the psychiatric service: `You see', Gordon tells Gilmore, `the idea is 
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to let the undamaged parts of the brain come out and let them enjoy themselves like 
any normal person... '. My own interpretation is that living with the co-existence of 
irrationality/rationality is part and parcel of the human condition and that like Gordon, 
we have to acknowledge our own irrationality/rationality if we are to better 
understand and make allowance for those who appear different from us. 
Television and Public Debate 
Since John Reith's time, a swelling chorus of voices have criticised professional 
broadcasters for the ways in which they orchestrate public debate. Over decades this 
argument has come to centre around the opposition between paternalism and 
populism. Attempting to navigate this modem day Scyilla and Charybdis, programme 
makers have sought a safe passage between respect for expertise and celebrations of 
common sense and vernacular experience. 
But this familiar duality is over simple. It conceals a significant tension within 
populism, between programmes rooted in common sense as a prevailing consensus 
("what everybody knows") - which we can call `commercial populism' since its 
heartland is in the commercial TV sector where assembling mass audiences for 
advertisers is an economic imperative, and programmes that seek to give a platform to 
voices marginalized by both expert and mainstream vernacular discourses, which we 
might call `radical populism'. 
It has been widely noted that television has become much more populist in recent 
years and whilst some programme forms (e. g. Video Diaries) can be fairly seen as 
instances of 'radical populism', the majority are examples of commercial populism. 
Of these the new talk shows are the most ubiquitous. 
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Populist Television and the Representation of Mental Illness 
The representation of mental illness and of mental patients provides a particularly 
productive case study of the organisation of public debate within the changing 
television system. There are two reasons why this is so. 
Firstly, mental patients are the archetypal `other' - representatives par excellence of 
the non-normal. They therefore offer a major instance of commercial populist 
television's mobilisation of an imagined `us', united by common sense. 
Secondly, by virtue of their "condition" they are likely to judged as incompetent to 
speak on their own behalf. They therefore pose problems for radical populism's 
ambition to give a voice to the marginal and to deconstruct prevailing stereotypes of 
the `other'. 
Representing Mental Illness in an Era of Community Care 
Contemporary representations of mental illness however, must be placed in the 
context of the major shift, from asylum treatment to care in the community. This 
massive reorganisation of the mental health system has several implications for the 
politics of televisual representation. 
Firstly, the demise of the asylum means that the mentally ill are now more available to 
programme makers compared with the problems of gaining access to secure 
institutions. 
Secondly, at the same time, the dominant image of the mad as "bad", "unpredictable" 
and "dangerous to know" has both reinforced their `otherness' and grounded it in 
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everyday experience. An increasing number of people now encounter the mentally ill 
- on the streets, in shopping centres, and other public spaces. 
Thirdly, by distributing care for the mentally ill over a wide range of groups - from 
community nurses to family members and other voluntary carers - the shift to 
community care has decentred medicine and psychiatry as the sole source of relevant 
expertise and opened up uncertainty and debate on what sorts of 
expertise's/experiences mandate authoritative comment on the causes and treatment of 
mental illness. 
Mental Illness, Radical Populism and Public Knowledge 
These developments also have implications for television's future mediation of mental 
health issues. The greater accessibility of current and former mental patients, as well 
as the continuing uncertainty as to what counts as `authoritative comment' on mental 
illness and community care, generate difficult questions about the `desired' balance 
between testimonial and analysis in public debate about mental health. The principle 
issue concerns the kind of analysis one believes television should provide in order to 
underwrite citizens' rights of access to knowledge about mental health/illness. 
The problem can be expressed as a question: what sort of knowledge about mental 
illness and mental patients do we get from radical populism? Certainly, self- 
representation formats like Video Diaries can provide valuable ethnographic insights 
into the world of the mentally ill `other'. Indeed, the `thick descriptions' offered by 
`schizophrenic' subjects like Sharon may well help to build bridges between the 
worlds of reason (rationality) and emotion (irrationality) in ways not presently 
available in either the talk show or the classical documentary format. 
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But we are also faced with another question: what exactly does Video Diaries 
contribute to the stock of public knowledge? The diarist's individual point of view 
certainly. But what it does not (indeed cannot) offer is any coherent analysis of the 
myriad factors which may have contributed to the formation of the diarists' 
subjectivity and point of view or of the factors which might, in another context, 
oppose or challenge it. 
Herein lies the rub. It is precisely because self-representational formats only generate 
analysis/interpretation at the situational level that we must be sceptical of any claim 
that they offer a `corrective' balance to whatever `distortions' one believes constricts 
a comprehensive explanation or understanding of the issues raised by individual 
diarists. But what sort of `corrections' or `balances' would be necessary if television 
is to further public understanding of the social world? 
For example, what sort of abstracted knowledge/expertise(s) should radical populism 
draw upon? Whilst Video Diaries' achievement in giving voice to `others' is 
important, it also easy to overlook how access-led initiatives fail to make sense of the 
social formations and cultural patterns that constitute the contexts and resources out of 
which `inner experiences' are constructed. The danger, quite simply, is that an anti- 
analytic aesthetic may come to dominate public television leaving personal biography 
and local `truths' as the only interventions on offer. 
To avoid being dragged too far into the pit of relativism it is my contention that 
television's future mediation of mental health/illness needs to `balance' the fleeting 
and superficial `pull' of lived experience (however interesting it may be) with 
analyses of the historical situations and the cultural formations from within which 
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those grounded voices are speaking. This means valuing (and also continually 
evaluating) the role of discourses of expertise within public culture without either 
automatically prioritising or undermining them. 
My hope is that forms of representation will be developed which combine 
ethnographic depth with critical social enquiry. Exactly what these future 
representational forms will `look' and `sound' like will depend on the experiments 
that programme makers undertake, but communications and media scholars can help 
to develop an informed audience for new initiatives in this area by taking more 
seriously than hitherto the analysis of televisual form as an object of study. 
Situating the Analysis of Television Form 
The analysis of the ways television programmes represent particular areas of social 
life has generally been sharply divided between quantitative and qualitative 
approaches. Content analyses provide a broad brush picture of the structure of 
attention - what/who is featured, how much prominence they receive, and what is 
ignored or marginalized. In contrast, studies drawing on qualitative methods - from 
semiotics to discourse analysis - tend to deal in detail with particular cases, but pay 
little attention to the problems of sampling. 
The approach used here - though it has involved a close reading of particular 
programmes - is based on a clear sampling strategy. It is not a random sample but a 
quota sample. It sampled all actuality programmes dealing with mental illness 
broadcast on the four main terrestrial channels over a designated period (2 years) with 
the intention of locating ideal typical instances of the major forms of current 
programming. 
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Analysing Television Form 
Form is an essential (but still relatively neglected) mechanism for organising both 
representations and public debate. The way any actuality programme - from a `classic' 
current affairs format to a talk show - organises discourse about a particular domain 
(in this case mental illness) can be looked at along three dimensions: 
1. visibility - what is shown and who gets to speak? what range of viewpoints is 
brought into play? is the programme relatively open in the sense of mobilising a range 
of discourses or is it closed around a particular position? 
2. legitimacy - whose views are given credibility and respect and whose are denied it? 
3. hierarchy - whose views are given precedence in the sense of setting the agenda 
and prescribing the terms of debate? 
The analysis offered here has attempted to show how these processes work in relation 
to the major forms of contemporary actuality programming. 
In terms of visibility, our analysis suggests that programmes can be usefully seen as 
mechanisms for organising who will speak in public and how. In the `classic' format 
of Disguises, the journalist Holloway speaks for and on behalf of schizophrenics 
living in the community. Although he encounters real schizophrenics they are only 
allowed to speak within the expositional structure of the programme; as victims of a 
system that (literally) does not care. In contrast, representatives of the psychiatric 
profession speak for themselves within the programme. 
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In Kilroy, the talk show format gives schizophrenic participants an opportunity to 
address the audience directly about their voice hearing experiences. However, the 
programme's closure around a medical model of mental illness means that they are 
not invited to speak about their experiences of care in the community. This is the 
prerogative of other, non-mentally ill, speakers deemed by the host to be more 
qualified on this particular topic. 
In contrast, Video Diaries provides a radical mechanism for side-stepping professional 
control over the means of public representation. The diary format gives Sharon an 
unmediated opportunity to represent herself publicly, and in her own words. Not only 
is she able to reject the illness label, she is able is to provide her own interpretation of 
why she became mentally disturbed without sacrificing her credibility in the process. 
In terms of legitimacy, we have argued that the form that a programme takes 
determines whose views are given credibility. In Panorama for example, the 
representation of Gordon and Mark as incoherent/incompetent denies them an 
`informed' viewpoint on compulsory treatment whereas the views of other, non- 
mentally ill, speakers are treated as more credible and worthy of respect. The 
programme's thematic orientation, in favour of the `irrationality of non-compliance', 
militates against the possibility that either man can make a credible contribution to the 
programme's debate on this issue. 
In contrast, the testimony of voice hearers in the science programme, Horizon, is 
treated with considerably greater sympathy and respect. The programme's 
argumentative thrust allows voice hearers to speak about their experiences from 
within their own life-world perspective, and to interpret these experiences as 
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meaningful. However, the programme's makers are careful to support the space given 
to voice hearer's' testimonies with strong statements from suitably qualified mental 
health professionals declaring that they consider it therapeutically appropriate to listen 
to what they have to say. 
In terms of hierarchy, Broken Poets for example, privileges the voices of the 
psychiatric profession over other mental health professionals working in the field of 
black mental illness. Although the programme's agenda is orchestrated around a 
socially grounded model of black mental illness, a traditional hierarchy of expertise is 
mobilised with medical knowledge placed firmly at the top. 
Black and Blue deploys the testimony of a black counsellor to set the agenda for its 
critique of orthodox Western psychiatry. Within the thematic context of the 
programme, her testimony signals community care as an appropriate arena for treating 
black mental illness. However, affirmation for its core argument again comes from 
within the ranks of the psychiatric profession. By giving a black psychiatrist the final 
word in the programme, the `Afro-centric' model she proposes re-asserts the 
psychiatric profession as the ultimate font of knowledge about black mental illness. 
Suggestions for Further Research 
This present research was intended as an extended exploration of television's 
performance as the pivot of the contemporary public sphere. It suggests three lessons 
for further work. 
Firstly, it demonstrates that sampling by programme forms, and looking in detail at 
the way particular forms organise representation and discourse, provides a fruitful 
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base for systematic qualitative research which could and should be applied to other 
areas. 
Ideally, such probes would include fictional genres alongside actuality programming, 
though time and resources did not allow the research to be extended in this way in the 
current work. 
Secondly, the findings confirm the important role of visual images as well as 
discourses within orchestrated social debate. 
It shows that arguments and debate are rooted not only in the juxtaposition between 
the voice track and the image track but in sequences of images themselves. In the 
context of a television system increasingly reliant upon `imaged actuality' this has 
important consequences for the quality of public debate and argument. 
Thirdly, the results pose important questions for future television policy. If the 
television system moved more forcefully towards commercial populism (as many 
observers are predicting) what would be lost in terms of its capacity to: 
(a) offer representations of situations and issues that did justice to their complexity 
and which decentred or questioned prevailing stereotypes. 
(b) mount a public debate on the causes of current situations and the possible 
responses to them, that did justice to the contestable nature of claims - including those 
made by designated experts. 
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Our findings suggest that democracy is best served by the maintenance of a range of 
contrasting programme forms that provide a variety of ways of organising public 
representation and debate. 
Final Reflections 
As I write these final remarks, the mental health field is again experiencing 
(sometimes bitter) winds of change. Various interest groups are gathering in order to 
stake out their vision of the future of mental health policy and practice in Britain. 
Between incarceration in `secure' environments and the relative `freedom' of 
community care, a repertoire of professional and lay discourses are engaging in a 
struggle to be seen and heard. The quality of this debate however, lies largely in the 
hands of professional broadcasters whose task it is to marshal this debate on our 
behalf. In an era of growing commodification of public debate and representation it is 
by no means certain that they will succeed. But as this thesis shows, ensuring the 
television system provides the widest possible range of programme forms is one of the 
best hopes we have for enhancing and maintaining democratic public life. 
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